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rThe problem of old age protection has 'been engaging the
attention of the economists, the social reformers and the Govern-
t
ment for some time* It has assumed importance due to the our ' 
developing economy and the consequent industrialisation of the 
country. This thesis makes a study of the "Administrative and 
Cost Implications of Paying Retirement and Old-Age Pensions to 
Industrial Workers of U.P." It has been suggested that the 
qualifying age for retirement be fixed at 60 and 55 years for 
male and female workers respectively. However, a retirement 
test may also be applied to work a^  a corrective force in the 
employment situation.
Of the available sources of old age protection to the 
industrial workers of U.P. viz., the Employees' Provident Fund, 
the employer-instituted schemes of providents funds, private 
savings, mutual insurance and life insurance, none provides an 
adequate protection to them. The U.P. Government has taken a 
lead in paying Old Age Pensions to the destitutes since 
1st. December, 1957; but the amount of pensions is hardly 
justifiable as an adequate provision for old age* The Study 
Group have also recommended the conversion of the Employees' 
Provident Fund ^cheme into one of pensions* They maintain 
status quo in financial matters. I differ with them and am of 
the opinion that the scheme should be financed by the insured, 
their employers and the Government so that none escapes the 
responsibility of providing against old age.
ABSTRACT
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The proportionate share of the parties should bear a rte- 
ference to their respective capacities to pay and share in 
administration of the scheme. Thus, the insured, their empljysri 
the Central and the State Governments should pay in the rat|lo 
of 42 : 48 : 6 : 4 respectively. Payment of contributions bjr 1 
the employees would, however, reduce their wages and may affect
their standard of living. But, the retiral benefits would r^ com-
t
pence this loss in their retired life. Again, the employers' 
contributions are likely to raise the cost of production by 
some 1.5^ . But, since they can pass it on to the labourers ^d 
consumers of their product, this burden will not be felt he4v^  
by them. The States' share being nominal, it would also not
burden materially the general tax-payer. The fear that the e|i-
Iforcement of this scheme would hamper foreign trade and check 
capital formation is merely notional. As a matter of fact, t lis 
will lead to investment of enormous pension funds which woul|l 
provide emplosrment to labour and speed up the process of 
capital formation. \
It is pointed out that the scheme may be financed on j 
accumulation basis and the fund may be invested in governmenlj 
securities for their comparative safety, even yield and liquijdit 
The proceeds of such issues should be applied by the Governmetnt 
for the promotion of social and economic utility projects. PoirI
the sound administration of the fund, a three-tier Central 
Board of Investment is recommended.
To reduce the cost of management, it is recommended tha)| 
the existing machinery of the Employees' State Insurance and I 
the Employees' Provident Fund schemes be integrated and a new 
pattern of organisation be evolved in which the government 
representation be reduced and brought in parity with the repr i 
sentation of the insured and their employers.
Thus, the aim of this thesis has all along been to focui^ s
!
attention on the administrative and cost problems and to make 
suggestions for the feasibility of the scheme.
lb.3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish to place on record the deep sense of my gratitude 
to Mr. Q.H. rarooquee, MJ^ ,, B. Com, (Luck.), M.Sc. (Econ.) 
London, my Stupervisor and the Head of the Department of Commerce, 
in M.U, Aligarh. In spite of a heavy draft on his time due to 
his engagements in varied fields of academic and administrative 
matters in the University, he spared no efforts and grudged no 
time in granting me free approach to him and helping me with 
his able guidance, constructive criticism and encouragement at 
all phases of this work. Words fail to express befitting 
thanks to him without whose help, this work could not have been 
completed in the present form.
I am also beholden to Dr. F.H. Rizvi, M.A,., M.Com., Ph. D* 
(Edinburgh), for his valuable suggestions, to Mr. M. Hafizuddin 
for his kindness to grant me a facile access to available 
material in the Commerce Seminar Library, and to other members 
of the staff of the Coimiierce Department who were helpful to me 
in many ways. Thanks are also due to Messrs. S.M. Zaki,
A.Q. Siddiqui and H.H. Zuberi, Research Scholsirs in this 
Department who read through the typescript.
I must also acknowledge my indebtedness to Mr. R.K. Agrawal, 
Regional Director, Employees* State Insurance Corporation,
Kanpur, for his help during my stay in Kanpur in connection 
with this work, I am indebted to all organisations, labour 
leaders and institutions, industrial executives and managers 
who assisted me in any way. I must specially refer to the
help rendered by the Labour Officer, the Murarjee Goculdas 
Spinning and Weaving Mill Company Liniited, Bombay in collecting 
information on the basis of questionnaire prepared by me*
I am also indebted to various authors, organisations and 
editors of periodicals on whose works I have fr#ely drawn to 
bring this thesis in the present form,
I am thankful to the University Grants Commission for 
awarding me Scholarship which enabled me to concentrate on 
this work without financial worries*
At this stage, I must emphasise that the opinions expressed 
in this thesis are my own and no one else shares them with me*
My thanks are due to Mr. Nafis Ahmad Tirmizi who prepared 
the typescript of this thesis at short notice*
Department of Commerce Najmul Hasan.
Aligarh Muslim University,
Aligarh.
September, I960
ABBREVIATIONS USED
E.S*I.(C) OR ESI(C) « Employees* State Insurance (Corporation)
L.I«C or Lie = Life Insurance Corporation
E.P.P, or EPF = Employees* Provident Fund
O.A.S.I. or OAIS s Old Age, Invalidity and Survivorship
Pension-cum-Gratuity Scheme recommended by 
the Study Group on Social Security*
OISDI = United States’ Old Age, Survivor^ip and Disability 
Insurance,
OASITF = United States* Old Age, Survivorship Trust Fund,
UTP * United States' Unemployment Trust Fund
EXPLANATIONS
One Crore is equal to 10,000,000 
One lakh is equal to 100,000
CONTEHTS
Introduction i - viil
PART ONE
CHAPTER I. The Problem of Old A ^  and Retire­
ment Dependency 1*1 - 45
II* 01^ A ^  Protection in U.P* 11*1 - 51
PART TWO
III* Financial Implications of 01d<^A^
Security 111*1 - 38
IV* Cost. Implications of Old-A^
Security IV *1 - 34
V* Cost of Old-Age Insurance :
It-® Nature and Effects V*1 - 36
PART THREE
VI* Financial System and Investment
of Pension Funds VI. 1 - 37
VII* Administrative Implications of
Pension Scheme VII*1 - 42
APPENDIX a  -  c
BIBLIOGRAPHY 1-12
INTRODUCTION
For a speedy industrial development and a sustained 
prosperity of the nation, a contented laboUr force is but 
essential. Industrial workers are vulnerable to erosions 
in their standards of living on account of stoppage of income 
during the periods of economic and biological contingencies. 
Thus, the problem of social security which aims to provide 
protection in such circumstances has assumed growing importance 
in India in general and in U.P. in particular for their 
attempt to•industrialise themselves for a 'take-off from 
the situation they are in.*
In India, provision of social security has been made 
through the Workmen's Compensation, Maternity Benefits and 
Employees' State Insurance schemes. But, there is no 
scheme to provide old-age security to industrial workers.
In the present work, I have made a study of the "Administrative 
and Cost Implications of Paying Retirement and Old-Age 
Pensions to Industrial Workers of U.?," Although specific 
references may be found in the text to the problems of U.P., 
the observations can be applied to Indian conditions as a 
whole. There are two reasons for it. Firstly, economic 
conditions of U.P. do not materially differ from the parent 
country. Thus, any scheme of old age security should be 
launched on all-India basis in order to avoid regional 
disparities and to achieve xmiformity in standards of 
labour welfare. Secondly., coverage of retirement contingency
on regional basis is ineq.uital5le as its incidence does not 
differ from region to region as the incidence of sickness or 
from industry to industry as the incidence of industrial 
accidents. Nevertheless, U.P. has been pioneer in insti­
tuting a scheme of Old Age Pensions with effect from 
December 1, 1957, thus, leading all other Indian States. 
Moreover, the Employees’ State Insurance scheme was first 
launched at only two centres in India, of which Kanpur (U.P.) 
was one. In this way, though the coverage of retirement and 
old-age contingencies on all-India basis is more justified, 
a consideration of the case of industrial workers of U.P. 
may be given a precedence.
The main hurdles in the way of old-age security schemes 
are encountered on account of their cost and administrative 
implications. Cost is the most important problem of old-age 
security because no such scheme can be implemented without 
planning for securing adequate finances for its running. 
Hence, before introducing the scheme, a study of its cost 
implications becomes imperative. Similarly, administrative 
problems deserve careful consideration because it is a sound 
administration on which the success of the programme depends. 
Therefore, both these problems have been studied at some 
length in order to gauge the feasibility of the scheme*
Old-age pensions are generally payable to population at 
large, and are mostly non-contributory. Retirement pensions,
( i i )
on the other hand, are contributory and are paid to working 
class after their retirement from service. I have favoured 
the payment of contributory retirement pensions to indus­
trial workers not because they are the vocal section of 
population as compared to agricultural or domestic labour 
but because old-age protection of the entire population 
would be impracticable and prohibitory at this stage both 
from the points of view of cost and administration.
To illuminate the problem of old age and retirement 
dependency, the present work can be divided into three 
parts. Fart One comprises of Chapters I and II and deals 
with the background of the problem* Part Two consists of 
Chapters III, IV and V. This deals with the cost implica­
tions of the scheme of old-age insurance. Part Three in 
which have been grouped together Chapters VI and VII, 
studies the administrative implications and requirements of 
the scheme.
Chapter I discusses the problem of old age and retirement 
dendepen'cy and points out the justification of its protection to 
the industrial workers with special reference to economic 
conditions in U.P. It has been maintained that old age pro­
tection is economically justifiable on the ground of un­
employability of the aged and its undesirability on efficiency 
considerations. The object of old age protection is the 
provision of three R's: rest, requirements and respect to
( iii )
( iv )
industrial workers. For q.ualification to the benefit of 
pensions, a retirement age at 60 years for males and 55 years 
for females has been suggested. However, retiral benefits 
may be made subject to some retirement test vftiich may be 
applied as a corrective force to the employment situation*
Chapter II describes the available buttresses of old 
age protection to the industrial workers of U.P. Such 
sources are contributory, non-contributory and Government- 
sponsored. Thus, the Employees* Provident Fund Scheme , 
and employers’ contributory schemes, private savings, mutual 
insurance, and life insurance have all come in for discussion.
It has been noted that none of these sources provides adequately 
for old age. The U.P. Old Age Pensions paid to destitutes 
of the State since 1st December, 1957, are also inadequate to 
be called a genuine measure of old age protection. The 
recommendations of the Study Group on Social Security set up 
by the Central Ministry of Labour and Employment, have also 
been examined insofar as they relate to finance and adminis­
trative aspects of the scheme.
Chapter III is devoted to the discussion of the financial 
implications of the old age insurance scheme. This is partly 
fact-oriented incsofar as a survey of the international 
practices has been made on this problem. Accordingly, it 
has come to light that the socialistic countries lay the 
responsibility of finance on the employers alone and the U.S.A.
( V )
scheme req.uires employer-employee participation in the 
finances. In Great Britain the scheme of retirement pensions 
has heen financed by the contributions from the insured, 
their employers if any and the State* I have recommended 
the same pattern of finance in order to make all the 
parties feel the responsibility of protecting against old- 
age contingency*
In Chapter IV, the factors influencing the proportionate 
share of contributions of the financial parties have been 
discussed. Keeping in view the benefits accruing from the 
scheme, the share in administration and the respective 
capacities to pay, I have suggested that the proportionate 
contributions to the scheme should be by the insured,
48^ by the employers, 6^ by the Central Government and 
by the U.P. Government*
In Chapter V, the nature and effects of such contribu­
tions on the financing parties have been assessed. The 
employees* share of contributions, it has been studied, 
may affect their standard of living insofar as they reduce 
their take-home wages. But the continuity of consumption 
due to receipt of benefits in retired life would compensate 
this loss. For employers, the payroll contributions will 
constitute an element of cost of production which may be 
shifted backwards to labourers in the form of reduced wages 
or forwards to the consumers in the form of an increase in
( Vi )
the prices of the product concerned. Shifting of employers* 
contributions to labourers is prohibited by law both under 
the Employees' State Insurance and the Employees’ Provident 
Fund schemes. Total employers' contributions, therefore, 
will be shared between the consumers and the producers in 
the proportion of the elasticities of supply and demand for 
the product. It has been estimated that the maximum burden 
on the consumers may be about 1.5^ of the cost of production 
of the article. Therefore, the effect of such contributions 
on the internal or external market will not be so heavy as 
to justify the postponement of old-age insurance scheme on 
this ground. Effects on the level of employment and capital 
formation will also be negligible, if at all. They will 
further be nullified by the impetus to capital formation 
provided by the investment of pension funds and the creation 
of employment as a consequence.
Chapter VI deals with the financial management of the 
scheme. A discussion on the financial systems, actuarial 
or budgetary, investing authority, and the investment policy 
form the main theae of the Chapter. An -actuarial system of 
finance with a Central Board of Investment of Funds and the 
application of the Fund resources for the promotion of 
economic and social utility projects are the main recommenda­
tions made in this Chapter.
( vii )
Chapter VII makes an analysis of the administrative 
problems of the scheme. I have recommended the retention of 
the existing arrangement of three-tier participation in 
policy matters for accommodating the view-points of the 
financing parties. However, the share of the government in 
administration of the scheme may be reduced to bring it in 
parity with that of the employers and the insured. In 
executive and technical matters the services of the experts 
may be secured. The existing organisation for the registra­
tion of employers and employees, collection of contributions 
and inspection of performance may be left unchanged. For 
handling the increased volume of recurring payments under a 
pension scheme, additional local offices shall be required 
to be opened. However, the conversion of the Employees’ 
Provident Fund scheme into one of pensions and its integra­
tion with the Employees’ State Insurance Scheme will secure 
economy in cost and staff requirements and it will save much 
botheration to the insured and their employers both*
In the end, I may confess that the present work is 
more problem-oriented than programme-oriented as India has 
no rich traditions of social insurance. This study provides, 
mainly, a basis for discussion. At present there is no scheme 
for the protection of the aged on all-India basis, though 
the Government of U.P. have a scheme for the assistance of
( viii )
destitutes. Other States are also contemplating to set up 
such programmes. I shall feel amply rewarded if the present 
work stimulates further thinking on this subject*
PART ONE
THE BACKGROUND OP THE PROBLEM
THE PROBLEM OF OLD AGE AND RETIREMENT DEPENDENCY
There are three stages in man's life viz., childhood, 
old age and morbidity when he requires help from others.
Two of them are biologically inescapable and the third may 
be avoided. Dependence in childhood is universal and it is 
biologically inescapable too. A suckling baby cannot but 
be dependent on 6thers in every respect for his life and live­
lihood. The next inevitable stage in which dependence is 
common is old age. Nevertheless, old-age dependency is circum­
stantial. An old man becomes dependent on others when he has 
no private savings. His source of income generally dries 
up in old age. Moreover, he cannot engage himself in gainful 
activities in order to earn his subsistence. The third case 
in which man becomes dependent on others is that of morbidity 
due to disease or accident. He becomes dependent because he 
cannot work in such conditions and often has no income to 
support him. The international Labour Organisation agrees 
with this analysis when it expresses the view that " In the
life of a man there are two stages of dependency ----------
childhood and old age -----  and in the intervening years of
adult life there are likely to occur spells during which he 
cannot earn his living. ""I Schemes of family allowances or
CHAPTER I
1. International Labour Organisation: Approaches to Social 
Security, Geneva, 1 9 '2 , v 'i.
exemptions from income tax allowed for children are the mea­
sures taken for protecting and subsidising childhood, while 
adult-life dependency in case of sickness and accidents is 
sought to be provided for by means of instituting the schemes 
of sickness and workmen’s compensation insurance. \ . The 
present Chapter attempts to discuss the problem of old age 
and retirement dependency in its different aspects. To eluci­
date the subject-mattej;:^  ^it has been divided into seven sec­
tions, The first section deals with the meaning of old age ani 
retirement age and throws light on the difference between the 
two concepts* The second section relates the factors deter­
mining old age; the third, the characteristics of the aged 
population; the fourth, the need for protecting and providing 
against old age; and the fifth tries to fix a suitable age 
of retirement for the industrial workers. The sixth section 
discusses the problem of retirement test and the last one 
deals with the economic and social justifications for the 
provision against old age.
1. The Meaning of Old Age and Retirement Age
As it is well known, old age is the last stage of 
animal life preceding death provided that its full natu­
ral span is enjoyed. Thus, it is sin inevitable biological 
phenomenon. But it is a bit problematical to construct a 
suitable definition of old age. It is not necessarily that 
age which reduces man to a defunct skeleton with no mental or
( 1.2 )
( 1 . 3  )
physical capability at all. That may be a case of extreme 
senility. The ILO opines, " The economist regards by old age 
as that age at which worker should retire from employment 
because he is no longer fit to play a normal and effective 
part in the productive process. Thus, by old age is meant 
that age at which a general decay in physical faculties is 
noticseable* Man may be still fit to engage himself in work 
but the criterion to determine such age is that the human 
strength begins to fall swiftly. However, it is not necessary 
that the decadence in mental and pliysical faculties coincide 
in all cases. The fall in physical faculties and vigour and 
strength generally goes ahead of the fall in the mental capa­
bilities. Sometimes mind comes to maturity when body goes to 
decay. A time-lag between the two is not uncommon to occur.
Old age, as an economic and biological contingency, has 
been defined as "the age at which unemployment, if it occurs,
is likely to be permanent, and invalidity becomes so prevalent
2that to prove it in individual cases is superfluous." Accord­
ing to this definition, old age is a special case of invali­
dity ——  it is an invalidity attendent upon a certain age.
In another sense, it may be taken to be a special case of
1. Op.Cit., p 53*
2. ILO: Social Security; Principles. (Montreal, 1944), p 8*
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un^nployment —  it is that unemployment which attends a 
certain age and which is liable to be permanent* The victim 
of such unemployment cannot hope to be re-employed in ordinary 
course of things. Truly speaking, old age resembles invalidity 
in the technique of its protection ( or vice versa); and it 
resembles unemployment in its consequence. The cost of pro­
tection of old age being permanent, bears a similitude to the 
cost of protecting the invalids. The amount of benefits £ . 
peid in both the cases are more or less the same, although 
invalidity is costlier from the victim's point of view as it 
requires extra expenditure for meeting medical and nursing 
requirements. But this difference seems to melt away when the 
other side of the problem is considered, viz., that the invali­
dity generally attends old age and old age itself is a special 
case of invalidity.
Retirement age is that age when man is generally supposed 
to have become unfit to play an effective and normal role in 
the productive process. He should retire from active partici­
pation in production at this age. Retirement in most cases 
is necessitated by old age though it may be necessary for other 
reasons too. Nevertheless, on a minute scrutiny, there is 
found to exist a fine difference between the concept of retire­
ment and old age. The former is a legal convention while the 
latter is a biological truth. At a given age a man may not 
feel 'old' though he may be required to retire because he has
( 1 . 5  )
attained the so-called retirement age . Moreover, retirement 
age is discussed only in context of wording population while 
old age is a universal concept appljcafcle to all sections of 
population equally. A man who never followed a calling (and 
such cases are not unknown) cannot take leave of it* Only 
those who work retire. A crippled man, for example, or a 
bom invalid can never ( or ever ) attain retirement age 
although he becomes old only on the approach of a certain age. 
Besides, a retired worker may take up to some other whole - 
or part-time jobd, but a really old man woilld not. Thus, old 
age is a different concept from retirement age to that extent. 
Nevertheless, retirement must bear a close conformity to old 
age. Any differential between the two on either sides repre­
sents a loss to the community. If the workers are compelled 
to retire before their effective productivity declines below 
the cost of their engaging, the community will suffer a loss 
of potential output to that extent. Moreover, the larger the 
proportion of population above retirement age, the greater 
will be the loss to potential output* But the extent of 
potential economic loss should not be overempahsised. So 
long as the community is unable to ensure employment to all 
its eligible job-seekers, there is little to be gained by 
continuation of old workers in their position and adding to 
the existing plethora of the unemployed. Nevertheless, this 
contention does not negate the economic fact that a differential
( 1.6 )
between retirement and old age and the usefulness of the 
workers as an agent of production represents a potential loss 
to national output. But its usefulness is doubtless evident 
from the fact that the attitude of old age security system to 
encourage retirement early or late will have to be governed 
by changes in the general employment situation. In times 
of heavy unemployment, the potential loss through early re­
tirement will be more than offset by the gain-received through 
the employment of the waiting young labour force. This may 
be secured by lightening the retirement test as discussed 
later on. However, it is a fact that in normal conditions, 
retirement age bears a significant reference to old age. This, 
therefore, leads to a discussion of the factors determining 
old age*
2. Factors Determine Old Age
Old age may set in due to various causes. The most 
important factors governing old age are age, sex, climate, 
standard of living and the occupation of the population.
Age is,no doubt, the most effective cause of old age. 
Sooner or later, man must submit to the aging process. It may­
be delayed, but it may, in no case, be postsponed indefinitely. 
Various researches have been carried on to trace out the fact 
of aging and different symptoms of aging at different ages 
have been established, thou^ it has not been possible to trace 
out the cause of the causes themselves. At least, no remedy 
has been suggested to give a final defeat to aging process
( 1 * 7 )
and to postpone it permanently. An interesting account of
aging process has been given by the Family Doctor, a medical
weekly of London. According to this, some known faets of aging
are as follows;^
At ten loss of elasticity in the eyes begins.
At twenty hearing begins to fall off.
At forty the ability to see dimly-lit objects starts 
to diminish.
At fifty there is a decline in the final degrees of 
taste.
At sixty the sense of smell begins to lose acuteness.
At seventy a man loses two-thirds of his powers.
Wounds take five times as long to heal at sixty as they 
do in a ten year old child. At that age bones become brittle 
and muscles lose sixteen per cent of their strength.
This is a general statement of the agin g process. In old age, 
the following symptoms are particularly visible;^
(a) Gradual tissue disiccation,
(b) Gradual retardation of all division, capacity for cell 
growth and tissue repair.
(c) Gradual retardation of the rate of tissue oxidating or 
metabolic rate, that is, lowering of the speed of living.
(d) Degeneration of cellular atrophy, increased pigmentation 
of the cell and fatty infiltration.
(e) Gradual decrease in tissue elasticity and degenerative 
Changes in the elastic connective tissues of the body.
1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, January 50, 1959. *
2. \ / ^  L i .  Gm-»s£ ■ Gldtij
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(f) Decreased speed, strength and endurance of neuromuscular 
reactions.
(g) Progressive degeneration and atrophy of the nervous 
system, impairment of vision, of hearing, of attention, of 
memory and of mental endurance,
(h) Gradual impairment of the mechanism which maintains a 
fairly constant internal environment for the tissues ( a 
process known as homeostasis)^
However, these are normal cases of study. The facts 
differ from case to case according to the degree of influence 
ezerted by other factors enumerated above. But one thing is 
obvious — —  aging process is inescapable. At certain age man 
must lose resistence to -fragility and his capacity to take 
up physical or mental work must exhaust ultimately.
Sex is smother determining factor of old age. Women 
attain both the age of maturity and old age earlier than men 
though expectation of life for woman may be hi^er at certain 
ages. Moreover, the older women survive longer than older men; 
but women in the child-bearing age are more exposed to morta­
lity. Those women who give birth to a greater number of 
children experience weakness earlier than those who give birth 
to fewer children. This is a fact which has been recognised 
in certain countries. Thus, in the USSR, women who have given 
birth to five or more children are eligible for old age 
pensions at the age of fifty provided that they are not
entitled to it earlier by virtue of the type of their former 
occupation. This is a happy co-ordination of the population 
policy to a biological fact.
In Indian States including U.P., social conventions 
for example, low prestige of women in society, lower the 
vitality of womenfolk. Males on the contrary, are less ex­
posed to death and morbidity between fifteen and forty years 
of their ages than females'*due, perhaps, to high maternal 
mortality.
Climate is yet another factor which influences longevity. 
In cool regions, longevity is higher than in torrid zones.
The table on the following page shows the expectation of 
life at birth in different countries. It reveals that the 
expectation of life at feirth in Australia, New Zealand, Japan, 
the U. K., the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., Canada and France is 
above sixty years for males and females both. Incidentally, 
countries having higher expectation of life at birth fall in 
temperate regions by,and large. Temperature and climate in 
these regions is more suited to the growth of mankind.
Australia is, however, an exception where life expectancy is 
high notwithstanding the fact that this Island Continent lies 
between 12®and 38° Southern latitudes, and is a hot arid land
( 1.9 )
1, Vide; Census of India. 1951, Vol. II, U.P., Part I-B, 
Subsidiary Tables, Table 1.12, p 26.
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Table 1.1
EXPECTATION OF LIFE AT BIRTH IN SELECTED
COUNTRIES
Countries Years of Expectation of Life at Birth
Estimate Paoales Both sexes *
(around 1955)
Australia^ 1946-48 66.10 70.10 -
New Zealand^ 1934-38 65.46 68.45 -
India 1951-52 32.45 31.66 35
Japan 1953 61.90 65.70 -
U.K. 1953 67.30 72.44 71
USA 1954 67.40 73.60 -
USSR® 1958 63.00 69.00 67
8ibada 1950-52 66 .30 70.83 -
France® 1952-56 65.04 71.15 68
V/est Germany 67
SOURCE: V/oytinsky,W.S*, and Woytinshy, E.S. World Population
and Production. Trends and Outlook* (Twentieth 
Century Fund, New York, 1953)> table 92, p 182.
a Agarwala,A.N. Insurance in India ( a thesis submitted for 
the degree of D.Litt. of Allahabad University, 1957), 
table 124, p 242.
b
0
*
Encyclopaedia Britannica.
Europe Year Book, 1958.
Eastern Economist, January 1, I960.
** Z f r 0ffA*<S* What Soviet Workers Get Besides Wages.
(Information Department, The USSREI*assy, New Delhi, 1959), 
P 29.
The countries that have a comparatively lower expectation of 
life viz. India, "exico and U.A.R, are those that lie bet­
ween 30° latitudes. It may be inferred, therefore, that 
climate has some influence on the longevity of man which de­
termines the approach of old age*
Standard of living also influences longevity* Countries 
that enjoy a higher per capita income have comparatively 
higher expectation of life. This may be because higher incomes 
allow consumption of medical services and other comforts of 
life which reduce the hazards of life and increase longevity. 
The table on the next page exhibits the national per capita 
incomes. According to this table, Australia, New Zealand, U.K., 
U.S.A., U.S.S.R., Canada and France are high-per-capita-income 
countries* Other countries such as India, China and Burma are 
low-per-capita-income countries. Per capita income in U.F» 
is even lower than the Indian figure. Referring back to table 
1.1, it may be recalled that these countries were found to 
score comparatively lov/er longevity than the high-per-capita- 
income countries. Thus, there seems to exist a fair degree 
of positive correlation between per capita income, life expec­
tancy and climate. Although this may be false, but the excep­
tions being too few, the contention seems to stand that longer 
expectation of life ( and a later experiencing of old age ) 
is positively correlated to higher incomes ( and a better 
standard of life )• This statement may be distorted due to the 
intervention of two factors: In case of extreme inequality of
( 1.11  )
* !That is to say, countries having per capita incomes of
0. 200 or more*
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Table 1.2
PER CAPITA INCOME OF SELECTED COUNTRIES
Countries
Per capita 
income 
US dollars
Indian
rupees
Australia 950 4,523.80
Canada 1,310 6,238.10
Ceylon 110 523.80
Burma 50 238.10a
China(Mainland) - 285.00
France 740 3,523.80
India(1956-57) 289.10
Japan 180 857.10
New Zealand 1,000 4,761.90
U.A.R. 120 571.40
U.K. 780 3,714.30
U.S.A. 1,870 8,904.80
U.B<ISLfrS-59)
West Germany 510 2,428.60
SOURCE: Eastern Economist, January 1, 1960, extracted from
the State of Pood and Agriculture, P*A.O.., 1959*
a Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East (Hongkong, 1957), 
1956, p 86. converted at 2.35 Yuan= $ 1
Figures have been converted at $ 21 = Rs 100/-
incomes, the standard of living of the majority of population 
will remain low despite high per capita income. Then, stan­
dard of living does not depend on income alone. The manner 
of spending and consumption habits of the consumers play a 
significant role in detemining the standard of life. But, 
in actual practice, it stands to reason that a higher income 
secures a better standard of living to people. Extreme in­
equality of income is an exception and higher income is 
generally spent by all normal beings in such a way that they 
achieve greater satisfaction. Thus, the hypothesis that the 
population that enjoys better standard of living experiences 
old age later is tenably proved.
As regards the objective factors that govern old age, 
viz. climate, standard of living and occupation, India has 
her own characteristics. She lies in the hot temperate zSne 
which accelerates the approach of old age* Per capita income 
being low, people enjoy a low standard of living; this again, 
helps old age to set in earlier. Life expectancy, standard 
of living and climate of U.P. are not materially different to 
llh.ose of India so that the factors affecting old age can be 
said to enfold the case of U.P, too. Therefore, the observa­
tions regarding Indian population apply to the residents of 
U.P. with equal force. At this stage, it will be interesting 
to discuss the characteristics of the aged population.
3* Gharacterist^ ics of Aged Population
The proportion of juveniles is 38,3^ in India. The 
following table presents such proportions in other countries:
(1.13)
PROPORTION OF THE
( 1.14 )
Table 1.3
YOUNG AND THE AGED POPULATION 
COUNTRIES (around 1950)
IN WORLD
Countries Juveniles 0-14 years
Aged 65 years or over 
Males Females
Australia 27.06 9.26 12.27
Canada 30.34 7.78 7.74
Ceylon 37.15 3.53 3.35
Prance 21.72 9.68 13.77
India 38.30 3.43 3.75
( U. P. 37.43 3.36 4.06
Japan 35.42 4.26 5.60
New Zealand (exclu 
ding Maories).
i-
28.39 7.42 8.65
U.K. . : ■ 22.48 8.91 9.58
U.S.A. 27.15 7.75 8.53
U.S.S.R. 36.20 — —
SOURCE: The Aging of Populations and Its Economic and
Social Impli^tions« ( U.N., 1936 ) table 7« p 17
* Census of India, Paper No. 3, 1954 p 36.
The table exhibits that the proportion of the juveniles in 
Indian and tf.P. population rank highest, whereas that of the 
aged almost lowest. However, an improvement in the environ­
mental hygiene and a fall in birth rates combined with a re­
duction in improvident maternity, is likely to improve the 
proportion of the elderly population. This tendency is 
already visible in Uttar Pradesh. Thus, the proportion of 
the persons aged 55 years or more increased from 7 .4^
( l.iS )
in 1941 to 8.A% in 1951.
Socio-economic condition of the aged population in India 
also needs an examination here. The occupation may also have 
a relation to the economic insecurity to which the aged popu­
lation may be exposed. As larger proportion of the aged is 
likely to take leave of their callings or engage in other 
occupations, its study becomes even more imperative in order 
to estimate the comparative urgency of the protection required. 
The proportion of working population in India has been esti­
mated at 39.6 per cent of overall numbers. Of this, the 
proportion of active men is 54.3 per cent and that of females
to
is 23.7 per cent. According]a ten-per-cent sample survey of 
the census da$a in Uttar Pradesh in 1951, it was found that 
out of a sample population of 5,31,390, persons, 5,01,736 
were agriculturists and the rest 19,644 depended on Twn-agri- 
cultural professions in earning their livelihood. Therefore, 
a very small portion of the population can be said to depend 
on non-agricultural callings. During 1951, total working 
force in agricultural classes formed 27.7 per cent of the 
total population of the country. Production other than 
cultivation of land claimed 4.6 per cent; commerce, 2,0%; 
transport 0Jo%; and other services 4.7^ « This made up a 
total of 11.9^ (including earning dependents) of the country’s 
population engaged in non-agricultural occupations. If non- 
agricultural employees are to be covered first, it will be a 
manageable population in the years of its inception.
Qeath rate among the aged has also its implications on of
the costjsocial security for the aged. A high death rate 
economises the cost and a low rate burdens it. The following
( 1 . 1 6  )
table smnmarises the registered deaths in U.P*
Table I.f
REGISTERED MORTALITY PER MILLS BY AGE GROUP IN U.P.
(1921-1951)
Age group
1931
Males Females
1941
Males Fonales
..............m r
Males Females
40-49 20.4 17.2 13.9 11.6 9.5 8.4
50-59 36.9 31.4 24.0 19.3 15.3 13.8
60-and over 101.6 88.2 68.5 58.9 40.1 31.2
All ages 27.3 26.6 19.9 18.7 14.0 12.7
SOURCE: Census of India, 1951» Vol* II, U.P*, Part I-B,
Subsidiary tables, table 1.12, p 26.
According to the above table, mortality rate for males 
and females in 1951 has been 15.3 and 13.8 per mille respectively 
in the age group 50-59* It is higher than the average of 
mortality for all ages and individual age groups. The supera­
nnuated group above sixty years.v/as subject to still higher 
mortality rate. The above table may be compared with the 
rate of mortality in other countries. The trend of specific- 
age mortality in the U.S.A. has been as ]^ resented in the 
Table No. 1.5 on the next page. This table shows that the 
death rates are higher in the United States than in U.P* for 
the age-groups above 55 years. Therefore, the aged of the 
U.P* are likely to draw benefits for a longer duration than 
in the United States. This contention is based on the assump­
tion that the rates applicable to general population also 
apply to industrial population proposed to be covered. This
Table 1,5
DEATH RATES AMONG THE AGED 55 AHD OVER IN U.S.A.
( 1 . 17 )
Death rate per Mille 
Age group ~ 1 9 4 0 1 9 5 0
55-64 22.3 19.1
65-74 48.0 40.7
75-84 112.0 93.3
85 and over 235.7 202.0
SOURCE: Steiner and Dorfinan, Op.Cit, table 2 ,2 , p 8.
may not be so. But in the absence of data available for 
industrial population separately, general statistics have 
been assumed to apply to this sector also. However, the 
Study Group on Social Security have adopted mortality in 
employment two years lower t^hati whafc are shown in 1S51 census 
tables and the mortality of pensioners as reduced by five 
years*^
Expectation of life is another important factor which 
influences cost estimates. It is essential to note that for 
the purpose of the present study, expectation of life of the 
aged group is of particular interest rather than that of the 
entire population as such. The following table presents the 
expectation of life for the aged at 60 years for different 
countries.
1. Vide the Report, Annexure I, Actuarial Bases.
( I ^ W ‘ )
Table 1.6
EXPECTATION OF LIPE AT 60 YEARS IN DIFFERENT
COUNTRIES
Countries.
Years of 
Estimate Males Females
India
Canada
Japan
U.K.
U.S.A.
Mexico
1951-52
1950-52
1953
1953
1954 
1940
10.1
16.7
15.0
15.3 
18.2
13.4
11.3 
18.6 
17.7 
18.6
19.4
13.5
SOURCE: Agarwala, A.N., Op.Cit., table 124, p 242.
This table shows that a higher expectation of life for women 
at 60 was commonly estimated in all the countries examined 
in the table. However, India has the lowest expectation of 
life in this age-group which is only 10*1 years for males 
and 11.3 years for females. With a low expectation of life 
and high mortality rate at 60 years of age, chances of sur­
vival of the aged are few. This influences the cost of an 
old age pension insurance scheme. It determines the duration 
of their benefit period. Taking both these elements into 
consideration, it may be concluded that in India, they will 
put the cost at a lower proportion than in other countries 
with a higher expectation of life and a lower mortality rate 
of the aged population.
Since the conditions in U.P. do not differ materially, 
this conclusion may be applied to U.P. also v/ith the same 
validity. Aged population constitutes a class of dependents 
in the general population because old age is essentially an 
age of dependency unless past savings have been adequately 
accumulated or some public protection is provided to them.
It will not outdo if the need for protecting the aged is dis­
cussed at this stage.
4. A Need for the Protection of the Aged
The demographic situation of the entire world, and India 
being no exception, is changing precipitately so that all 
forecasts of population growth have been found to err on the 
wrong side. Particularly since 1950 the rate of growth of the 
world population has surpassed all previous records. Indian 
population is increasing at an average of ^ , ’5% per annum, 
while the population of U.P. is rising at a decennial rate of 
10.8^ * Cultivable area being fixed ultimately and the rate of 
growth beinf? almost certain ( unless some extra-ordinary 
positive checks distort its course ), it is evident that the 
pressure on agriculture would increase in future so that an 
alternative livelihood shall be essential to find out for it. 
Industrial employment is likely to be the first choice. In 
the industrial sector, based on wage-for-work principle^  sur­
vival is assured to the fittest only. Therefore, the old mem­
bers of the society will need social security if anything 
approaching social welfare is sought to be achieved. For 
ailing members, there are Sickness Insurance and other laws
( 1.19 )
and Maternity Benefit legislations^ but the old remain un­
protected. A plan for the protection of the aged in the near 
future will be an imperative need.
Moreover, modem civilisation is the civilisation of 
cities which are increasing with the pace of industrialisation. 
This development has had far-reaching effects on living condi­
tions both in cities and rural areas. The entire world has 
experienced a shift towards urbanisation. Consequently, per­
centage of population living in urban communities has increased 
during the recent past. The following table presents the 
percentage of population of different countries living in 
urban areas:
Table 1.7
PERCENTAGE OP URBAN POPULATION IN SELECTED
COUNTRIES
( 1^20 )
Countries Percentage of Urban population
Australia 69
Canada 62
Ceylon 15
China (Mainland) 27
Prance 56
India 17
Japan (1948)* 51
New Zealand 61
Pakistan 11
UAR 30
U.K. 80
U.S.A. 64
U.S.S.R. (1959) 48
West Genaany 71
SOURCE: Eastern Economist,Jan. 1,1960,taken from the State of 
Food and Agriculture, 1959(PAO).
* Woytinsky and Voytinsky,Op.Cit.,Table 31,p 116.
** The Soviet Union, 1959 to 1965(New Delhi), table 21, p 16.
The above table shows that the Indian population bears a rural 
character; but the proportion of urban population in the 
countries of the Western civilization has been over 50 per 
cent* Indian population, on the other hand, is only 17 per 
cent (17*3^ to be more siccurate) urban according to 1951 
census data. This shows that a great scope for urbanisation 
still lies ahead in our country. The trend of urbanisation 
is showing an upward tendency. The following table shows 
that urban population is showing a progressive trend since 
long time. Compared with the figures of the preceding years,
Table I.g
( I.2 I )
PROPORTION OF URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION IN INDIA
AND IN U.P.
Years
I N 
Urban
D I A 
Rural
U T T A R P R A D E S H *  
Urban Rural
1921 11.4 88.6 12.8 87.2
1931 12.1 87.9 26.1 73.9
1941 13.9 86.1 22.9 77.1
1951 17.3 82.7 N.A* N.A.
SOURCE: India, 1958, p 25*
* Indian Census, Subsidiary Tables, Part I-B, Uttar 
Pradesh, p 47.
it becomes clear that the trend of urban population is rising. 
Urban population consists of people permanently settled in 
urban localities. As such^  it is not a synonym to industrial 
population. With an increase in population, urbanisation is 
likely to increase in future. As the pressure of population
on agriculture will increase more people v/ill tend to migrate 
to cities in search of employment. Urban population, unlike 
the rural population, depends mainly on non-agricultural 
occupations. Agriculture provides a modicum of income through­
out the year for the whole life. Thus, it provides an unfailing 
though inadequate buttress against all income insecurities. 
Non-agricultural professions provide counted income for counted 
number of days. Due to individualistic way of life in urban 
communities, aged persons have little value in their economic 
system. Again, cost of living and housing problems in urban 
areas do not permit the maintenance of the aged. It has been 
rightly observed that " Even independently of direct condi­
tions and employment, modern industrial civilisation aggravates 
the economic problem of old age by urbanisation..... Indus­
trial Revolution has transferred rapidljr increasing proportion 
of population into wage earners and the economic difficulties 
which confront the aged are inherent in the very nature of 
wage system,"^  A rapid industrialisation is the cherished 
goal of the present Indian economic policy. In U.P. too, 
the possibilities of industrial expansion are still great and 
the factory employment is likely to increase in future. In 
addition,a permanent industrial population is emerging in 
many towns with a permanent abode in industrial centres and 
with factory employment as the primary source of its living. 
Such population has no village nexus, so that it lives and 
endures life in industrial towns at all times. It has nothing
1.Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, Vol. XI, p 454.
( 1.22 )
*like agricultural holdings to fall back upon. Factory 
employment is the major governing factor in the emergence 
of a committed industrial population:. And as Prof. Radhakamal 
Mukherjee remarks; " Gradually a permanent labour force is 
developing in i^y centres in India, and it is essential to 
make some provision against old age for the workers, who 
at the beginning of their industrial career might have some 
agricultural holdings to fall back upon, but now have lost 
these.
In a mechanised system of production, the aged worker 
loses his adjustability to new techniques of production. 
Moreover, unlike in rural areas, every thing, board, lodge 
and maintenance require purchasing power in urban localities. 
Therefore, an industrial society must provide social security ' 
to its aged members if public prosperity is to be brouj^ Kt 
about in an atmosphere of industrial peace.
The earnings of the factory workers also low. Ac­
cording to the findings of the Study Group on Social Security 
the average wages of unskilled employees in the age-group 
45 years and over is Rs, 90 p.m. Operatives get slightly more 
than Ri 5 a day. These two classes taken together constitute •
( 1.25 )
* Cf. C# A. Myers, Industrial Relations in India (Asia Pub­
lishing House, Bombay, 1958) p. 65. He opines that ” We 
can say that a committed industrial labour force has deve­
loped when workers no longer look on their industrial em­
ployment as temporary, when they understand and accept the 
requirements of working as a part of a group in factory or 
®ther industrial enterprise, and when they find in the in­
dustrial environment a more adequate fulfilment of personal 
satisfactions than they enjoyed in the village or rural societj^ i
1, Indian Working Class, ( Hind Kitabs, Bombay, 1951)» P 347
91.3 per cent of all workers*,The average for all workers 
gives a daily wage of Rs» 5. Daily average is about Ra» 4.50 
according to the Employees Provident Fund data. The average 
annual earnings of factory employees in U.P. was Rs, 967
f ■
which yields an even lower daily average.^ Thus, it is 
clear that possibility of any savings out of such meagre 
earnings is very remote*
The condition of workers looks mor§ pitiable when seen 
in the light of high cost of living in industrial cities.
The working class consumer price index numbers in Kanpur 
based on 1939 prices were 371 in 1955 but rose to 424 in the 
next year which registered a rise of 53 p6ints over the 
previous year figures. Labour Bureau consumer price index 
numbers for working class based on 1949 prices were 120 in 
October and November 1959. It may be noted here that prices 
were high in India during 1949. This is proved by the fact 
the index numbers of consumer prices for Kanpur during 1949 
based on 1939 prices were 478 while those for 1948 and 1950 
were 471 aid 431 respectively. This shows that the cost of 
living in industrial towns is high and the workers cannot 
afford to cut down their consumption in monetary terms in 
order to effect a modest saving*
Family budget enquiries of industrial workers reveal 
that the majority of th§ members of the family are non­
earning dependents. The following is a summary given for 
the selected industrial centres, h^is is helpful for
( 1.24 )
1. Indian Labour Year Book, 1955-56, (Ministry of Labour, 
Government of India), table IV, p 473.
( 1.25 )
a visual study:
Table 1.9
COMPOSITIOH OF FAMILIES OF INDUSTRIAL WORKERS AT SELECTED
CENTRES m IJSTDIA
No.of Average number of workers per familyventres Budgets
Studied* Earners Dependents Dependentsstring 
away from 
family.
Total 
number- 
of per­
sons per 
fa&ily.
I* West Bengal
1.Calcutta. 2,707 1.43 2.66 0.87 4.96
2.Howrah & 
Bally. 1,435 1.63 3.20 0.80 5.63
3. Kharagpur 222 1.57 4.05* 1.00 6.62
[I* Bombay
1. Ahmedabad 1,820 1.56 2.77 0.48 4.81
2. Bombay 2,030 1.53 2.43 0.69 4.65
3. Jalgaon 338 1.66 3.92 0.07 5.65
4. Sholapur 778 1.85 3.54 0.14 5.53
[II. Bihar
1. Jamshedpur 691 1.33 3.09 2.94 6.36
2* Jharia 999 2.02 1.60 1.75 5.37
SODRCEj Indian Labour Year Book,' 1947-48, pp 159-60.
According to this table, average industrial worker's 
family consists of about five members. In some cases six- 
member-family units are also recorded* In Jamshedpur and 
Kharagpur even more than six memberiper family were found* 
In every case studied in the above table, the number of
dependents is, on an average, twice the number of self- 
supporting earners. Although the results of such family budget 
enquiries are not available for the industrial workers of 
U.P., the same family pattern may be assumed in this case too 
as the results resemble the general livelihood pattern of the 
Indian population. It is, thus, clear that the burden of de­
pendents on the industrial workers is onerous in view of the 
lowness of his earnings. This again narrows down any margin 
for savings. It is almost non-existent in average cases. The 
industrial workers are exposed to economic contingencies more 
often than the agricultural population. Hence, it is impera­
tive to consider their case for the provision of old age se­
curity first.
From the national view-point, industrial sector contri­
butes sizeable proportion of India's national income which is
I
derived from agriculture, mining, manufacturing and hand- 
trades, commerce, transport and communications and other ser­
vices. Proportionate contribution of these profession-groups 
reflects their comparative importance for the national economy. 
Proportionate share of industrial sector is more than the 
share of industrial population in the total population. Its 
contribution is on the increase too. Estimates of national 
income show that the proportion contributed by the agricultu­
ral sector to the national income of India is decling and 
consequently the importance of the non-agricultural sector 
is increasing. The follov/ing table testifies this fact:
( 1,26 )
( 1 - t J )
Table 1.1P
HATIOHAL INCOME OF INDIA AT CURRENT PRICES 
(PERCENTAGES)
Years
S O U R C E S  O F  A C C R U A L
Agriculture, Mining, Conmerce, Other Less Total 
Animal Hus- Manufac- Transport servi- earned 
bandry and turing & & Communi-ces. income 
other anci-- small en- cations* remitted
llary indus- terprises. abroad,
tries.
1950-51 51.3 16.1 17.7 15.1 0.2 100.0
1951-52 50.0 17.0 18.2 15.7 0.9 100.0
1952-53 49.0 17.3 18.1 15.7 0.1 100.0
1953-54 50.7 16.9 17.2 15.2 0.1 100.0
1954-55 45.3 18.7 18.8 17.2 - 100.0
1955-56 45.4 18.5 18.8 17.3 - 100.0
1956-57 49.8 17.3 16.9 15.9 0.1 100.0
1957-58 46.9 18.4 - 17.8 16.9 - 100.0
1958-59 (P.)- 50.0 17.0 16.8 16.2 - 100.0
SOURCE;
P.
Estimates of National Income, March, 1958, (CSO„ 
Central Cabinet, Government of India,)and Eastern 
Economist March 4, 1960, Budget No.(New Delhi), 
Vol. miV, No. 10, p 549.
Preliminary.
According to this table, the share of agricultural sector* 
was 51.3 per cent of national income in 1950-51 at current 
prices. It fell in later years so much so that it was only
45.3 per cent in 1954-55. It improved later on and rea<died 
46.9 per cent in 1957-58; but during 1958-59, estimates show
( l a s  )
that the share of agricultural sector in the national income 
of the country was 50*0 per cent* This is, thus, clear that 
1950-51 level was never reached again. In this way, the 
non-agricultural sector always contributed more than a half 
of total income and its share increased from year to year.
The share of mining and manufacturing which sustains only 
about one per cent of population constituted about 16.1 per 
cent of national income (at current prices). This share 
increased to 17.0 per cent in 1951-52 and to 17.3 per cent in 
1952-53. In the following year, however, it fell to 16.9% 
but this fall was temporary. During 1954-55, this industry 
contributed 18.7 per cent. Again, this share fell to 18.5/5 
during 1955-56 and to 17.3% the next year* But the share 
increased again to 18*4% during 1957-58 and fell to 17.0 per 
cent during 1958-59. However, it was above the 1951 propor­
tion throughout* This proves the future potentiality of this 
sector to contribute increasing proportion to national income. 
This also shows that the share of agricultural sector shall 
decline in future and the share of manufactories and other 
non-agricultural occupations will improve. Therefore, the 
importance of non-agricultural sector in the national economy 
is understandable. If we have to secure from this sector 
increasing income in future, we shall have to build it from
*
the base. An unsecure industrial population may not be expec­
ted to give its best for the development of the country. 
Position of the older members in an industrial society is 
vulnerable to many contingencies and insecurities. It will 
be a right step to provide social security to the aged at least
I 1 . 2 9  )
first for the industrial sector, if not for other sectors 
simultaneously«
5* Old A^e and Retirement A/ge in India
The aforesaid faotors are in play in India too and they 
influence the setting in of old age in their own way.
Expectation of life in India cannot be favourably compared 
to that of other countries. The census actuary of India 
estimated it on the basis of 1951 data at 32.45 years for 
males and 31.66 years for females, , The latest estimates show 
that the present expectation of life for the Indian population 
has increased to 35 years for general population. (See table 
1.1 ante)* The last official estimate was that of 1941 made 
on the basis of 1931 population data and was put at 26.91 and 
26.56 years for males and females respectively. No official 
estimate was, however, made on the 1941 census records.
Prof. Kingsley Davis has estimated the expectation of life 
in India at 32.09 years for males and 31.37 years for females 
but the difference between this estimate and that of the Census 
Actuary is insignificant. These figures, nevertheless, bettay 
poor physical conditions prevailing in India. Althou^ the 
figures show a rising trend in the life expectancy of Indian 
population, yet there is no denying the fact that figures 
reveal a very low expectation of life. The possible reasons 
of this are the high rate of infant mortality in India, low 
standard of living and consequently poor nutrition available 
to the majority of the population and inadequacy of the provi­
sions of preventive and curative medical services. Nevertheless, 
a low expectation of life need not necessarily mean that the
natural span of life of the Indian population is short# It is 
more so due to high rate of infantile mortality in India* Butj 
however, it may be inferred that the health conditions in India 
do not permit an advanced age for retirement*
India lies between eight and thirty-seven degrees of #  
north latitude and between 68® and 98® of eastern longitudes* 
The climate of the country is essentially monsoon-tropical*
This description is valid notwithstanding the local variations 
of climate due to her considerable expanse^ Climatic effect 
on the efficiency of the working population has been a uni­
versal experience. In torrid zones, people cannot work long 
hours, nor can they work at an advanced age* Occupationally, 
India is predominantly an agricultural country* About 70^ 
of her population derives livelihood directly from agriculture* 
Combined with social practices that prevail in U.P., paternal 
deference is duly witnessed particularly in agricultural 
sector* In the patriarchal family \^ich is the comnon type 
in India, the authority of the old man extends to the entire 
economic unit. The father retains the functions of guidance 
and planning and even after his share in the direct work has 
been reduced , he remains the head of the family. Hence, the 
problem of the aged among the farm population is less acute 
than in urban and industrial sections of population*
Retirement age established in different countries of the 
world shows clear appreciation to these considerations* It 
is an advanced age in temperate regions aid where economies 
are enjoying higher per-capita incomej it is lower in hot coun­
tries* The following table presents the age of retirement in
( 1.30 )
selected countries.
Table I.1t 
RETIREMENT AGE IN SELECTED COUNTRIES
( 1.51' )
Countries Males Females
Australia 65 69
Canada 70 65
China (Mainland) 60 -
Prance 60 55
Greece 65 60
India® 55 -
Mexico 65 -
New Zealand 60 55
Sweden 67 —
U.A.R. 65 -
U.K. 65 60
U.S.A. 65 62
U.S.S.R. 60 5^ .
SOURCE: International Survey of Social Security, (]
Geneva, 1950).
a ibr Government Baployees only.
According to this table, the frequency of retirement 
at 65 years is the highest, being 6, v;hile 60has the next 
highest, 4 ( both for males)? 55# 67 and 70 have only one 
frequency each* The table also shows that retirement of
( ).
women takes place at an earlier age generally by five years.
As has been aptly remarked, " This differentiation is based
on the assumption that women are generally incapacitated for
regular work at an earlier age than men, although in many
1 2countries their average expectation of life is higher." 
Incidently, the countries having higher retirement age, for 
example, Canada, Iftiited Kingdom, U.S.A., Australia etc. are 
those that lie in cold temperate zones or cold regions. They 
also enjoy higher per capita incomes and (consequently higher 
standards of life), and in these countries expectation of 
life at birth is generally above sixty.
Type of occupation, as discussed in a preceding section 
has also a bearing on the age of retirement. Thus, some 
countries concede for unhealthy and strenuous work. In the 
U.S.S.R.., for example, retirement is permissible at fifty for 
men and 45 for women employed on underground jobs, in coal 
mining industry, and in some fiwips in the iron and steel indus­
try etc. (Women are no longer employed on such jobs, but any 
previous work of this type is taken into consideration wMle 
fixing the pension.) In Czechoslovakia, miners, underground 
workers and aviation workers are permitted to retire at 55, 
although the normal age of retirement is 60 years in these 
countries.
In India, retirement age is enforceable in case of 
government employees only. In Industrial concerns there is
1. Vide table Ho. 1.1 ante.
2. ILO: International Survey of Social Security, Op.Cit.,
p.50
no standardised practice. Retirement of workers is generally 
at will and they are allowed to postpone retirement as long 
as they wish in ordinary business conditions. Prof* Adarkar
recommends a retirement age of 60 years for men and 55 years
1 2 for women. * Dr. A.N.Agarwala^ also seconds him.. The Govern­
ment of Uttar Pradesh have instituted a scheme of Old Age 
Pensions since December, 1957* According to this scheme, 
pension is payable to those aged 70 or over. This age is in 
keeping with the international practice of fixing a hi^er 
age for old age assistance. But for ordinary retirement, this 
age cannot be endorsed. In the first place, this is very 
advanced age for efficiency considerations of the working 
force. Secondly, on economic grounds too this age is undesir­
able. Climatic and occupational considerations also do not 
support this age. Moreover, from the point of view of employ­
ment situation too seventy years is not a suitable age for 
retirement. Recently, the Bombay Industrial Court has expressed 
the view that ” For sometime to come the age of retirement 
will have to be on the higher side.” The decision of the court 
ran as follows; "An operative/employee shall retire from 
service on attaining the age of 60 years, but a male operative/ 
employee shall be retained in servicej[upto the age of 63 years, 
provided that when the retrenchment becomes necessary, an 
operative/employee who has completed the age of 60 may be 
retired in preference to younger men."^ The Study Group on
1. Adarkar,B.P. Social Security, in Planning for Labour 
(ed. Labour Forum, New Delhi, 1947)*
2. Insurance in India. Op.Cit., p 791.
3. Indian Labour Gazette (Simla), April, 1959, p 814*
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Social Security set up by the Ministry of Labour, Government 
of India, also fatrours 60 years as the retirement age for men 
and 55 years for women. From the climatic point of view, 
age of retirement should be lower in India than in other coun- 
tries. Then, industrial occupation(more physical vigour. Life 
expectancy also favours a lower age of retirement. Then, 
general employment conditions require that less efficient 
aged should yield place for young men. In my opinion, these 
considerations justify 60 years as age of retirement for males 
and 55 years for females, ^ince the ultimate aim of old age se­
curity should be to extend it to the whole population, the same 
ages may be preferred for industrial workers of U.P. tooo 
6. Test of Retirement
Retirement is the cessation of active life, .But it is 
nearly impossible for a man to retire completely® He cannot 
live without working. Prof. Donald Webb reports the experiment 
with college students. They were offered $ 20 a day for doing 
literally nothing ( of course, they could get up for their 
meals and for attending to theiir bodily needs )« Few could
endure this condition for more than three days. The uppermost
2record was for six days. This indicates that complete in­
activity is against human nature. Therefore, complete cessa­
tion of active life is impossible for even a retired man.
What is therefore, required is that some test may be evolved 
to find out if an; employee has actually retired or not«
1. Op. Cit., para 75(a).
2. Billimoria, R.P., Some Factors Affecting Absenteeism.
Indian Labour Gazette, Loc. Cit., April 1959, p 779.
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This test may he earnings or employment test. In fact both 
these tests are interrelated. An employed person earns and 
an earner must be employed. Therefore, earnings test seems a 
better one. However, total absence of earnings as a test of 
fetirement will be a stiff condition to fulfil. A limit should 
be laid down to periodical earnings beyond which the person 
may be supposed to have not retired prima facie and below 
which he may be allowed to earn any amount. In other countries, 
the retirement test has been profitably utilized. In the 
United States, annual earnings upto a maximim of 1200 dollars 
have been exCempt; beyond this, old age pensions are cut down 
at the rate of a month’s benefit for every one hundred dollars 
earned.
The retirement test has an advantage of reducing the 
financial cost of retirement pensions. Moreover, the test may 
be variated with reference to economic activity. If labour is 
scarce, the retirement test may be liberalised and the earn­
ings may be allowed to be exempt in spite of the receipt of 
pension. On the other hand, if labour is experiencing a slack 
season, the test may be tightened to make room for new en­
trants in the labour force. The practice of giving retirement- 
postponment credit has been followed in some countries such 
as Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Hungary, Iceland, 
Israel, Italy, the United Kingdom, the United States and 
YugoslaviaJ In addition to the argument of increased produc­
tion, resulting from the employment of older people in times 
of scarcity of labour, a reference can also be made to the
( 1 . 3 5  )
1. Cohen.W.J.. Retirement Policies Under Social Security
(Berkley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 
- 1957), p 92.
sense of individual contribution, responsibility and activity 
which v;ork can mean to aged people. Therefore, opportunity 
should be availed of letting the older persons work whenever 
it is possible and beneficial to the society. In evaluating 
the effect of a retirement test, reference is also made to the 
social contribution which older people can make in areas in 
which their contribution is not measurable in terms of usual 
type of economic activity. For instance old people can work 
for social welfare, political, religious, recreational, and 
community organisations for remuneration substantially below 
what it would be necessary for them to obtain for their ser­
vices, in absence of a regular retirement income. Iftidoubtedly, 
if the pace of our economic development and cultural advance­
ment is not retarded suad if the general productivity of our 
economy continues to increase, there will lay ahead a vast 
field for increased social, cultural and recreational activi­
ties which will contribute to the happiness, welfare,cultural 
status and prosperity of the community and the aged alike.
This potentiality must be taken into consideration while 
framing a scheme of old age social insurance.
It may be noted here that the Study Group referred to 
above recommends that the workers may be allowed to continue 
working after completing sixty years (retirement age), but 
neither they will pay contributions for that periO(| nor will 
they receive any additional benefits therefor,^ Tuis is a
1. Op-Cit, para 79 ( i i i )
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sort of inducement which may be utilised in times of labour 
scarcity without prejudicing the pension plan as such or the 
earnings of the employee.
7* Justification of Old Age Protection
A schCTie of social security for the aged is a costly 
scheme. Therefore, before instituting any such scheme, it 
is pertinent to examine why at all should the society protect 
old age against economic contingencies. This sinalysis may be 
diagnosed from economic, political social and moral angles 
of vision.
With the improved medical facilities provided by the 
modem medical science and increased resources, the number 
of three generation familities is increasing, though the number 
of three-generation households is tending to disappear fast.
But the lessened ability of the family to provide economic 
security for its old members to facilitate comprehensive and 
cohesive continuity for successive generations must be attri­
buted also to a gradual shift from an agricultural to an 
industrial civilisation, the emergence of money-oriented 
economy and the increasing mobility of the population. Many 
of the problems that arise in relation to the aged reflect our 
inability as a people to adjust time-honoured and persistent 
customs of the old when the older people typically belonged 
to a large family group to the more limited functions, the 
family is able to perform in the civilisation of today.
The scope of providing job to the older people is very 
limited. Increased mechanisation of the productive system 
has little value and use to be obtained from the aged workers.
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Moreover,thare is little opportunity for the aged to get a 
job so that he can support himself in old age. According to 
U.S. Population Reports in April, 1952, 3S% of the aged (65 or 
over) were not in the labour force. Of this, 45^ of the entire 
aged population was found to be ’not well enough to work* 
and eight per cent was not interested in work. Only three 
per cent were interested in their work.^  This type of study 
is lacking in our country. Bat the Labour Investigation 
Committee collected some detail^ regarding the age data of 
industrial workers. Personal investigations conducted by the 
Committee through their ad hoc survey staff in various in­
dustries and areas and the replies received from the employers, 
workers' associations and other bodies showed that neither 
the employers nor the employees attached any great importance 
to vital statistics, age data, length of service, sickness 
records and the like. "Tie Committee found that agB data were 
available in only eleven concerns regarding 20,954 workers. 
Information on distribution of age among industrial workers 
shows that workers belong to the young and middle-age groups 
to a greater extent than to the older age-group. In three 
concerns, there were no workers in the upper age brackets 
above 60 years. Female workers were non-existent in this
age-group in case of six units. One unit did not employ any
2worker above 45 years of .age. Another set of data available 
to the Committee were those from the Bombay Labour Office.
( 1.38 )
1. Steiner and Dorfman, Op. Git. table 4.1, p 39.
2. Op. Cit, Main Report, table 23.
This was a family budget inquiry conducted in Bombay between 
September 1932 and June 1933 and in Ahmedabad between October 
1933 and January 1935* The workers covered were predominantly 
those employed in cotton textiles. According to this inquiry
86.5 per cent of the workers were below 45 years and those 
above 55 constituted only one per cent in Bombay. In Ahmedabad 
90.1 per cent were below 45 and those above 55 years were 
only 1.5 per cent.
Data collected by Mr. R.G.Gokhale, the Labour Officer, 
Bombay Mill owners' Association in 1951 regarding 74,700 
workers of the Bombay cotton textile mills in different areas 
showed the following results.
Table I.tZ
AGE DISTRIBUTION OF COTTON MILL WORKER 
IN BOMBAY
( 1.39 )
Age groups. Males Females
Nos. Percentage Nos. percentage
Below 20 128 0.2 6 0.1
20-40 46345 67.0 2,469 45.2
41-45 8826 12.8 1,059 19.4
46-50 5908 8.5 846 15.5
51-55 4403 6.4 593 10.9
56-60 2221 3.2 297 5.4
over 60 1326 1.9 190 3.5
Total 69157 100.0 5,460 100*0
SOURCE: Gokhale,R.G., Bombay Cotton Mill Workers
(Bombay Mill Owners Association, 1957)*
This table shows that the proportion of workers aged over 
55 yea^ in cotton textiles was 5.1 per cent of males and 8.9 
for females. This reflects the stability of labour force in 
this industry. However, these studies show that the aged are 
not in employment in sizeable proportions. Even those who are 
found to continue in employment are those who have long record 
of services. Fresh recruitment of aged persons from the 
labour ifiatKet is an exception. In hi^ly technical or skilled 
professions services of those above retirement age may be 
procured for organisational purposes on contract basis but 
it is not a practice to prefer the aged to the young or even 
accord them equal treatment in matters of recruitment. There­
fore, the inference that occurs to a plain mind is simply 
that chances of employability of the aged particularly in 
industrial areas are very limited*
Even if the onployability of the aged becomes possible, 
it is not desirable economically. The older workers are less 
efficient in physical labour and their productivity is less 
than that of younger workers. This will increase the cost 
of production, accelerate the waste of equipment and raw 
materials and also lower the quality of products. Besides 
this, after a long period of toil, the old members of the 
society require three R's; REST, Requisites and Respect. Rest 
is needed because exertion is not always possible in old age. 
Requisites of life such as food, clothing and shelter are 
primary needs. Victuals and other requirements of life can­
not be commanded without purchasing power. As for respect, 
it is a precious solace of the old. They have seen a genera^ 
tion born before them. They are experienced and venerable
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for their dejcendents. But this respect can hardly be comman­
ded by them if they are allowed to look to the purse of the 
already famished family of their sons, daughters of some other 
liable relations for subsistence. These three R's can only 
be secured to them if their subsistence is secured through 
some scheme of old age security. The employment of the 
aged should be discouraged on this ground too. Moreover, 
modem society is job-oriented society. Unemployment is a 
source of depression and vice versa. In a community where 
millions of persons are always in wait for their chance of 
employment, it is very hard for the less efficient and the 
older persons to compete in the employment market with the 
efficient hands. From the view-point of the efficiency of the 
plant too, labour force should be held at a high morale by 
upgradings and promotions. If the older workers are allowed 
to continue indefinitely, the incentive of the younger workers 
will be killed and the general efficiency of the plant will 
suffer as a consequence. The Massachusettes Commission on 
Old Age Pensions, Annuities and Insurance, 1910, held an 
identical view when it observed that " The economic gain from 
the pension system is twofold: it eliminates the waste and 
demoralisation attendent upon the continued employment of old 
men who have outlived their usefulness; and it helps to promote 
industry, contentment and loyalty on the part of the working 
force. The pension systfio aids in solving the difficult prob­
lem of stimulating the employees of a large corporation to the 
highest efficiency."^
I.^by Conant, Op, Git,, p 21
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Old age proteetion also eliminates excessive labour turn­
over* Such schemes as require long qualifying period of con­
tribution on the part of the beneficiary for the entitlement 
to benefits, tend the worker to the industry. However, young 
workers m ^  not profess so much loyalty, but difficulties in­
volved in finding a new job in case of an aged v/orker is suf­
ficient inducement to continue in the present position. On the ' 
whole, such schemes are strong deterrent to the shiftability of 
the workers which at times is so necessary. They help to 
stabilise the industrial force v/hich is beneficial for the 
industrial development of the country and the State both*
Absenteeism is also likely to be more in case of older 
employees due to various reasons. In the first place, pre­
valence of illness is common in case of aged workers. Ill­
ness in later stages of life tends to be unnoticed at the 
onset, gradual in progression and to be of such a nature 
that the body cannot build up an immunity to it. Secondly, 
accidents take place more frequently in case of older v/orkers 
than in case of the y'oon^  workers who are alert and smart 
( Experience and other things, no doubt, remaining the same)* 
These factors inflate the payroll, reduce the output of the 
plant and add to the cost of sickness insurance unusually* 
Therefore, the protection of the aged against economic in­
security in the retired life is not only beneficial to be 
considered by the worker himself but it is useful as a means 
o f  r a t io n a l is a t io n  on the fro n t o f  the employees inter se.
( 1 A %  )
As a matter of economic policy, man must be provided 
throughout his life from the profession he follows. If the 
economic system cannot employ the old, it can and should 
provide them wherewithal in their retired life. That economic 
systiem is basically wrong which does not provide means to its 
members to live their full natural span of life. Survival of 
the fittest is the phil*osophy of the jungle and it is a dead 
slogan in the context of the modern civilisation. Human society 
is essentially composed of weak and strong and both have de­
finite roles to play for the progress of humanity howsoever 
imperceptible this role may be. If the philosophy of 'no-work- 
no-food'■ is vigorously followed, the old and the young child­
ren who are unable to work, the sick and the incapacitated 
should be exterminated from the society. But this would be 
a rash suggestion. Man must eat throughout his life irrespec­
tive of his age, efficiency or the ability to do work. Society 
today does not provide sufficient income to all so as to 
allow a margin for savings to be drawn upon in old age. h^is 
is a genuine economic ground to protect the aged against the 
controllable insecurity to which he is exposed, poverty and want, 
Morally, it is advisable to protect the aged population 
because they are the erstwhile builders of society. It is im­
moral for the society to scrap its old members and throw them 
to destitution in their dependent age."From the standpoint 
of the whole system of social economy," it has been remarked,
"no employer has a right to engage men in occupations that 
exhaust the individual's industrial life in ten, twenty or
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forty years; and then leave the remnant floating on society 
at large as derelict at sea. From the standpoint of public 
economy, it is argued that every industry should be compelled 
to bear its own burden of waste, whether material, machinery 
or human life; that it is as equally unjust and improvident for 
an industry to turn adrift its worn out m d aged employees to 
be taken up and housed at public expense in almshouses, as it 
is for the employer to stop work and become tramp or vagrant*"^ 
It is unquestionably immoral to forsake the aged in their re­
tired life although they contributed to the prosperity of the 
society which the present generation is enjoying*
Socially, if one section of society is condemned to des­
titution, other sections cannot remain immune from it for long. 
Poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere. 
Moreover, it is a slur on the social prestige of the community 
to leave the venerable members of the society on the vagaries 
of fate. Indian people can never stoop too low.
Old people are also mature in thought and experience. They 
are influential politically. In a democratic set-up, they can­
not be neglected, otherwise they would not be able to devote 
their thoughts towards social and welfare work.
CONCLUSION  ^ jQ recapitulate the foregoing discussion,
old age and retirement age are two different concepts, but 
the latter is governed by the former, approach of old age 
is infiuenced by age, sex, climate, standard of life and 
occupation* D.P.'s population is growing at a decennial
1. Lee Wellington Squire, quoted by ^onant. Of. Git., p 7*
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rate of 10*8^* Cultivable area being ultimately fixed, greater 
reliance will have to be placed on the non-agricultural call­
ings* Urbanisation is also increasing in U«F* A settled in­
dustrial force is a sine qua non for the industrial development. 
But wages being low, and families consisting of large team of 
non-earning dependents, it is difficult to save for old age*
This compels the workers to migrate to villages. Hence, the 
need for old age security for the growth of a settled indus­
trial force.
Retirement age for industrial, population may be fixed at
60 years for males and 55 years for females. However, some 
retirement test may be evolved; it may be adjusted to the 
needs of the employment market to effect an automatic cor­
rective to the volume of emplosrment.
Old age protection is economically justifiable due to the 
inability of the aged to secure employment and its undesir­
ability too for efficiency considerations. Socially, destitu­
tion is liable to affect other sections of population. Old 
age insurance pushes up the consumption of the aged which 
stabilises market conditions and is anti-depressive in effect. 
Moreover, it is morally cruel to abandon the erstwhile builders 
of society in their retired life. Therefore, the object of 
old age protection is the provision of three R’s: rest, re­
quirements and respect, to the aged, I propose to discuss the 
protection against old age enjoyed by the industrial workers 
of U.P. in detail. This forms the subject-matter of the next 
Chapter.
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CHAPTER II 
OLD AGE PROTECTIOH IN U. P«
In the preceding Chapter, I stressed the need of old age 
protection on economic, social, political and moral grounds, 
Uttar Pradesh has been the leader in introducing the Baployees' 
State Insurance Scheme* The purpose of this Chapter is to 
discuss the sources of old age protection available to indus­
trial population of U.P. and to assess their efficacy as a 
reliable measure.
Prom the view-point of technique of coverage, such measures 
can be classified into contributory, non-contributory and 
Government-financed* Various provident funds operating in indus­
trial concern^, particularly the Employees' Provident PUnd 
Scheme has been discussed in the Chapter* Among non-contribu- 
tory sources come individual savings, mutual insurance and life 
insurance* The second, i.e. the mutual insurance is confined to 
industrial workers alone while the rest two are available to 
the population in general.The Old Age Pensions scheme of the 
Government of U.P. is the only State measure taken to provide 
for the destitute aged population. It has been particularly 
discussed in order to point out the extent of protection pro­
vided by it and the possibility of instituting such schemes in 
other States*
I have discussed the contributory schemes first because 
they are nearer the approach of social insurance which has 
been held to be the most suitable way of social security*
Contributory Sch^es
The problem of old age dependency received some attention 
at the hands of the various Labour Inquiry Committees. The 
Royal Commission on Labour also referred to this problem but, 
it did not recommend the institution of any scheme of provident 
fund at that time. The Indian Provident Fund Act 1925, popu­
larly known as the Statutory Provident Fund was then already 
in operation. The Act applies to the Railway and Government 
industrial establishments. It is a contributory scheme to 
which the beneficiaries and their employers contribute equally. 
The contributions to this type of Provident Fund have been 
accorded special treatment in Indian Income Tax law. The law 
also makes provision for the recognition of any other private 
provident fund satisfying certain conditions and such recognised 
provident fund is also given certain tax concessions. Despite 
all such inducements, no encouraging response was recorded on 
the part of the employers to institute such funds barring a 
few enlightened concerns.- The voluntary institution of funds 
has been few and far between. Now, after a long struggle, an 
Bnployees’ Provident Fund Scheme has been instituted under 
the law passed in 1952. I give below its salient features.
1 • The SnT3loyees Provident Fund Scheme. 1952.
The subject of institution of a provident fund scheme 
for the benefit of industrial workers received consideration 
and was discussed at the Labour Ministers' Conference held in 
1942. It was agreed that instead of introducing any compulsory 
scheme, a set of model rules should be framed and circulated by 
the Central Grovemment among the industrial employers who may 
be given option to adopt them. But the matter rested there
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and nothing further came out. The question was again revived 
in 1947 and subsequently, it was discussed by the Indian Labour 
Conference, the Standing Labour Committee and by some Industrial 
Committee^ . They all agreed in principle and were in favour of 
instituting a provident fund scheme on statutory basis. In 
1948, a private member introduced ’Workers Provident Fund Bill’ 
in the Legislative Assembly, It was a non-official motion for 
making it obligatary on every employer in industrial concerns 
to establish provident funds for the betterment of employees’ 
and their familjds’lots. The Government, however, assured that 
they were themselves contemplating to introduce a comprehensive 
Bill to this effect after studying the matter fully. Consequently 
the private motion was withdrawn. The question was again dis­
cussed at the Labour Ministers’ Conference held in January 1951 
at Patna. As a result of the conclusions arrived at, an 
ordinance was promulgated by the Central Government on 15th 
November, 1951 which was later on replaced by the Qnployees 
Provident Fund Act 1952 (Act XIX of 1952).
The employees Provident Fund Act seeks to make provision 
for the future of the industrial worker after he retires from 
active service or, if he dies earlier than retirement, for his 
dependents. The Act extends to the whole of India except Jammu 
and Kashmir. It applies to all factories in which fifty or more 
persons are employed. The Central Government may, however, 
specify by notification to this effect any other establishmBnt 
in which fifty or workers are employed. But under Section 
16, the Act does not apply to establishments belonging to 
Government or local authorities; it also does not apply to
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'infant establishments’ until after the expiry of three years 
from the date on which the establishment has been set up. 
However, those establishments in which schemes of provident 
funds are already in operation and the rules of such funds 
are, with regard to the rate of contributions and benefits, 
not less favourable than under this Act or if the employees 
are in the enjoyment of benefits favourably comparable to those 
under the Act, the appropriate Government may exempt such 
establishments from the operation of the Act or any provision 
thereof.
The Act authorises the Central Government to frame a 
scheme for the establishment of provident funds for employees 
or any class of employees and to specify such factories in 
which the scheme shall apply. The term "factory" has been 
defined for the purpose of the Act as ” any premises, includ­
ing the precincts thereof, in any part of which manufacturing 
process is being carried on or is ordinarily so carried on, 
whether with the aid of power or without the aid of power.
The scheme of Provident Fund could be framed for the industries 
given in Schedule I to the Act in the first instance, but the 
Central Government is authorised to add other industries to 
this Schedule.
In excercise of the powers conferred by the Act, the 
Central Government have framed an Employees’ Provident Pund 
Scheme and notified it on 2nd September, 1952. According to 
this Scheme ewery employee of the aforesaid industries is to 
become the member of the Provident Fund on completing one 
year’s service provided that he was earning not more than 
Rs 300 p.m. as basic wages. Contributions have been fixed at
( I I . #  )
1. Section 2 (g).
6i per cent of wages for both, employers and employees, POr 
the purpose of this calculation, wages have been defined to 
include "all emoluments which are earned by an employee while 
on duty or on leave with wages in accordance with the terms 
of the contract of employment and which are paid or payable 
in cash to h i m . T h e  contributions are collected from employers 
in the first instance. They can deduct the appropriate sum 
from the wages of their employees for the employees’ share of 
contribution. In case of insolvency, the pajnnent of contri­
butions carries a priority to all other debt claims. To ward 
off the irregularities on the part of employers. Section 12 
of the Baployees Provident Fund Act lays down that " No employer 
in relation to an establishment to which any scheme applies, 
shall, by reason only of his liability for the payment of any 
contribution to the Fund or any charges under this Act or the 
Scheme, reduce, whether directly or indirectly, the wages of 
any employee to whom the scheme applies or the total quantum 
of benefits in the nature of old age pension, gratuity or 
provident fund to which the employee is entitled under the 
terms of his employment, express or implied." The Fund has 
been recognised under Section 58C of the Indian Income Tax Act 
1922 for the pQrposes of income tax concenssions.
Contributions are calculated < . monthly, weekly or daily, 
Insurable earnings of the employees have been raised to |s 500 
per month since February 1957. Besides paying their own share 
of contributions, the employers are required to pay an addi­
tional charge for meeting the expenses of administration of 
the scheme. At present the administrative charge is 3 per cent
1. Section 2 (b)*
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of the joint contributions or 0.4 per cent of wage bill. The 
amounts received are to be credited to a Provident Pund Account 
out of which the expenses of various kinds are met. A separate 
account called "Central Administration Account" is required to 
be opened for recording all administrative expenses relating 
to the ilmd. All interest, rent, and miscellaneous income, 
profit (or loss) on the sale of investments shall be trans­
ferred to an Interest Suspense Account. An account is required 
to be opened in the office of the I\md in the name of each 
individual member which shall be credited with his own contri­
butions, his emjiloyer’s contributions on his wage bill and 
interest credited to his accumulated balance of the fund at 
the rate which may be deemed proper. At present this rate 
is 5*75 per cent per annum.
The employee will receive a provident fund on retirement 
equal to his own and his employers' contributions together with 
the accumulated interest credited to his account in the afore­
said manner form time to time. In case of his death, the credit 
standing to his account will be payable to his nominees or in 
the absence of nomination, to the miembers of his family. In 
case of dismissal or discharge due to serious or wiilful mis­
conduct, the appropriate authority may forfeit the employers' 
share of his fund at the latter's request. However, members 
are also allowed full withdrawals in the following cases:
(a) On retirement from service any time after attaining the 
age of superannuation (which is fifty-five years at present).
(b) On retirement from service due to permanent and total 
incapacity for work in any industry.
(c) On migrating from India for permanent settlement abroad.
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Withdrawals on grounds other than the aforesaid ones are 
permitted subject to the condition that the employer's contri­
bution and interest thereon shall be returned to the employee 
in the following manner;
PERIOD OF MEMBERSHIP OF THE FUHD PERCENTAGE OF RETURNABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS OF EMPLOYEES
Less than three years membership 25
3 years’ but less than 5 years 50
5 years but less than 10 years 75
10 years but less than 15 years 85
15 years and over. 100
Any amount which is so withheld is to be credited to a 
forfeiture account. Full return of contributions is also per­
mitted (both of his own and his employer’s) if the employee 
is retrenched from service or is suffering from leprosy or 
Tuberculosis.
The administrntion of the Fund is vested in a Bosfd of 
Trustees. A Central Bosard of Trustees was constituted on 31st. 
October 1953* with the Secretary of the Central Ministry of 
Labour as its Chairman. For the purpose of the implementation 
of the scheme. Regional offices have been established and 
Regional Committees have been constituted to advise the Central 
Board on such matters as fcay be referred to them. The chief
pmd
executive officer of the Scheme is the Central Providentj[Commiss­
ioner who is assisted in his work by three Assistant Provident 
Fund Commissioners in charge of Statistical, Enforcement and
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*  For fu r th e r  d e ta i l s  see  Chapter VII p o ste .
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Administrative Sections and a Deputy Provident Fund Commis­
sioner in charge of Special Section® Regional Offices are 
headed by Regional Provident Fund Commissioners who are assis­
ted in their work by the Provident Fund Inspectors and Accounts 
Officers. They ibok after the collection of contributions and 
the maintenance of Accounts.
• Bnployees covered under the scheme are issued Account 
Niimbers after making declaration on prescribed forms for the 
purpose of registration. The employers are required to submit 
a consolidated list of employees coverable under the scheme 
( showing their wages, dearness allowance and the cash valee 
of any food concessions paid to them). Then they submit joint 
contributions to the Office by seperate bank drafts or cheques 
for contributions and administrative charges. They issue to 
their employees Contribution ' Cards in which all sums paid on 
their accounts are entered. These are current for one year 
after which a new Card is issued. The employers are required to 
submit these cards to the Commissioner before the expiration of 
their currency at least one month in advance. Fresh Contribution 
Cards are then issued. On request, the employees are allowed 
to inspect their Cards once s in every two calendar months.
It may be noted that the Employees• State Insurance does 
not cover the same industries as under the Employees’ Provident 
Fund scheme. The foimer covers only perennial factories whereas 
the latter does not discriminate in this respect. Moreover, 
the ESI scheme is extendible to factories employing twenty or 
more workers v/hile the EPF schem is enforcible in factories 
employing 50 or more employees. At the end of September, 1959,
the coverage under the ESI&henie was a little over H«51 lakhs 
in Inidia while the EPF covered about 25.25 lakh workers in 
7502 factories. The administrative pattern of the two schemes 
is almost identical but for th^  fact that the EPP scheme has 
no local disbursement offices wheras the ESI has* Contribution 
periods of the two schemes differ. Under the ESI, the contribu­
tions are weekly while collection period is s i x  months. Contri­
bution period under the EPF scheme is a month and the collection 
period is a year.
2. Baployers* Schemes
Besides the Baployees’ provident Rind scheme, some enlight*: 
ened employers have had their own voluntary provident fund 
schemes. Ihe Bombay Millowners’ Association already recommended 
to its members to make provision with effect from September 
1946, for the provident funds to their employees upon retirement 
or to their dependents in the event of their early death« All 
the employees earning less than Rs 500 p.m. were to join the 
scheme. Contribution rates for the employees and employers both 
were fixed at of the employees' wages. The Delhi Cloth and
General Mills and some employers in Kainpur had their own provi­
dent fund and gratuity schemes. However, since the implementa­
tion of the EPF scheme, 1952, employers* voluntary schemes can 
only be retained if the rules of such schemes are not less fa­
vourable than those of the EPF scheme with regard to various 
benefits. Therefore, a detailed consideration of such schemes 
seems superfluous«
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An evaluation of the provident fund schemes as an old 
age protection measure may be done at this stage. As noted 
above, provident funds are paid on retirement in lump sums.
In order that this income serves in old age, it must be invested 
and its efficacy as an old age security depends on the prudence 
and foresight of the retiree. However, receipts of lump sums 
are more amenable to misuse than regular pension payments. 
Sometimes, even the thoughtful persons are found spending reck­
lessly when money is received in lump sums. In fact, sure 
pleasure of the present can be hardly sacrificed for an uncer­
tain future. The receipt of fund by orphans and widows often 
turns into a source of exploitation on the part of th^ ir crafty 
relations in stead of protecting them in distress.
Provident.- funds are financed by joint contributions 
of the beneficiaries and their employers. This is not a social- 
insurance technique of finance. It is also not a social assis­
tance measure for, that requires unilateral finance of the 
scheme by the general tax payer. But, they constitute one of 
the ancillary measures of providing old age security* Social 
security essentially aims to provide income for subsistence. 
Provident funds, on the other hand, grant lump sums which 
should be properly distributed over time before it may be of 
use to the beneficiary as subsistence income. In one sense, 
provident funds grant a modicum of income for investment. Thus, 
they are not preferable to pension schmes under which benefits 
are periodically paid. If the pensioner wastes one instalment 
of pension, it does not entail life-long suffering and repentence
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On the next receipt.of pension, pafit inaccuracies of judgment 
may be rectified. Hence, a pension scheme is preferable to 
provident fund schemes*
B. Non-Contributory Measures
Non-contributory measures of social security are mostly 
voluntary and as such are available to the entire population 
notwithstanding their occupational status. Here, only those 
institutions of old age protection have been discussed which 
are specially available to industrial population or are general, 
inclusive of industrial workers.
1. Individual Savings
Most important among the voluntary buttresses of old-/se- 
curity is the private saving of the individual himself. Savings 
constitute the first line of defence against all income inse­
curities. Saving is the function of total income thai an indi­
vidual receives during a given period of time. It is the excess 
of total income over the amount spent on consumption. Saving 
decisions are governed by various subjective and objective 
considerations. Principal objective fas^ tors that influence 
the decision of the individual to save are the size of on^^s
total income, fiscal structure of the country, price-level
and the family responsibilities.
Size of an individual's income is the most important 
factor that governs his consumption behaviour. The marginal 
propensity to save rises with a rise in total income. And,
*To my mindj it is rather the capacity to save that^ s^o governed.
Propensity means inclination, an urge to do a thing. Thus !
propensity to save,is governed by subjective considerations, 
whereas the capacity to save is governed by objective factors.
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the lower the income, the higher the propensity to consxome*
As such, the lov/er-income group consumes major part of its 
income ( sometimes the whole of it ) and leaves little to save» 
Only those earning above their subsistence level may afford 
to save. Industrial workers, as also average Indians, are 
living in a state of poverty. This statement is valid in spite 
of a rise in per capita incomes of U.P. after :nfpj<^ 950’s. The 
following table presents per capita incomes of U.P.:
Table II.1
PER CAPITA INCOMES IN U.P. (1950-51 to 1958-59)
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Years of estimates Annual Incomes 
Rs.
Daily Averages 
Rs.
1950-51 2 57.66 0.70
1951-52 242.20 0.66
1952-53 240.12 0.66
1953-54 229.76 0 .6 3
1954-55 208.79 0.57
1955-56 2 12 .2 3 0.58
1956-57 230.29 0.63
1957-58 227.26 0.62
1958-59 255.89 0.70
SOURCE; Monthly Bulletin of Statistics(U.P. Govt., Lucknow), 
January 1960, p 128.
According to this table, per capita annual income in U.P.
was highest in 1950-51 when it v/as Rs, 257.66. Even this gives 
a daily average of Rs, 0.70. Since then income has fallen . Even
I
if the per capita incomes increase fey small driblets, it does 
not seem to improve the conditions of teeming millions. It is 
evident, therefore, that the income of the vast majority of 
masses does not leave a margin of savings*
In case of factoiy workers, the average income for all 
workers is Rs. 155 p.m. according to the estimates of the 
Study Group* This gives h daily average of about Rs5. If the 
average number of members per family is taken to be five, this
yields a daily average of one rupee* Considering the high
cost of living in industrial areas, this is not sufficient to
leave a margin of savings to be drawn upon in old age*
Price-level is another factor which influences individual 
savings. It determines the amount of earnings of the consumers 
in terms of goods and services. In view of the lowne^s of the 
incomes of industrial workers, it may be safely assumed that 
in times of rising prices, they have to cut down their consump­
tion to absolute minimum necessities of life* In U.P., as 
elsewhere, prices have risen. As has be’en aptly remarked, prices 
rise by lifts and incomes rise by ladders in workers’ case*
Hence the margin,, of savings has been further reduced*
Income tax affects the industrial workers who earn above 
the minimum exemption limit. At present, this limit is fixed 
at Rs, 3000 of annual incomes* Therefore, those workers who 
receive monthly wages above Rs. 250 are required to pay income 
tax* Moreover, Indian working class is maintaing a large team 
of dependents. Non-popularity of female employment, low earn­
ings of average workers and prevalence of unemployment are 
contributory cause to this phenomenon. During the course of 
mjf tour to Bombay undertaken in connection with this study
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I came to learn that some of the workers in a textile mill 
had families of more than ten members with single earning mem­
ber. All these facts point to the conclusion that margin for 
saving is non-existent in average cases.
Over and above these considerations, there are some sub­
jective factors that govern one's decision for saving. Precau­
tion against future contingencies and provision for old age 
are very influential ones. To be independent in doing things 
for oneself, to enjoy a gradually better standard in later life 
also play their role in this matter. The Report of the Saving- 
Consumption Behaviour of Aligarh Muslim University Qnployees 
discloses that " Contractual savings(such as provident funds 
and life insurance policies) seem to be relatively more impor­
tant strengthening the view that a very important motive for 
saving is provision for old age and contingenciesv"^ Sometimes, 
to secure masse de manoeuvre, to carry on business or specula­
tive projects, and to bequeath a fortune to the heirs, are 
other important considerations to induce a man to save. Lastly, 
for the satiation of sheer miserliness and avarice, one may 
cut down his consumption and hoard wealth. But hoarding is 
productive of no good. It may not provide protection against 
old age for^  not infrequently, a miser may. prefer to undergo 
suffering rather than to suffer to spend his hoards in good time, 
Debt-redemption also constitutes a major factor in taking 
saving decisions in case of majority of industrial population 
and peasantry. Considerations like improvement in standard of
1. Op. Cit. p 81.
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living, enterprise and pride exert little influence to induce 
industrial worker to save. However, these are normal conside­
rations and all depend primarily on the income of the indivi­
dual, s^ has already been noted, the income of the industrial 
workers is so low as these considerations are hardly transla^ 
ted into action, howsoever powerful they may be«
Besides, there are certain other obstacles to savings 
which prevent the worker from accumulating any substantial fund 
for future purposes* Lay-off and involuntary unemployment and 
voluntary abstentions from work in pursuance of trade union 
decisions interrupt the earnings of the individual workers to 
save* This does not only check current savings, but eats into 
the accumulated past savings and not infrequently involves 
the worker in debt. Sickness of the earning members, maternity 
of the wife or the employee himself do not only interrupt 
the current earnings but also they are additional drain to 
the purse of the affected workers. The patient needs medical 
assistance due to biological ailment and also monetary relief 
in order to meet the usual expenses of upkeep and additional 
strain of medical requirements aad nursing. Thus, savings 
cannot be .continued in times of such incapacities. Death 
of the breadwinner is a disaster to the familymembers inas­
much as it stops the very source of income altogether. In such 
circumstances, there arises a problem of bread before the fa­
mily much less of savings. In addition to this, the birth 
of a child is an additional item of expenditure and care for
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the family. If the mother is an earning member, her income 
is stopped. It may be noted by way of parenthesis that mater­
nity protection is not universal though all the States of India 
have some sort of legislation to this effect...If, however, 
the mother is not an earning member, the question of stoppage 
of her income does not arise, but she may require additional 
expenditure in the nature of postnatal care, and the cost of 
layette etc. It may be observed here that the aged population 
does not en^unter such difficulties as they are past the age 
of progeniture. The most important amoing the impediments 
to savings ( or the sources of expenditure in the nature of 
emergencies) is the social pressure, which is not only a ruler 
in India, but at times it is a tyrant too. Marriage, death 
and festivals, so profusely celebrated in , are giant
devourers of the savings of an individual. They do not only 
interrupt current savings but also eat into the accumulated 
savings too. Sometimes they necessitate savings at the cost 
of consumption.
No doubt, the schemes of social security tend to dis­
courage the propensity to save to some extent and supplant 
savings; but the fact must be admitted that when the margin 
for any savings itself is absent, there is nothing to dis­
courage them. In fact, savings come to salvage the worker 
from total wreck. From the foregoing discussion, it may be 
inferred that savings are neither adequate nor reliable as a 
measure for protection against the contingency of old age.
As such they can no longer be relied as a reserve to be drawn 
upon in the event of the inevitable contingency of old age.
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2. Mutual Insurance
Having examined the extent and adequacy of savings as a 
means of protecting industrial workers against the contingency 
of old age, it is now pertinent to go over to the next alter­
native of mutual insurance an^ other means adopted by workers' 
organisations to protect their members against old age and 
other economic contingencies. Mutual insurance has been 
defined as "the provision of a fund by common subscription 
to insure against casualties; to provide maintenance, that is 
to say, in cases in which a member is deprived of his liveli­
hood by causes over which neither he nor the union has any 
control."^  Thus, it is a trade union provision to provide 
against contingencies, such as sickness, accidents, superannua­
tion, burial and other allied contingencies. It excludes the 
cost of financing volimtary actions undertaken by trade unions 
such as the cost of maintenance in case of strikes or trade 
negotiations and victim pay etc.
Mutual Insurance is the oldest.form of trade union acti­
vity undertaken for collective and mutual security. But due 
to want of legal protection or financial security, it never 
engaged the attention of actuaries to devote any serious consi­
deration to the probl^ of trade union insurance. Nevertheless, 
this method was largely used by the trade union organisations
1. Webb, Sidney and Beatric, Industrial Democracy. (Longman's 
Green and Co., London, 1914), p 152.
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before the grant of recognition to collective bargaining* It 
helped to bind the member to the union and the benefits v/ere 
‘a potent attraction to hesitating recruits*. The prospect of 
support in case of disability or unemployment was a strong in­
centive for the worker to join the union. Contributions helped 
unions build up reserves of appreciable amounts whcih was found 
to be an effective moral backing in negotiating terms with em­
ployers. It helped as a powerful instrument to maintain (Siscip- 
line among the ranks. V/hen abandonment of affiliation involved 
a deprivation of all share in th§ acctnnulated fund, the affi­
liate disatisfied with the central organisation, hesitated to 
break off. It was a great consolidating force in trade unionism. 
Ihe out-of-work relief prevented the members from accepting 
employment under the stress of starvation on terms, which in 
the judgment of the trade union, would be injurious to its 
interest. Members could also ’keep up their price’©
It may be noted that benefit provisions for benefits under 
mutual insurance schemes prove effective only to the extent to 
which alternative provisions are non-existent. Formerly, trade 
unions feared introduction of alternative social security 
schemes by their employers because they apprehended that it 
will undermine the discipline within the organisation. This 
method of old age protection has lost much of its popularity 
and effectiveness in modern times. The constant vigil and 
organisation that the governance of the mutual insurance benefit 
funds require for proper running of the scheme and the absence 
of statutory protection on the trade unions to utilise the
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only for the purpose for v/hich it was originally constituted 
and the temporaty nature of its achievements have undermined 
its importance in the present move of social security*
Organisation of benefit funds in this State by the trade 
unions has no rich history. But, the Ahmedabad Textile Labour 
Association organised mutual funds built up from the contribu­
tions of members out of which benefits like victimisation 
benefits, strike benefits and legal aid were paid to members* 
Besides the Association, some other unions also pay different  ^
types of benefits; but the amount of such benefits has been 
insignificant and inadequate from the point of view of the 
recipient* In Uttar Pradesh, out of 330 unions, 108 paid sick­
ness, accidents, unemplojrment and death benefits during 1949-50* 
The amounts of benefits varied from one rupee to Rs, 875. During 
1950-51, the number of unions paying such benefits was 103 and 
the amount of benefits distributed amounted to Rs, 9,908*
The table on the next page presents the expenditure 
pat,liern of Central and State trade unions for the year 
1954-55} and the percentage of such expenditure to the total 
outgoings of the unions:
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Table 11,2
BENEFIT EXPENDITURE OF TRADE UNIONS (1954-55)
( 11.20 )
Heads of expenditure Central unions State Unions amount % of amount i<> of 
Rs total Rs total
1* Legeil expenses
2. Expenses in trade 
disputes
5. Trade Dispute Comf 
pensation paid to 
members
4. Funeral, old age, 
sickness, and un­
employment benefits
5. Educational, social 
and religious
8,242 1.9 284,273 5.0
17,785 4.1 258,987 4.9
1,301 0.3 68,771 1.3
1,735 0.4 132,136 2.5
3,470 0.8 110,995 2.1
SOURCE: The Indian Labour Book, 1955-56, table XCVII.
This table shows that very little attention has been paid 
to such activities. There are various reasons for this* Absence 
of strong craft unions is one of them. V/ith the exception of 
a few organisations such as the Ahmedabad Textile Labour As­
sociation, most of the unions are industrial unions. Craft 
unions are organised on the basis of craft and they generally 
enter the names of skilled hands in their membership registers. 
In the home system of production, such unions were the com­
mon variety existing in every trade. But due to a change in 
the system of production, and due to a rapid growth also
of employers’ associations, the significance of such unions 
has been relegated to the background. Lack of skilled labour 
made it possible and convenient for the worker to organise 
on the basis of industries. Skilled workers receive compara­
tively higher wagea. As such, the financial position of the 
craft unions is generally better. Skilled workers can afford 
to pay high rates of contributions; they have greater sense of 
solidarity, fraternity and fellow-feeling. Friendly benefits 
which were particularly organised in Great Britain could not 
be popular in India.
The Indian trade union Act 1926, provides for voluntary 
registration of unions; and it has conferred on trade unions 
legal status and respectability. Unlike in Great Britain, 
there were no Combination Acts in India militating against 
the trade union movement. The method of mutual benefits was, 
therefore, not needed to finance the workers’ struggle against 
such statutes. Thus, benefits schemes were not needed in 
India which may be utilized to enforce discipline and trade 
union solidarity by means of suspending benefits. Hence the 
unpopularity of the method of mutual insurance in India,
Experience of other countries in the field of mutual 
insurance has not been very happy. By the time, the trade 
union movement began in India, in 1918, the method of mutual 
insurance had already slumped down to obsolescence in other 
countries. Therefore, Indian trade unions that appeared late 
in the labour movement and consequently had in store the experi­
ence of other countries, did not naturally profess much faith
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in this technique of social security.
Outside leadership is another reason for the unpopularity 
of this method in India. Labour leaders who happend to be 
political leaders of the country also, did not believe in the 
secEtarian tendencies of v/orkers* benefit alone; they had 
nationalistic outlook and as such, tried to emulate the spirit 
of national welfare in the trade union movement of the country 
from the very beginning. The idea of welfare state dominated 
their minds and the Indian National Congress could easily lead 
them away in the national fervency from thinking ilnt terms of 
mutual insurance societies. They hoped an early realisation 
of Swarajya, and expected the Government to introduce social 
insurance measures as a general policy. Method of mutual 
insurance, therefore, did not receive much publicity at their 
hands.
Absence of a permanent industrial proletariat in India 
has been another reason of the unpopularity of this method. 
Indian labour is proverbially notorious for being of a migra^ . 
toiy character in the sense that it does not belong to the 
place of its work. The joint-family system of India has been 
a great bulwark of social security, l^ lhenever, the worker is 
ill, out of work, grows old, he goes b^k to his village.
Such workers were never seriously inteieWed in organising 
mutual bene^t societies. Although, p'ena^ent industrial 
proletariat ^ is growing slowly in India^  and'the joint-family 
system as an\ institution of old age se^ Srity is also waning 
in importanc^ it is now too l a t e  ^  suggest the method of 
natual insuranJ«\to be organised by workers. Moreover, the
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State has begun to take active interest in social security 
legislation, giving a reasonable ground to the workers to 
expect that the outdated method of mutual insurance will be 
replaced soon by a modem technique of social insurance*
Industrial workers are very poor to contribute towards 
the single-handed finance of mutual insurance schemes. Major 
part of their incomes is derived from the subscriptions by 
their members in case of workers’ unions* present rate of 
subscriptions are very low* In 1947, Mr. S.C. Joshi mentioned 
in his report on the representative character of the All- 
India Trade Union Congress, that the lowest rate of subscrip­
tion was only four annas per worker per annum. This is a low 
rate for the finance of mutual insurance scheme. The movement 
is further handicapped by the fact that the whole of the subs­
criptions are not realised. In Bombay alone, Ri 419,732 re­
mained unrecovered during 1949-50. This was a quarter of the 
total sum payable. The other sources of income available to 
the workers unions are donations, interest on investments, 
sale of periodicals and miscellaneous source* The last three 
sources are quite insignificant in case of workers' unions 
both central and State* Donations accounted for about a fifth 
of the State unions^while they contributed less than a tenth 
of the central union finances*^  This shows that the finance 
of mutual insurance on the part of the unions will require 
unilateral finance on the part of the workers themselves 
which they can ill afford for the present. The present
1, The Indian Labour Year Book. 1955-56, vide table XCVI.
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financial position of the trade unions in India is wealf in 
every respect. The finances of the unions are, thus, insuffi­
cient to meet even their necessary expenditure, let alone the 
planning of ambitious benefit schemes.
Illiteracy of the working population has also contributed 
to the unpopularity of this method of mutual insurance technique 
in India* Workers are neither qualified to look after the 
finances of trade unions nor can they provide requisite staff> 
Social customs, heterogeneous character of Indian workers in 
caste, creed, religious and regional affinities, filialr ^ 
attitude towards their employers, fatalistic tendencies of 
thinking tov;ards the problems of life in general, and lack of 
mutual confidence are other factors that have retarded the 
popularity of this method of contingency insurance in India.
Ag a matter of fact, this instrument of protection has lost 
its significance in nearly all the countries of the world. 
Therefore there is no scope of reliance on this method of old 
age protection in India too.
3* Life Insurance
There is yet another individual action which provides 
protection in old age. This is the method of purchashing life 
insurance policy by the individual himself. Strictly speaking, 
this is a type of investment of savings. Savings are motivated, 
as was observed, by various considerations and the old age 
protection is one of them. It is why an independent considera­
tion of this institution is required*
Life Insurance is no substitute for old age social insurance; 
it only supplements the meagre benefits under the plan of social
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security in case of those who can afford to purchase life 
insurance policies. Life insurance policy is generally 
purchased by those who are comparatively better-to-do than the 
poorest beneficiaries of old age insurance, the primary object 
of which is to protect the underdog. Moreover, social insurance 
is an omnibus provision covering all sorts of contingencies of 
life, economic and biological, whereas life insurance protects 
only old age and other allied contingencies like orphanhood 
a^nd widowhood after the death of the chief bread-wiriner of the 
family. It is pertinent at this stage to examine the extent of 
protection provided by life insurance and the popularity enjoyed 
by this institution among the Indian masses.
In India , modern life insurance business came as a by-^ - 
product ofjthe British Rule which brought about far-reaching 
changes in the field of trade and commerce, particularly in 
the later half of the nineteenth century. Life insurance, 
which is the gift of modern industrialisation, envisaged to 
protect widowhood and orphanhood from the very beginning as 
is evident from the names pf some early life insurance companies, 
such as Madras Widows (founded in 1833)> the Bombay Family 
Pensions Fund for Government Servants (founded in 1848), the 
Tannevelly Diocesan Council Widows' i\md (founded in 1849), 
the Bengal Christian Family Fund (founded in 1859) and the 
General Family Pensions Fund (founded in 1870). At present, 
life insurance is sold exoDlusively by the Life Insurance 
Corporation which came into being in September, 1956 after 
the nationalisation of the Life insurance business in India. 
According to section 30 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 
1956, the Corporation is to enjoy the monopoly of life insurance
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business. However, certain other agencies such as Posts and 
Telegraphs Department are allowed to transact life insurance 
business in a defined sphere, h^e following t&ble presents the 
life insurance business in India since 1950.
Table II.3
LIFE INSURANCE IN FORCE IN INDIA(1950-1958)
(In rupees cfores)
( i i .a e  )
Years Total business 
in force.
New Business Affected
1950 748 133
1951 877 149
1952 925 148
1953 970 156
1954 1,091 237.60
1955 1,128 240*51 '
1956"" - 187.69
1957^* 1,374 277.67
1958 1,585 339.06
SOURCE: Lie Report, 1958. N
* Upto 31st August*
** From 1st Sept ember. 1956 to 31st December, 1957.
The above table shows clearly that total business in force 
has risen throughout the period under review. It amounted to 
only Rs 748 crores in 1950> but rose to Rs 1,585 crores by the 
end of 1958. The new business affected has also registered an
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upward tone. The total business in force in India thus comes 
to about Rs 40 per capita, while per capita life insurance in 
other countries is much hi^er. It is about Rs 8,365 in the 
United States, Rs 6,647 in Canada, Rs2,440in Australia and 
Rs 1,840 in Great Britain. Low figure of life insurance busi­
ness in force in our country studied in conjunction with the 
high price level becomes still more insignificant and thus 
the real protection seems still poorer.
The nationalisation of life insurance in 1956 was moti­
vated by considerations that it will
(a) spread insurance habit among the people;
(b) co-ordinate private voluntary insurance with social 
security measures and national health, factory services 
and labour;
(c) make insurance cheaper to the community; and
(d) permit the utilisation of life insurance funds for the 
planned development of the country.
Prior to nationalisation, the percentage of population touched
by this device of protection was very small. The insurance
habit of Indian people was very poor. The insured population
constituted only one percent of the total population of India*
It protected only five per cent of Indian families, while
eighty per cent of families are protected in the United States.
In India, savings effected through life insurance are about
one half of one per cent of estimated national income of the
country while they are three per cent in U.K. and Australia t :
and more than six per cent in the United States and Canada.
The proportion of life insurance premiums to total savings was
only about seven per cent in India, whereas it was 50 to 60 
per cent in dther countries. The amount of new business 
secured in the post-nationalisation years has risen steadily 
but for during 1956. Nevertheless the figures for that year 
relate to seven months only. An inspection of the above table 
discloses that the rise has been consistent throughout. Number 
of policies purchased has also increased from 30,25»000 in 194-8 to 
43,15,000 in 1954. But a period of three years which has 
passed since nationalisation is too short a period to assess 
the actual efficacy of incentives provided to the people for 
greater consumption of life insurance#
Under life insurance, protection against old age is 
provided by endowment policies under which the sum assured is 
either payable after the expiry of a specified period or on 
the death of-the assured whichever is earlier. In addition to 
this,life Bjjnoities are also another means of protecting old 
age* tftider this type of life insurance contract, the insured 
is paid in consideration of the ’purchase money” annual sums 
on the attainment of a given age. In India, about seventy 
per cent of the number of policies are endowment policies. 
Joint-life and whole-life policies account for ten per cent 
and eight per cent respectively. The rest is apportioned 
between children's assurance and miscellaneous policies. But 
the sums assured present a different proportion under different 
types of life insurance contracts. The table on the next page 
shows the distribution of life insurance business over diffe­
rent types of policies.
( 11.28 )
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Table II.4
DISTRIBUTION OF LIFE INSURANCE BUSINESS ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT 
TYPES OF POLICIES (for 1957 & 58)
Distribution 1957 1958 Percentof policies. Sums assured P.C. Sums assured
Rs crores. Rs crores.
Endowment 30.68 9.35 26.93 7.98
Joint-life 245.24 74.75 234.29 69.43
Whole-life 16.21 4.94 32.70 9.69
Children 13.02 3.97 17.14 5.08
Miscellaneous 22.93 6.99 26.39 7.82
Total 328.08 100.00 337.45 100.00
SOURCE: Life Insurance Corporation Report for 1957 and 1958.
The above table exhibits that both sums assured and 
proportions of policies under joint-life and endowment contracts 
declined and the other types of insurance gained. The highest 
gain was marked in case of whole-life policies, the next 
highest being for Children's Assurance. . this is clear, 
therefore, that this proportion of endowment is inadequate 
for appreciable protection of old age by life insurance in 
India notwithstanding the fact that the proportion of this 
type of contract has registered an increase. (Per capita 
endowment policies were only Rs 0.75 and Rs 0.63 respectively 
for 1957 and 1958).
!Ehe Lie has already introduced new schemes for the 
purpose of carrying life insurance to the doors of the poor
(tonsumers. The new schemes of Janata Insurance, Group 
Insurance and Superannuation and the Salary Saving have been 
mainly organised for populatising life insurance in India, 
specially among the poor,
Janata scheme was instituted on 1st May, 1957 in Bombay, 
Ahmedabad, Delhi, Kanpur and Calcutta. At present, this 
scheme is working as a pilot project in the rural and indus­
trial areas of Greater Bombay, Ahmedabad,-Sholapur, Delhi, 
Rohtak, Kanpur, Calcutta, Silguri, Madras, Coimbatore, and 
Hyderabad. Under this scheme policies valued at small sums 
of Rs 250 can be purchased, the maximum amount of policies 
being Rs 999 only. In certain cases medical examinatioi^the 
assured is waived and proof of age has greatly been simplified. 
No medical examination is required if the assured is below 
thirty-five. The authorised agents visit the homes of the 
policy-holders in order to collect the premiums, so that the 
entire procedure in the conduct of life insurance has been 
drastically simplified for this purpose, and much botheration 
has been saved to the assured. As a step towards fufther 
popularisation of these policies, policy forms and other 
documents have been printed in regional languages in order 
to make it understandable to the general public# The table 
on next page shows Zonewise business effected under the Janata 
scheme. Thus, all-India average per Janata policy was 553.44 
However, Central Zone had an average of Rs 561.07. No doubt, 
this is not an ambitious achievement and the figures show 
that only an insignificant fraction of po)fnilation has purchased
( 11.30 )
ZONEV/ISE
( 11.31 )
Table II.5
BUSINESS IN JANATA POLICIES 
(December, 1957)
Zones NOo of policies Sums assured
Rs
Northena 3,185 20,91,977
Central 1,545 8,66,848
Eastern 6,858 37,70,423
Southern 3,039 13,36,690
Western 6,581 36,71,330
Total 21,208 1,17,37,268
SOURCE: L.I.C. Report, 1958.
' Janata policies. But it
ts
results or to judge its efficacy.
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too early to expect great
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Group Insurance and superannuation schemes are meant 
for homogeneous groups of white-collar proletariat and factory 
employees. It aims to provide low-cost life insurance under 
one master policy. This scheme is a new introduction in India.
Salary Saving scheme is, as a matter of fact, a com­
pulsory saving scheme. The employer pays the premiums on be­
half of employees and deducts the appropriate sums from their 
salaries. During the eight months of 1959-60, over 19,000 
surveys were conducted in U.P. The collections under this 
scheme averaged to Rs, 160,000 per month.
Social security has made a beginning in India; but old 
age has not been protected. It is perhaps the realisation of 
this fact that the Government took measures to popularise life 
insurace. This can be popularised in regular income groups 
like industrial workers.
The efficacy of life insurance as a measure of old age 
protection may be judged with reference to the following
*
criciteriajL
1. 'Insurable Capacity of the Nation;
2 . Per Capit Life Insurance Consumption; and
3. Life Insurance Ratio.
Insurable capacity is the upper limit to which life insurance 
can be consumed. This depends on the size of national income 
on the one hand ' and the insurance habit of the community on 
the other. The latter is itlelf governed by the capability of 
the community to save and the attraction offered by alternative 
channels of investment. As has already been pointed out, in 
less-developed countries, propensity to consume is very high. 
Therefore, a small proportion of national income is available 
for investment. Even this is possible due to existence of in­
equalities in individual incomes, which permits a saving in 
some cases and reduces others to utter poverty level.
According to the third round of National Sample Surveys 
conducted during August and November, 1 9 5 1 , the consumption 
expenditure in the towns averaged at R& 31.55 per capita per 
month. For bigger cities like Calcutta, Bombay, Madras and 
Delhi, it was as high as Rs. 5 4 .8 2  per month. For’the country’ 
as a whole, this average was Rs, ? 5 . 7 0 ,  If this amount is assumed 
as a basis for calculations in U.P., the following information 
comes to light:
C 11.32 )
PER CAPITA INCOME AND EXPENDITURE IN U.P. (1950-51 to 1958-59)
( 11.35 )
Table II.6
Years Per capita Per capita Expenditure Capability
income Ri expenditure as of in- to save
Ri come. p,c.
1950-51
1951-52
1952-55 
1955-54
1954-55
1955-56
1956-57
1957-58
1958-59
257.66
242.20
240.12
229.76
208.79
212.25 
250.29
227.26 
255.89
508.40
508.40
508.40
508.40
508.40
508.40
508.40
508.40
508.40
119.7
127.5
128.9
155.1
147.7
145.5
155.9
156.1
120.5
-19.7 
-27.5 
-28.9 
-55*. 1 
-47.7 
-45.5 
-55.9 
- 56.1 
-20.5
It is abundantly clear from the perusal of this table 
that the average population of Uttar Pnadesh has ai negative 
capability to save. Taking the case of workers covered under 
the Payment of Wages Act, 1956, that is to say those workers 
who were earning less than Rs, 200 per month, per capita 
daily incomes work out at Rs, 0.72, for all States in India 
if the average number of members per family is assumed to be 
five. The expenditure per person per day according to the 
above estimates works out at Rs. 0.86. Thus, in this case too.
( 11.34 )
the average capability to save remains negative, notwith­
standing the fact that the average industrial workers are 
better off than the average population. Taking a mild view, 
it may be concluded that the average industrial worker has 
little insurable capacity in the sense that he can afford to 
purchase life insurance policies to a negligible extent, if^  
at all.
The next cri::terion, the per capita life insurance con- 
besumption may stated to signify the extent to which life 
insurance has been practically successful as a measure of 
protection against the contingency of old age. In all the 
States of India, like other less-developed countries, per 
capita life insurance consumption is very low. It may be noted 
from the table No. II.7 appearing on the next page presenting 
per capita life insurance consumption of Indian population, that 
it is increasing since 1951, notwithstanding the increase in the 
population of the country. It was only Ra 24.2? ner head of 
population in 1951 but later on rose to R& 29.69 in 1955, 
which was the last year of private life insurance in India.
In the two years that followed nationalisation, the improve­
ment was greater. In 1957, per capita life insurance in force ’ 
rose to Ri ?5.2? and then to Rs, 39.63 in 195S. Despite 
all this, per capita life insurance in force in India stands 
no comparision with the same in V/estem countries. In 1952, 
per capita life insurance in force in the United States was
Table II.7
PER CAPITA LIFE INSURANCE IN FORCE IN INDIA
Life insurance Per capita
Years , in force Es, Population crores life insurance
crores. in force Rs,
( 11.35 )
1951 877 36 24.22
1952 925 37 25.00
1953 970 37 26*22
1954 1,091 38 28.71
1955 1,128 38 29.69
1956 - — -
1957 1,374 39 35.25
1958 1,585 40 39.63
Rs. 8,390. In the near future, it will be a femtastic target
to achieve* But in the light of the measures taken for the 
popularisation of life insurance in India, it may be hoped 
that an encouraging future lies ahead, the foreshadowings 
of which are already visible.
Turning to the third criterion of Ratio of Life Insurance 
Consumption, the actual protection provided by this technique 
may be gauged* Ihe ratio of life insurance consumption is 
the percentage which the new life insurance business secured 
bears to the volume of national income in a given year* The 
following table presents the life insurance consumption ratio 
in India. This table shows that life insurance business
Table II.8
LIFE INSURANCE CONSUMPTION RATIO IN INDIA.
National Income New life in- Marginal life 
lears (Rs, crores) surance busi- insurance con-
ness. Rs crores sumption. %
1950 9,400
1951 9,860
1952 9,858
195^ 10,515
1954 9,?28
1955 9,895
1956 11,050
1957 11,^ 23
* Figures have been adjusted to calendar years.
secured varies between 1.50 per cent to 2.55 per cent of the 
national income of the years concerned. The higliest ratio was 
recorded in 1954 when it was 2,55^ of the national income. 
This percentage was the result of a sudden rise in the new 
life business secured from Rs» 156 crores in the preceding 
year to Rs 237.60 crores in this year. In the following year, 
the ratio fell again to 2.43 per cent. Althou^ the ratio 
rose to 2.45 during 1957, the figures vere for seventeen 
months. However, the combined ratio for the years 1956 and 
1957 is 2.04 v'hich is less than the ratio for the year 1955. 
The modal ratio, however, was 1,52 per cent but the trend is 
more or less constant except for the sporadic erruptions
( 11.36 )
133 1.52
149 1.51
148 1.50
156 1.52
237.60 2.55
2^ 0.51 2.45
187.69 ♦
277.67 P .^5
during 1954 and 1955. It may be noted that this ratio was 
2.8 in the United Kingdom and 6.0 in the U.S.A.^
These  o b s e r v a t i o n s  l e a d  to  th e  i n f e r e n c e  t h a t  l i f e  i n s u ­
r a n c e  h a s  been  e n jo y in g  l i t t l e  p o p u l a r i t y  i n  o u r  c o u n t r y .  The 
m e a su r e s  t a k e n  t o  c a r r y  i n s u r a n c e  to  t h e  d o o r s  o f  th e  p r o s p e c ­
t i v e  con su m ers  may n ot do away w ith  th e  need  to  c o v e r  th e  
a g e d  u n d e r  a  c l o a k  o f  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y .  M oreo v er ,  in  W estern  
c o u n t r i e s  l i k e  U .K. and C an ada  o r  U .S .A . ,  n eed  f o r  s o c i a l  s e ­
c u r i t y  c o u ld  n o t  be  r u le d  o u t  i n  s p i t e  o f  th e  g r e a t  p o p u l a r i t y  
e n jo y e d  by l i f e  in s u r a n c e  in  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s .  H ence, i t  may 
be c o n c lu d e d  t h a t  l i f e  i n s u r a n c e  i s  no s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  - o l d  a g e  
i n s u r a n c e  i n  I n d i a .  The c o n c l u s i o n  i s  e q u a l l y  a p p l i c a b l e  to  
c o n d i t i o n s  i n  U .P .  H ence, l i f e  in s u r a n c e  p r o t e c t i o n  can n o t  
r e p l a c e  o l d  a g e  in s u r a n c e  i n  th e  S t a t e  and c o u n tr y  b o th .
C. GOVERNMENT SCHEME
In  a l l  th e  schm es d i s c u s s e d  a b o v e ,  e i t h e r  th e  Government
d o e s  n o t  p a r t i c i p a t e  a t  a l l  o r  i t  p a r t i c i p a t e s  to  th e  e x t e n t
o f  p a s s i n g  l e g i s l a t i o n  o r  p r o v i d i n g  s u p e r v i s i o n .  B u t ,  h ow ever ,
/  \/^ sX
th e  U .P . Government i n s t i t u t e d  an Old Age P e n s io n  scheme  
which i s  an  o b j e c t i v e  m a n i f e s t a t i o n  o f  th e  i n t e r e s t  th e  Govern­
ment sh o u ld  t a k e  in  th e  w e l f a r e  o f  th e  a g e d .  In  f a c t ,  i t  i s  
e n t i r e l y  a  new m i l e s t o n e  i n s t a l l e d  i n  I n d i a  f o r  th e  f i r s t  
t im e  on t h e  ro a d  l e a d i n g  to  th e  r e a l i s a t i o n  o f  s o c i a l i s t i c  
p a t t e r n  o f  s o c i e t y ,  which sh e  h a s  ch o sen  f o r  h e r  g b a l ,
1. M alviya, H.D., Op. G i t * ,  p 19
( 11.37 )
It has been rightly stated in the preface^ introducing 
the scheme:’It is difficult to earn living in old age, 
hence it has been considered an immediate need that those 
aged seventy years or more and incapable of earning their 
living and those having no other means of subsistence must 
necessarily be given some financial assistance.’ With this 
end in view, the scheme was instituted in order to grant 
pensions to such persons with effect from December 1, 1957.
The Uttar Pradesh Government leads other States of the Indian 
Union in the institution of a soccial assistance scheme for the , 
amelioration of the conditions of the aged.
Ihe eligibility for assistance under this scheme rests, 
primarily, on age, destitution and residence conditions. In 
order to qualify for benefit, the beneficiary
(a) must be aged seventy years or more,
(b) must be a destitute, and
(c) must be a resident of Uttar Pradesh for at least one year
before the dat§ of application for the award of pension.
A destitute has been defined as a person who has no 
source of income and who has no ’liable relation’ specified 
hereunder, aged twenty or feore:
(i) a son, a son’s son, a son’s wife;
(ii) real brother, son of a real brother, wife of a real brother?
(iii) married daughter, daughter's son (such relations will be 
considered only if the local,religious, community and social 
customs permit dependence upon them);
1, Translated from the Hindi Pamphlet issued by the U.P. Govt,
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( i v )  h u sb a n d ,  w i f e ,  r e a l  b r o t h e r s  o f  h u sb an ^ ;
(v )  m a r r ie d  s i s t e r ,  so n  o f  a  s i s t e r ;  and
( v i )  so n  o f  f a t h e r ^ s  r e a l  b r o t h e r .
The a p p l i c a n t  s h a l l  a l s o  b e  t r e a t e d  a  d e s t i t u t e  i f  a l l  th e
r e l a t i o n s  d e s c r i b e d  ab ove  happen to  be/
( a )  ab o v e  s e v e n t y  y e a r s  o f  a g e  and h a v in g  no incom e o f  t h e i r  
own,
(b )  t o t a l l y  i n c a p a c i t a t e d  to  e a rn  t h e i r  l i v i n g ,  su c h  a s  th e  
b l i n d ,  th e  l e p e r s ,  th e  l u n a t i c s  and th e  c r i p p l e d ,
( c )  u n t r a c e a b l e  f o r  th e  l a s t  s e v e n  y e a r s  and i n  su c h  c a s e s  a s  th e  
D i s t r i c t  M a g i s t r a t e  i s  s a t i s f i e d  a f t e r  n e d e s s a r y  e n q u ir y  t h a t  
th e y  a r e  u n t r a c e a b l e .
I f  t h e r e  i s  o n ly  one l i v i n g  r e l a t i o n  v i z ,  w i f e ,  th e  husband  
s h a l l  be  t r e a t e d  a s  d e s t i t u t e  i f  h e r  a g e  i s  s i x t y  y e a r s  o r  m ore.  
In c a s e  o f  l u n a t i c s  and i d i o t s ,  th e  D i s t r i c t  M a g i s t r a t e  i s  
a u t h o r i s e d  t o  a p p o jn t  g u a r d i a n s  whom t h e  amount o f  p e n s io n  
may be  r e m i t t e d .  However, s a d h u s ,  b e g g a r s  and th e  in m a te s  o f  
o r p h a n a g e s  and p o o r  h o u se s  m a in ta in e d  f r e e  w i l l  n o t  b e  
c o n s id e r e d  to  be d e s t i t u t e s .
The a p p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  th e  award o f  p e n s i o n s  s h a l l  be  
s u b m it te d  i n  Form OAP I  i n  d u p l i c a t e  to  th e  T e h s i l d a r  o f  
th e  t e s i l  in  which th e  d e s t i t u t e  o r d i n a r i l y  r e s i d e s .  A ppli* .  
c a t i o n . f o r m s  a r e  o b t a i n a b l e  from  th e  Gram P a n c h a y a t s ,  T e s i l s  
o r  th e  o f f i c e s  o f  Town A re a s  and n o t i f i e d  a r e a s .  On th e  
r e c e i p t  o f  a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  t h e  award o f  Old Age P e n s i o n s ,  th e  
T e h s i l d a r  v e r i f i e s  a g e ,  d o m i c i l e ,  r e s i d e n c e  and th e  econom ic  
c o n d i t i o n s  o f  th e  a p p l i c a n t .  Such e n q u i r i e s  a r e  made w ith  
th e  h e lp  o f  e n t r i e s  in  th e  Natio.^l^Jil R e g i s t e r  o f  C i t i z e n s
( 11.39 ).
The T e h s i l d a r  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  make a  l i s t  o f  a l l  a p p l i c a n t s
f o r  th e  g r a n t  o f  p e n s io n  on Form OAP I I .  In  th e  r u r a l  a r e a s ,
th e  T e h s i l d a r  may make e n q u i r i e s  w ith  t h e  h e lp  o f  th e
L e k h p a l  in  o r d e r  t o  v e r i f y  t h e  c o n t e n t s  o f  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n s .
In u rb a n  a r e a s ,  t h e  M u n ic ip a l  M e d ic a l  O f f i c e r  o f  H e a lth
c o n c e rn e d  o r  where t h e r e  i s  no su c h  O f f i c e r ,  th e  D i s t r i c t
M e d ic a l  O f f i c e r  o f  H e a lth  s h a l l  r e n d e r  n e c e s s a r y  a s s i s t a n c e
in  v e r i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  a p p l i c a t i o n s .  In  c a s e  t h e  name o f
th e  a p p l i c a n t  d o e s  n o t  a p p e a r  in  th e  N a t io n a l  R e g i s t e r  o f
C i t i z e n s  o f  th e  a r e a  c o n c e r n e d ,  o r  h i s  a g e  m en tio n ed  t h e r e i n
d i f f e r s  from  t h e  one g iv e n  i n  th e  a p p l i c a t i o n ,  th e  T e h s i l d a r
may v e r i f y  t h e s g  p a r t i c u l a r s  from  o t h e r  s o u r c e s  a n d  fo rw ard  th e
a p p l i c a t i o n  to  th e  D i s t r i c t  M a g i s t r a t e  who a l s o  m a in t a in s
a  l i s t  o f  su c h  a p p l i c a t i o n s  in  Form OAP I I I .  A f t e r  ex am in in g
th e  a p p l i c a t i o n s  r e c e iv e d  from  th e  T e h s i l d a r ,  h e  s e n d s  h i s
recom m endation s t o  th e  L ab o u r  C om m ission er o f  U t t a r  P ra d e sh
s t a t i o n e d  i n  K an p u r, i n  Form OAPH •  The L a b o u r  C om m ission er
i s  th e  s a n c t i o n i n g  a u t h o r i t y  o f  p e n s i o n s .  He a l l o t s  a  s e p e r a t e
number to  each  p e n s i o n e r .  The f i n a l  award i s  com m unicated to
th e  D i s t r i c t  M a g i s t r a t e ,  t h e  T e h s i l d a r  and th e  a p p l i c a n t .
The T e h s i l d a r  m akes s ix - m o n th ly  v e r i f i c a t i o n s  o f  th e  p e n s i o n e r s
i f  th e y  a r e  a l i v e ,  and £^lso i f  they ' c o n t in u e  to  be a  d e s t i t u t e
a s  d e f in e d  i n  th e  schem e.* \
Ih e  p e n s i o n s  g r a n te d  u n d e r  t h e  schBme a r e  o f  two t y p e s :  
L i f e  P e n s io n s  and L im ite d - te r m  P e n s i o n s .  The fo r m e r  i s  p a y a b le  
t i l l  d e a th  o f  th e  b e n e f i c i a r y  and th e  l a t t e r  i s  p a i d  t i l l  
th e  a t t a in m e n t  o f  tw enty y e a r s  o f  a g e  by c e r t a i n  l i a b l e  r e l a ­
t i o n s .  The amount o f  p e n s io n  i s  r e m i t t e d  by Money O rd e r .
( 11.40 )
Ordinarily, the amount of pension is remitted quarterly, but 
the Government can direct to make payments at shorter intervals. 
In case of non-receipt of the pension on due date, the Labour 
Commissioner must be informed accordingly within a reasonable 
time. Tlie amount of pension has been fixed at fifteen rupees 
per month. On the death of the beneficiary, the payment of * 
pensions is stopped. Under special circumstances, however, the 
heirs of the beneficiary may receive the payment.
As an exhibit of the old relics of the English Poor Laws, 
the beneficiary is required to maintain good moral character 
for the continuance of his title to pensions.
The report of the running of the scheme shows that 
up to the end of August 1959, in all 6,448 applications 
for the avard of pensions were received of which 5,449 cases 
were sanctioned and 710 cases were finally rejected. Ihe 
remaining 289 applications were under consideration. It may 
be noted that the scheme is very modest. In the first instance, 
the amount of pension is low for the maintenance of the 
beneficiary, at least at the current level of prices. Again, 
the test of destitution is very harsh and the list of liable 
relations is almost exhaustive. Some of them are not liable 
to maintain their aged relations under any moral code or social 
custom. Thus, the real brother may have some compassion for 
his aged destitute brother, but his wife may not be so con­
siderate. Moreover, in view of the high cost of living in 
industrial cities and urban localities, disintegration of the 
j$int-family system and individualistic way of living in 
urban and industrial communities which are certain hard
(11.41)
facts of the modern society, it seems that they have been 
disregarded in framing the scheme outright. It may also be 
noted that 70 years of age is an advanced age of senility. 
Though it may be argued that it is in keeping with the 
international practice for the grant of assistance pension 
yet considering the low expectation of life in India, poor 
nutrition available to the majority of population, lack of 
subsidiary employaieAt opportunities and low income otjthe 
Indian population, the age needs be reconsidered. It should 
be preferably lowered to 65 years.
At this stage, one should ^^ ot lose Sight of the cost 
factor. Thus, according to 1951 census data, the population aged 
65 or more was 3»Pf of the total population. This shows that 
about 128 lakh aged will be eligible for the grant of pensions 
if the age is lowered by five years ( according to the present 
estimates of population at 40 crores). Number of persons eligi­
ble in U.P. will be about 24 lakhs. If the proportion of 
aged population actively engaged in production is taken to 
be 78.5 per centj the persons eligible for be^ng inactive 
aged will be about 25.20 lakhs in India and 5.18 lakhs in 
U.P. If, however, the actively engaged aged are taken to be
62.5 per cent (and this seems morSoapproximate to facts in 
India), the nuiber of persons eligible for pensions at that 
age will come to 48 lakhs and 9 lakhs in India and U.P.
1. Vide: The Agi^ of Population and Its Economic and Social 
Implications (United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, New York, 1956), table 31, p 5 ? .  I have adop­
ted the proportions applicable to undeveloped and semidevelop' 
ed countries for my calcualtions in view of the economic si- 
P tuation in India.
Ibid, . India is more a semideveloped country than an unde­
veloped country
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respectively. The following table presents these results 
for visual inspection:
Table II.9
PROPORTION OF INACTIVE AGED POPULATION IN INDIA AND U.P. AND 
COST OF PENSIONS AT Rs, 15 p.m. PER CAPITA
(11.45)
India U.P.
Total population ( in lakhs ) 4,000.00 750.00
Aged 65 or more 128.00 24.00
Active Aged^ 100.48 18.82
Active Aged^ 80.00 15.00
Inactive Aged^ 27.52 5.18
Inactive Aged^
Cost of Pensions^ (Rs, lakhs) 
Cost of pensions^ (Rs, lakhs)
48.00 
^ Wrae- 
4l0^ rO0-
9.00
/^Aoot>
a At 78,5 per cent of the aged population engaged actively 
in production.
b At 62.5 T)er cent of the aged population actively engaged 
in production*
N.B. Population figures according to the estimates of Central 
Statistical Organisation for the year 1959 ( mid-year ) 
were 415 millions including the population of Jammu and 
Kashmir. Allowance given for the Jammu and Kashmir population 
Indian population has been taken at 400 millions. Like­
wise, the population of Uttar Pradesh has been assumed to 
be 75 millions. There may be a diffeiience of a few lakhs 
on either side, but the approximate figures will do for a 
rough calcualtion as they are easy to handle*
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Thus, according to the estimates applicable to undeveloped 
economies, the pension will cost Ri lakhs in India and
R& lakhs in U.P. According to the estimates applicable
to semi-developed economies, the cost will be Rs, -720' lakhs
U so
in India and Rs, lakhs in U.P. This represents eiily
//•S'per cent afid OjOI^Der cent of the revenue expenditure of the
Union Government according to budgeted estimates for the year
7-7/ /$-2>and 0-*O^ per cent and-O.-OI-r per cent of the revenue
expenditure of U.P. according to the budgeted estimates for
the year 0-^ 59. 'A3rfefeotr^, ^ his is]a negligible proportion
a*uL
of the total Government budget, from other points of view, 
social assistance is not preferable to provide old age pro­
tection#
D.RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE STUDY GROUP ON SOCIAL SECURITY 
Government are nevertheless, taking active interest 
in thinking out a plan for providing old age security. With 
this end in view, inter alia, a Study Group on Social Security 
( later referred to as the Group) was set up by the Central 
Ministry of Labour and Employemut on 3rd. August 1957 
(a) to examine the experience gained by the working of social 
security schemes already in operation;
fb) to study how these schemes and any other privileges given 
to workers could be combined in a comprehensive social se­
curity system;
(c) to work out administrative details of such an integrated 
scheme;
(d) to examine whether, without any appreciable increase
in the total liability of employers and workers, additional
advantages can be given to the.working class; and
(e) to examine and make recommendations regarding conversion 
wholly or partly, of the present provident funds into a suit­
able pension scheme as envisaged in the Second Five Year Plsui. 
It is only the last term of reference that concerns this 
discussjron directly at this stage.
The Group observe that Provident Funds have "proved a 
real boon to the workers covered thereby, in the form of pro­
vision for old age,”^  But in their opinion, provident funds 
are hot preferable to a regular pension scheme. Therefore,
”A scheme of Old Age, Invalidity, and Survivorship Pension-
2cum-Gratuity is recommended for adoption,” For this they 
recommend the conversion of Provident Funds into Pension 
Funds. In order to augment the resources for paying pensions 
of reasonable amounts, they favour:
(i) an increase in workers' contributions to Provident Funds 
from 6.25 per cent to 8-1/? per cent. It should be given 
immediate effect.
(ii) A.year of contribution at the existing rate of 6^ per 
cent should be taken only as nine months' for reckoning the 
length of contribution period completed.
(iii) They have laid down that for transitional arrangements, 
rates for the factories should be as follows:
(a) For the factories in which the workers would be eligible 
for the benefits under the ESI scheme, the maximum rate 
under the said scheme viz. #- 2/3 per cent of the wage­
bill by the employer and 2-1/'^  er cent by the employees
1. Op. Cit., para 20
2. Ibid.
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should be given immediate effect.
(b) For factories in which the employees will be eligible
only to benefits under the proposed scheme of Old Age,
Invalidity and Survivorship Pension-cum-Gratuity, (OAIS) 
their rates of contribution under the EPF scheme should be 
raised to 8-I/ 3  per cent of the wage bill both for the 
employer and the employee;
(c) For the factories in which the employees will be covered
for full range of benefits under the ESI, and OAIS Pension
schemes, the full rates of contributions shall be 13
per cent and 10-2/’5 per cent for employers and employees 
respectively.
(d) In addition to this, the employers will be liable to pay 
an administrative charge not exceeding 0,4 per cent of 
this wage bill in cases under (b) and (c)* There will be 
no such levy under (a). It may be noted that the employers 
are already paying administrative charges under the EPF 
scheme.
For administration, they recommend integration of the 
existing schemes of ESI and EPF. They opine,that, " the sooner 
the administrative integration can be affected, the better it 
may prove for future smooth working.”^
The scheme proposed by the Group envisages the following 
benefits:
(a) Pension. This benefit will be available to (i) persons 
aged 60 (55 for women) with 15 years' service record,
(ii) persons certified to be invalid after completing at
1. Op. Cit. para 68
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least five years' service. These beneficiaries will be granted 
life pensions provided that they entered employment before 
the age of 45 years. Pension would be calculated at the average 
of last five years’ wages multiplied by 1/80 of the number 
of years of qualifying service, provided that the maximum 
fraction will be 55/80 ( 30/80 for women ), and the 
minimum 20/80. Those who enter employment after the age of 
45 years will only be entitled to the return of their own 
contributions together with employers' contributions plus 
interest on the accumulated balance at the rate of 3 per 
cent per annum. This amount may be paid in instalments.
(b) Survivorship Benefit would be payable to the family of 
the deceased (i) dying after putting in five years’ qualify­
ing service, (ii) dying whil6 in receipt of the retiring or 
invalidity pension under the scheme.
(c) If the insured postpones retirement after age sixty
(55 for females) his contributions will be reduced accordingly 
but no credit except the receipt of non-pensionary benefits 
will be allowed to him in respect of his additional service 
period.
(d) Gratuity will be payable in case of retirement after 
twenty years of qualifying service at the rate equal to four 
months’ wages calculated at the average of last five years’ 
wages. For retirement after twenty-five years of service, 
gratuity benefit will be increased to six months’ such wages.
(e) Withdrawal Benefits. Before attaining the age of fifty, 
if the employee leaves insurable employment, he will be en­
titled to the following percentages of wages for the period
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for which contributions were paid:
Years of service Percentage of wages returnable
Less than one year 8
1-15 10
15-25 12
over 25 15
Entrants after age 45 (40 for women) who so opt out even 
after the age fifty, will also be eligible for this benefit.
A look on these recommendations shows that public 
opinion as well as expert opinion is on the side of old age 
protection, vlth regard to the stages of introduction of 
such scheme, the recommendations are well thought out. Since 
the workers are williiig to contribute and they are already 
contributing to the EPF scheme, it will not jeopardise their 
living standards to pay the contributions. The rates of 
contributions are also moderate. However, the maximum benefit 
under the proposed scheme will be only 35/80 of the average 
wages of the last five years. If the worker enters employment 
at the age of twenty and contributes for forty years regularly, 
he should have been entitled to 50 per cent of the wages 
had there been no maximum limit. It may be mentioned here 
that the pensions allowed in socialistic countries range 
from sixty per cent of wages in Czechoslovakia to 100^ in 
cet-tain cases in the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia. If the contri­
butions at the rate of 16-2/3 oer cent of wages are accumu­
lated for forty years (without interest) payment of pension 
(alone) exclusive of other retiral benefits wi''l be possible
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at 66.67 per cent of the wages (assumed to be constant) for ten 
years# However, if the wages are supposed to increase, as they 
do, with the length of service and other elements of benefits to 
survivors etc. is taken into account, payment upto 50 per 
cent of wages does not seem impossible. But the non-payment of 
contributions due to excusals and the payment of pensions at 
the average of last five years of wages which are the highest 
one earns in his working life, call for a lower percentage. 
However, it is an actuarial problem, which majr be left to 
actuaries; but on an actual working of the scheme, experience 
may be gained. It will show whether the rasising of the maxi­
mum benefits is practicable at the existing arrangements.
Moreover, the Group have recommended the conversion of 
the existing Provident Fund schemes into one of pensions.
This is to obviate the practical difficulties and avoid the 
resistance of the emplojKers in its initial stages. As the 
Group seem to envisage, the proposed scheme should be extended 
to all industrial undertakings according to a schedule, '^he 
most vital point point in implementing; a scheme of social se­
curity is the problem of finance. The existing scheme of EPF 
does not require Government contribution. This follows that 
Government are excused of any financial responsibility under the 
proposed scheme of the Group too. The Group seems to be very 
cautious not to touch the purse of the Government, They had, 
perhaps, to proceed on a priori ground that the Government 
are not going to contribute to the scheme. I propose to 
discuss in detail the financial liabilities of the various 
parties of social insurance including the Government. Hence
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the discussion may be postponed at this stage,
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS | To sum up the foregoing discus­
sion, there are some buttress of old age protection in U.P.
EPF scheme is a contributory scheme, but is not an ideal 
measure of protection against old age. It is neither social 
insurance nor a social assistance measure. Employers' contri­
butory schemes voluntarily instituted by them stand at par 
with the EPF scheme. Of non-contributory measures, private 
savings are, no doubt, the first line of defence against all 
economic contingencies. But the low earnings of the industrial 
workers, high cost of living, gradual disintegration of the 
joint family system, large team of dependents per industrial 
employee are the factors that reduce saving margin. Thus, it 
cannot be relied to protect old age. Mutual insurance which 
is a co-operative device has been outdated now and it cannot 
be revived advantageously in this country due to its inherent 
weaknesses. Due to financial difficulties, trade unions can­
not afford to provide this insurance. Life insurance also 
provides against old age. It is only popular in the regular- 
income class and lettered people# At the best, it is a 
supplement but not a substitute to old age insurance. Our 
industrial workers have low insurable capacity. In the coun­
tries where it is much popular, it could not replace old 
age insurance. Hence, it cannot be relied upon here too. The 
Old Age Pensions scheme of the U.P. Government provides 
protection against destitution. This scheme suffers from
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all the defects of a non^contributory Government scheme, 
in addition to being inadequate and limited in coverage. Old 
Age Pension being a costly scheme, its unilateral finance 
will place undue burden on the general tax-payer.
In 1958, the Study Group on Social Security have 
recommended the conversion of the existing EPF scheme into 
one of old age insurance scheme. However, the existing EPF 
scheme is financed by the employers and the employees and 
the Government does not share the cost. Since the finance is the 
most important problem related to social insurance, I propose 
to discuss the technique of finance which may be adopted 
for old age protection in India and the parties that should 
contribute to the cost of the scheme. This forms the subject- 
matter of the next Chapter^
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PART TWO
COST IMPIICATIONS OP OLD-ILGE INSURANCE
CPIAPTER III
FINAHCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF OLD AGE
SECURITY
In the previous Chapter, I dealt with the necessity of 
old age protection in U.P. in view of the grov/ing industrial 
population , developmental plans and India's pledge for the 
establishment of a socialistic pattern of society free from 
want, hunger and disease. I concluded that at the moment, all 
the available sources do not suggest as reliable sources for 
the protection and amelioration of the conditions of the aged 
population. The recommendations of the Study Group for the 
conversion of the EPF scheme into one of old age pensions, laid 
down for the joint contributions of the employers and the 
employees. The present Chapter is an attempt to analyse the 
technique of finance for the protection of old age contingency.
A discussion of the international practices v/ill be use­
ful to review the matter of finances of the schemes of old- 
age security abroad. I have chosen to discuss those countries 
which are model ones either as regards the origin and deve­
lopment of the scheme of social insurance or of social assis­
tance or have some novelty in the coverage technique. Thus, 
Germany is the model country from the point of view of the 
origin of the scheme; Australia provides an example of the 
blanket coverage with a peculiar technique of finance; U.K.,. 
U.S.A. and France are obviously important with regard to deve­
lopment of old age security and also v/ith regard to their 
international prestige. USSR is the model socialist Republic. 
Among Asian nations, I have chosen Japan for her comparative
higher economic development. This will serve to assess the 
consensus of opinion in this behalf and also serve as a use­
ful beacon to light the way for our own guidance in deter­
mining the financial liability of old age protection.
In Germany, which is the birthr-place of social insurance, 
there was a tendency to distribute the cost of old age 
pension on the beneficiaries and the employers in equal pro­
portions with a supplementation of a state subsidy at the 
rate of fifty marks yearly for each pensioner. V/ith the 
passage of time, the consensus of opinion is now established 
on the side of distributing financial burden over the bene­
ficiaries, their employers, if any,and the State. During 
the financial year ending December 31, 1954, pensions for 
wage earners, salary earners and miners were financed by 
contributions from the beneficiaries, their employers and the 
State in the following manner:
Table III.1
THE TRIPARTITE CONTRIBUTIONS FOR GERMAN OLD AGE INSURANCE
(1954)
(Amount in million Rfe^l&arks)
Contributions. Wage Earners Salary Earners Mine V/orkers
Amount , % Amount % Amount %
( III.2 )
The insured 1,760 34 940 43 253 22
The employers 1,632 31 638 30 450 39
State 1,486 28 465 21 308 27
Miscellaneous 347 7 119 6 103 12
Total 5,227 100 2,162 100 1,114 100
SOURCE: I.L.Oi The Cost of Social Security. (Geneva,1958),
P 62.
In Germany, there are also schemes of pensions for 
civil servants and military men which are financed unilatera­
lly by the State. Incidentally, State is the employer too 
in such cases. Therefore, such schemes may best be called 
bipartite schemes financed by the employers and the State.
This shows that the schemes of social insurance operating 
in the Federal Republic of Germany are mostly financed by 
the employees, their employers and the State. However, the 
civil and military pensions can be either said to have been 
unilaterally financed by the employers alone or the State 
alone or by the two in collaboration with each other. The 
military services and civil services have never been treated 
at par with the industrial employment for social insurance 
purposes in any part of the world. Military pensions are 
the oldest pensions which the State organised for the benefit 
of the soldiers. In industrial employees' cases, it is 
clear, that the State is a participant in the cost and it 
bore a sizeable proportion of cost in Germany.
In Australia, pensions are a part of the integrated 
scheme of social insurance ( or social assistance) and wel­
fare programme under which the benefits are paid out of a 
consolidated National Welfare Fund. During the year ending 
50th June 1954, the Fund for social insurance and assimilated 
schemes-amounted to £A. 206.604 million of which the State 
and other public authorities bore £A. 179.838 million or 
more than 87 per cent. The employers and the insured shared 
£A. 24.054 millions and £A.. 0*411 millions respectively which 
formed ; per cent and • 0>2 per cent respective:
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of the total cost. The rest vas made up from the income 
from investments. Strictly speaking, the National Insurance 
has been financed in Australia by appropriation from the 
Consolidated Revenue equal to the expenditure of the Fund.^
As a matter of fact, social insurance programme is financed 
in Australia from the revenues of a graduated tax levied on 
taxable incomes and collected with the incometax.
A classification of the National Insurance and Assimi­
lated Schemes shows that during the year under review, it 
included National Welfare Fund, Coal Miners* Pensions, Coal 
and Oil-shale Mine-workers’ Compensation Subsidy Fund (applies 
in New South Wales only) and Workmen's Compensation for 
general and coal mining workers. The National Welfare Fund 
is a consolidated fund making provision for sickness, unemploy­
ment, maternity, funeral allowance, old age, invalidity and 
survivorship pensions, special benefits, family allowances, 
medical benefits and rehabilitation. The entire fund amount­
ing to £A, 181.751 m. was contributed by the State and income 
from investments (£A. 179..657 m. and £A. 2.094 m. respectively.). 
Coal miners’ schemes are financed by tripartite contributions 
from the insured persons, their employers and public authori­
ties. The other schemes are financed by employers alone. It 
may be said, therefore that social insurance proper has been 
financed by general tax-payer and^in this way, is a social 
assistance measure. Other schemes are not directly related 
to this analysis. But since a proportion of income tax is 
earmarked for the purpose of ■ financing these measures,
1. I.L.O. The Cost of Social Security, p 22, footnote 2
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the technique involves an element of social insurance.
In the United States, the scheme of Old Age, Survivorship 
and Disability Insurance (OASDI) is financed from the contri­
butions by the employers and the beneficiaries. In case of 
employed beneficiaries, their annual earnings up to a maximum 
of onlyi^ 4,80C; are subject to social security tax; any sum 
earned beyond this amount is ignored. The rate of contribu­
tions for the employee in 1959 was 2-3 per cent of their earn­
ings and their employers paid an equal sum on the first 
$ 4,800' paid as wages, to each employee individually during 
the course of a year. The self-employed persons who are also 
covered under the-scheme pay at a higher rate equal to one- 
and-a-half times the rates applicable to other employees.
The law provides that the tax rates will gradually increase 
from a combined employer-employee rate of five per cent in 
1959 rising ultimately to nine per cent in 1969.' The follow­
ing is the schedule of the contributions applicable in diff­
erent years under the present law:
Years C O N T R I B U T I O N  R A T E S  (Percentscge of 
Employees Employers 0 4,800 J Self-
employed
( III.5 )
1959 2^ 2i 3f
1960-62 5 3 4 2^-
1963-65 5i
1 9 6 6 -6 8 4 4 6
1969 and 
thereafter 42 41 61
It is clear, therefore, that the United State Government 
does not take active participation in the financing of OASDI 
scheme. The Federal Government, however, bears the entire 
cost of Old Age Assistance scheme in collaboration with the 
State Governments*
In Great Britain, the National Insurance scheme which 
comprises of widowhood (death of the breadwinner); old age 
(retirement pension); maternity; orphanhood (guardianship 
benefits); and funeral (death) grants, is supported by contri­
butions from the protected persons, their employers (if there 
are any), and the State. The rates of contributions are 
estimated to meet the cost of benefits if all protected 
persons had begun to be insured at the age of sixteen years. 
The insured pay flat rate contributions as follows;
Table III.3
FLAT-RATE CONTRIBUTIONS UNDER BRITISH 
NATIONAL INSURANCE SCHEME
Type of insured V/eekly rates of contributions apportioned 
and contribution, to National Insurance Scheme.
( III.6 )
Men over 18 Women over 18 Boys under 
18
Girls under 
18
Mployed persons § l i 1 5I § 3I 2® el
Self-Dnployed 7 7 6 6 4 4 3 9
Unemployed 5 8 4 6 3 3 2 7
Employers* share 5 41 4 3 I2 2
Central Governments’ 
share to:
Ekaployed 1 10 1 6 1 10 0 10
Self-employed 2 6 2 2 1 1 3
Unemployed 1 10 1 6 1 1 0 10|
N.B. IMemployed persons are eligible for all other benefits 
but not for unemployment compensation. Therefore, they 
pay lower rates of contributions.
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In Great Britain too as in the United States, the 
Central Government bears the entire cost of non-contrihutory
oveV
pensions and family allowances,!and above its contributionsA
in the contributory programmes.
The above arrangement has been recently modified in 
response to the long overdue change demanded for graduated 
contributions and benefits. The National Insurance (Amend­
ment) Act 1959, introduced a new system. For the first time, 
Great Britain departed from the principle of flat-rate system 
unrelated to earnings. The new law superimposes on the old 
system a graduated system under which contributions and bene­
fits are related to wages. The new graduated scales of contri­
butions for adult employees v;ill be as follow:
Table III.4
THE NEW GRADUATED RATES OF CONTRIBUTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN
Weekly Flat Rate Graduated ]Rates Total
earnings. Men Women Men V/omen Men V/omen
s d s d s d s d s d s d
£ 3 or 
less 3 0-1 2 10^ •I. mm 3 o i 2 10^
3 to 9 5 9-1 5 4 i - - - - 5 9h 5 4-h
10 5 9 i 5 41 0 10 0 10 6 6 2-1
11 5 9 i 5 1 8 1 8 7 5^ 7 0-1
12 5 9 i 5 2 6 2 6 8 7 10^^
13 5 9i 5 3 5 3 5 9 2-h 8 9-h
14 5 9-1 5 4i- 4 3 4 3 10 0-1 9 7-1-
over 15 5 9^ 5 4i 5 1 5 1 10 10-1 10 5i
SOURCE: Social Security Bulletin (U.S.Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, Washington), September, 1959 
P 5.
N.B. Employers' contributions are equal to that of the
employees save that for employees earnings less thani3 
a week, their employers contribute at the rate of 
8s.6id. for men and 7s.10-^ -d. for female employees.
It is evident, therefore, that the superstructure of 
social insurance schemes has been raised in Great Britain on 
the basis of tripartite contributions from the insured, their 
employers (if any), and the State. Pensions, which are contri­
butory as well as non-contributory, are financed on the social 
insurance lines, and the social assistance pattern respectively, 
In other words, all contributory schemes are financed by the 
insured, the employers and the State; and all non-contributory 
schemes are State-financed.
In the U.S.S.R., social insurance and pension schemes 
are unilaterally financed by factories and offices which are 
the chief employing institutions. The employee’ has to contri­
bute nothing*. Members of the collective farms get their 
pensions from funds specially earmarked for this purpose and 
financed by collective farms themselves out of their collec­
tive income. This feature of social insurance finance is 
more or less prevalent in all socialistic countries. For 
example, in China Peoples' Republic, Labour Insurance is 
financed by employers or owners of employing institutions.
A tax is levied on payroll at the rate of three per cent of 
which 70 per cent is utilized for the payment of current 
expenses of pensions, allowances and relief payments; the 
remaining 30 per cent is made over to the All-China Federa­
tion of Labour for financing communal labour insurance.* The
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Communal labour insurance includes the provision of over­
night sanatoria,special diets to needy persons,organisation 
of rest homes,orphanages and other facilities.For further 
details, see Labour Insurance in New China.(Peking.1955. 
Foreign Languages Press).
employee is not required to contribute to the finances of
the scheme. In Czechoslovakia too, the State participated in
the finances of social security. Expenditure of social
insurance claims one-third of the total State budget*^
In France, the social security scheme is financed by
tripartite contributions from the employers, the employees
and the State, Under the Decree No. 58-1436 dated December 1,
21958 , the maximum assessable income for the purpose of 
social insurance and employment injury contributions has been 
raised from 600,000 francs to 660^000 francs per annum. 
Employers are required to pay 12.5^ ( previously 10^ ) of 
their wage bill and the employees contribute at the rate of 
six per cent. For seamen, the full rate has been fixed at 
18.75 per cent with 11.25 per cent as employers’ and 7.50 
per cent as employees' contributions, In case of civil 
servants’ social security scheme, the State share ha^ been 
raised from 2.5 to 3.5 per cent. The figures for the 
calendar year 1954 disclosed that under the scheme of social 
inusrance for employees in industry and commerce, the insured 
paid 192,806 million francs out of a total receipt of 609,321 m. 
francs, the share of the employers being 393*011 m.francs, 
and that of the State and other public bodies 18,083 m.
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1. Erben,Bohumil and Marik,Jaromir,Social Security in 
Czechoslovakia. (Orbis Prague, 1957),P 1*
2. Industry and Labour (ILO, Geneva) May, 1959,
French Social Security Modification, p 346,
francs. This works out at 31.7f» 64.5^ and 2.9f for the 
employees, the employers and State respectively.^ The rest 
was contributed by other sources of income including interest 
on investments. Thus, the State's share in the finances is 
nominal. The employers and the employees share the cost in 
proportion of 2:1 roughly. This proportion resembles the 
cost structure under the ESI scheme under which the shares of 
the employees and the employers have been fixed at 2-1/5 % 
and 4-2/5 % of the insurable wages of the workers respectively, 
Among the Asian nations, Japan has an integrated scheme 
of social insurance which provides, inter alia, for welfare 
pensions. There is another scheme of public employees' pen­
sions. State participation in the finance of the two schemes 
is modest. During the financial year ending 31st March, 1955, 
total receipts on account of vielfare pensions amounted to 
56,707 m. of which the insured contributed 14,785 million or 
about 47.5^ 1 their employers contributed an e^ual sum. The 
rest 4.5^ was borne by the State. In case of public employees 
pensions, the State participated to the extent of 78,355 m.
The percentage contribution made by the State works out at
292^ and that of the insured persons at about eight per cent.
In Turkey, employers and employees shared equally during 
the financial year ended December 31, 1954. They contributed 
£T. 29.729 m. each out of a total receipt of £T. 63.557 m.
1. I.L.O. The Cost of Social Security, Op.Cit., p 55
2. The Cost o f  S o c i a l - S e c u r i t y , p 86.
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i#e* about 47 per cent each; the rest was contributed by the 
State and other sources of income*
The foregoing survey reveals that according to the 
technique of finance, old age social security schemes can be 
classified into the following types:
(i) Employer-employee-State financed,
(ii) Qaployer-employee financed,
(iii) Those financed by the employers alone,
(iv) Those financed by the State alone*
In India, as a passing reference was made in the Second 
Chapter, the following schemes of social security are in 
operation:
(a) Workmen's Compensation Scheme;
(b) Qaployees' State Insurance Scheme;
(c) Bnployees’ Provident FUnd Scheme;
(d) Maternity Benefit Schemes; and
(e) Coal Mines Provident Fund Scheme*
These schemes are all-India schemes except the Maternity Bene­
fit scheme which is State-wise. U.P. also has such legisla­
tion and other schemes are implemented in U.P. but for the 
last one. However, schemes (a) and (d) are financed by the 
employers alone. Neither the employees nor the State contri­
bute to the cost of the scheme. This resembles the social 
security model of socialistic countries. The financial 
structure of the ESI scheme rests on employee-employer par­
ticipation. This is patterned on the American model# However, 
the State Governments bear one-foutth of the cost of medical 
benefits provided to the beneficiaries, but in so far as 
cost of cash benefits is concerned, the State is dormant*
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According to Section 42 (1) to the ESI Act, 1948,
"No employees' contribution shall be payable by or on behalf 
of an employee whose average daily wages are belov/ one rupee.” 
Other employees are required to pay contributions at the rates 
specified in the Schedule I to the Act. The collection 
period has been fixed at six months or 26 weeks but the con­
tribution period is a week. The rates of weekly contributions 
according to the Schedule are as follows;
Table III.5
WEEKLY CONTRIBUTIONS UNDER THE E.S.I.SCHEME
( III.12 )
Group of employees Assumed V/eekly contributions
daily 
wages. BnployeES % o t (2 )  E m ployers  %
Rs nPs. Rs, nPs Rs nPs o f
l i L
1
1. Employees whose 
average daily 
wages are below 
Rs 1/- 0.87
2. Bnployees whose 
daily average 
wages are Re l/- 
but below Rs1,50 1.25
3* Employees whose 
daily wages are 
Rs 1.50 but below 
R s2/-  1.75
4. Qaployees whose 
average daily 
wages are Rs 2 
and above but
but below 3/~ 2.50
5. Employees v/hose 
average daily 
wages are Rs 3/- 
and above but
below Pj 4/- 3.50
0.12
0.25
0.57
0.50
1.7
2.4
2.5
2.4
0.44 8.3
0.44 5.8
0.50 4.8
0.75 5.0
1.00 4.8
(continued)
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(Table III.5, continued)
1 2 5 4 5 6
6.Employees v^ose 
average daily 
wages are Rs 4 and 
above but below 
Rs 6. 5.00 0.69 2.3 1.37 4.6
7.Employees \^ose 
average daily 
wages are Rs 6 
and above but 
below Rs 8. 7.00 0.94 2.2 1.87 4.4
8.Employees whose 
average daily 
wages are Rs8 
and above. 10.00 1.25 2.1 2.50 4.2
Insofar as the participation of the State in the 
finances is concerned, Section 27 provides for a grant by the 
Central Government laying dovn that, "The Central Government 
shall, every year during the first five years, make a grant 
to the (ESI) Corporation, of a sum equivalent to two-thirds 
of the administrative expenses of the Corporation not inclu­
ding therein the cost of any benefits provided by or under 
this Act#” According to section 58(1), the responsibility 
of providing medical benefits has been placed on the State 
Governments. Sub-section (1) thereto makes a provision to 
the effect that "Vhere the incidence of sickness benefit 
payment to the insured persons in any State is found to esceed 
the all-India average, the amount of such excess shall be 
shared between the Corporation end the State Governments in 
such proportions as may be fixed by agreement between them*" 
Originally, this proportion for the States was one-third, but
later on it was reduced to one-fourth by an agreement between 
the parties. The rate of contributions for the employers 
was originally fixed at 4-2/3 per cent of wages-bill, as is 
evident from table III.3, but it was never fully enforced.
The reasons advanced for this excusal were the employers* 
contention that the cost of production was very high in the 
year the scheme was enforced for the first time in February 
1952; and that any imposition of full rates of contributions 
will further increase the cost of production. But it may be 
noted that a 4.67 per cent of wage bill may not be more than 
one per cent of cost of production. In fact wages up to 
Rs400 per month per employee (the maximum amount of wages 
insurable under the scheme) constitute about fifteen per cent 
of the cost of production. Thus a tax equal to 4.6? per cent 
will add only 0.7005 per cent to the cost of production. The 
following remark is noteworthy in this connection as it 
corroborates my own statement." The net extra cost (due to 
imposition of payroll contributions) to the employer will, 
therefore, seem to be about f of one per cent of the value of 
output..."^ It is, therefore, quite clear that the employers* 
objection was no more weighty than a lame excuse in the nature 
of putting the cart before the horse. Moreover, the fear 
was expressed that the contributions will reduce the competi­
tive strength of the industry in the foreign markets. At 
present the employers are paying at the rate of li per cent
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1. Saxena,R,C.., Labour Problems and Social V/elfare (Jai Prakash 
Nath and Co., Meerut, third ed. 1954), p 375.
of the 'u'age bill which is neglibible to influence the posi­
tion of the industries covered under the scheme vis-a-vis 
others in the foreign market. Moreover, the present rates 
of the employers' special* contributions are only half the 
rates paid by the employees, a strange reversal of ratios.
The follov/ing is the statement of the amounts of contribut- 
ions paid by the parties under the ESI scheme:
Table III.6
CONTRIBUTIONS BY EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES 
UNDER THE E.S.I. SCHEMES
(amount in rupees thousands)
_ _ g  1956^57 1957-58 1958-59
Bmployers’ Special
Contributions 2,25,29 2,59,39 2,85,41 2,90^4
Bnployees* contri­
butions 2,59,61 5,*22,03 3,56,36 3,81,12
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It is thus, evident that the employees’ contribution throughout 
these years has been more than that of the employers’ special 
contributions. This is due to the fact that the full rate 
of the employers’ contributions has not been enforced so far.
The finance for the EPF scheme is obtained from the
* The present rate of employers’ special contribution is 
one and one-fourth per cent of the wage-bill-of covered 
employees in the implemented areas sind three-fourths of 
one per cent in non-implemented areas. The Government 
decided to increase the rates in August 1958 to three 
and a half per cent in implemented areas and one and three- 
fourths per cent in non-implemented areas, but it decided 
that the increased rates were not to be collected as long 
as the current expenditure of the Corporation could be 
met from the current revenues. This v;as stated in ESI 
Corporation's budget estimates presented in the Lok Sabha 
on 22nd March, I960 that the enhanced rates may have to be 
enforced "from a date not later than April 1, 1961". 
Reported by The Indianlsxpress(Delhi) p March 23, 1960.
contributions of the employers and the beneficiaries in 
equal proportions at the rate of 6.25 per cent of wages each.
The Coal Mines Provident Fund is also financed by the contri­
butions from the employees and the employers. It is evident 
that the State does not participate in the finances of any 
of the social security schemes operating in India; at least 
no portion of cash benefits is borne by the State in any scheme. 
The Study Group on Social Security referred to above, have 
also brought forth their recommendations for the financial 
participation of the employers and employees in equal propor­
tions with an additional levy on the employers at the rate of
0,4^ of payroll for meeting the cost of administration. It 
may be recalled here that employers are doing useful work 
regarding the administration of the ESI and EPF schemes 
already. Thus, the State has again been granted moratorium 
on its due share in the cost of social security for the aged.
In my opinion, the technique of social insurance, in 
the true sense of the term, which can be suggested for old 
age protection in Iridia, calls for a tripartite financial 
participation by the insured persons, their employers and the 
State too, in agreed proportions. It seems desirable at 
this stage to discuss the rationale of the financial partici­
pation of each of the three parties.
(a) The Insured Persons
The insured persons can make provision for old age 
contingency unilaterally or they may do it in collaboration 
with the other parties interested in his welfare. IMilateral 
finance of social security schemes by the insured persons
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themselves has been discussed at soae length in the previous 
chapter. It was noted that due to lov/ness of wages received 
by industrial workers and the cumbersome team of dependents 
which an average industrial worker has to support, he is 
hardly in a position to afford unilateral provision for the 
contingency of old age. If the scheme is financed indivi­
dually it assumes the character of individual savings which, 
as the discussion in the previous pages revealed, cannot be 
reckoned as a reliable source of old age protection. On the 
other hand, if the co-operative device among the insured 
persons inter se is followed, it boils down to the method of 
mutual insurance, which has shown its poor efficacy as an 
old age protection device in India and has been already 
relegated to the background. Moreover,)^ the insured persons 
are required to protect themselves single-handedly the 
really needy persons would likely fall from the mesh and the 
real purpose of the device will remain unfulfilled. This 
possibility of finance can, therefore, be safely ruled out 
for Indian industrial workers.
Nevertheless, the insured person owes a natural liabi­
lity towards the finances of the scheme which contemplates to 
protect him for the obvious reason that he is the chief and 
direct beneficiary. Payment of a part of the cost by the 
beneficiary himself arouses a feeling of ownership in him 
towards the scheme and the pricking feeling of charitable 
maintenance and all the attendant taint of disrespect, lowli­
ness and disgrace is repelled automatically. It is replaced 
by a sense of right, respect, dignity, effort and grace.
Host of the countries having social insurance benefit schemes
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believe that the establishment of legal relationship between 
benefits received and contributions paid enhances the social 
responsibility on the part of the insured. On this score, . 
a failure to raise the payroll tax in the United States in 
1939 as originally scheduled was made subject to se'tre'Be 
criticism by the members of the public as they thought that 
full rates must be realised to finance the scheme and no con­
cession should, however, be allowed therein. Lord Bweridge 
held that "The citizens as insured persons should realise that 
they cannot get more than certain benefits for certain contri­
butions, should have a motive to support measures for economic
administration, should not be taught to regard the State as the
1
dispenser of gifts for which no one needs to pay." Contribution 
condition will also serve as a brake on the irresponsible 
demands on the part of workers for unreasonable extension of 
benefits to distant relations or undue increase in benefit 
rates. The experience of other countries seems to suggest 
that workers’ contributions induce a degree of responsibility 
towards the programme of social security. Thus, both in America 
and Great Britain, increase or extension of benefits were 
accompanied by an increase in contributions to which the bene­
ficiaries consented willingly. Moreover, benefits, even if 
remotely related to the contributive effort of the beneficiary, 
cease to be despised in public as doles and the right of legal 
support which is the primary characteristic of social security 
schemes, would not be governed by the whims and caprices 
of the paying authority; but it would bear a relation­
ship with the beneficiary's contributive effort, however,
1. Social Insurance And Allied Services (H.M.Stationary Office, 
London, 1942), para 274 (ii).
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bumble and desperate it nay be. Life insurance policies give 
a sense of property ownership to assured and in no way less 
does a compulsory old age social insurance give a vested 
right of maintenance to the covered beneficiary. In this 
respect both the devices are identical. To quote Beverige 
again,”...by paying^not/ indeed', the whole cost, but a 
substantial part of it as a contribution, he (the benefici­
ary) can feel that he is getting security not as charity but as 
a right.
So far as the willingness of the workers to pay contri­
butions is concerned, it cannot be as safely concluded as did 
Beveridge that, "The capacity and the desire of the British
people to contribute for security are among the most certain
2and most impressive social facts of today." In India, 
workers are chary about the schemes of social insurance not 
because of there being any substantial ground for their sus­
picion but because of their ignorance and the adverse propagan- 
da of the interested parties. The trade unionists offer 
resistence to new schemes on the ground that it sometimes 
becomes a subterfuge for putting off the implementation of 
some already working scheme. Thus, the General Council of
1. Ibid, para 296.
2. ibid.
* Discussions on the working of the ESI scheme initiated by 
a responssible officer of the ESIC on 8th December, 1959, 
in a Labour Research Institute Semijar JtpIA in Kanpur, 
which the present writer attended^^v^ej) that when the 
medical benefits were extended to the w^kers' families, 
they suspected that the contributions will be raised.
Some interested parties tried to add to this suspicion - 
by giving wrong interpretations to this step.=ind streng­
thening their doubts for political reasons.
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All-India Trade Union Congress at its Bangalore Session held 
from 15th to 18th January, 1959, expressed in clear terms when 
it resolved that "The Central Council felt that an integrated 
pension scheme at this stage would provide 5n excuse not to 
fulfil the above-mentioned obligations of the Qnployees 
State Insurance scheme and their fulfilment would be all the 
more vitiated, delayed and side-tracked by the additional 
considerations of the further liabilities of the pension 
scheme. Hence we are against consideration of such a scheme 
at this stage (i.e. consideration of study group's recommenda­
tions for pension scheme)."
There is lack of elaborate research in India on the atti­
tude of working population towards the payment of old age 
insurance contributions and it is yet to be discovered. I 
tried to study the matter by means of issuing questionnaire.
To my disappointment, when I tried it in Kanpur, about sixty 
per cent of the workers refused to accept the questionnaire 
fearing some foul play. Of the remaining forty per cent who 
accepted it, none cared to return it back. It was again tried 
in Bombay. An encouraging response was received there.
About fifty per cent of those who returned were willing to 
contribute. The data cannot be said to b e fairly representative 
due to smallness of population studied, and paucity of 
response received. It was disclosed to me during the course 
of my discussions with vrt>rkers, that they did not understand 
the implications of the scheme despite the clarity of language 
used in the questionnaire. Of the 500 copies of questionnaire 
issued to the various categories of v;orkers in a cotton taxtile 
Mill in Bombay city, only 120 sheets were returned of
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which 60 respondents returned "willing to contribute." All the 
workers earning upto Rs100 per month were willing to contri­
bute. But it must be noted that they were only two in number. 
Of 79 persons earning from Rs 100 to Rs 150 per month, 39 or 
about 49 per cent were willing to contribute; of those earning 
between Rs 151 to Rs 200 per month;>c ■ about 52 per cent were 
willing and 50 per cent of those earning between Rs 201 to 
Rs 300 per month were also willing. Comparatively richer 
section i.e., those earning over Rs4OO per month were not 
willing to contribute at all. But again no generalisation 
can be based on their denial as there were only two persons 
in this wage-group. The general trend of replies, however, 
was in favour of the scheme. It led me to believe that the 
average worker's attitude towards contributions to a pension 
plan is not averse. Proper publicity ofthe scheme was not 
organised. If it were done, it would help clarify many doubts 
lurking in the minds of the working class. If the scheme is 
impressive and invokes confidence in the insured class, there 
is every reason to believe that the chief beneficiary class 
will be willing to contribute. The employers’ stand who 
constitute the next beneficiary class may now be examined in 
some detail.
(b) Bnployers.
Gone are the days when social conciousness was held in 
abeyance and individualism was in its heyday. There was a 
time when the responsibility for poverty was laid .-on the 
poor himself. But now the public opinion asserts that the 
economic system itself of which the employers as a class
( 1 1 1 .2 /)
constitute the chief custodians, is also at least partly 
responsible for social maladies such as the poverty of the 
masses including the employees in the productive system.
There are, however, divided opinions on the question 
of financial responsibility of the employers regarding social 
security oragnised for the benefit of their employees. On 
the one extreme, the employers are held wholly responsible 
for such finances as in socialistic countries. On the other 
extreme is the view that the employer should be wholly excused 
of any such responsibility. Social insurance pensions in 
Sweden, Australia, Nee Zealand or sickness insurance of 
Iceland are a few examples of this type of arrangement. It 
may be noted that when social insurance scheme was introduced 
in Germany for the first time, Bismark proposed a contribution 
on the part of the workers and employers both. But this 
suggestion met with severe opposition and the matter had to 
be dropped, making the employers solely responsible for the 
finances of the scheme. International Labour Organisation 
still hold the view that employment injuries should be uni­
laterally financed by the employers.^  In so far as the 
question of justice and equity is concerned, this view can 
be repudiated on the ground that after making all safety 
arrangements required by legislation, and after issuing
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1. Vide: Social Security Principles, p 33. "Qnployers 
normally bear the cost of compensation for employment 
injuries and this rule is maintained in the proposed 
Recommendation."
necessary safety instructions to the employees, the employer 
stands discharged of his liability for any accidents. In 
the USSR or other socialistic countries where the social 
security schemes are structured on the Russian model, employers 
are made wholly responsible for the cost of social security 
programmes provided to their employees. Even in the United 
States, unemployment benefits are financed by payroll tax on 
employers. These who hold it the employers' liability to 
bear the cost of such programmes, base their arguments on the 
employers' capacity to pay contributions or due to the notion 
that they are responsible for the occurrence of risks.
The employers’ contributions to his workers' pension 
insurance scheme can be justified on various grounds. In the 
first instance, it is the employers’ work which the employee 
is engaged to do; the revenue accruing to him must include an 
element of depreciation on his assets. Machinery and other 
fixed assets are, therefore, scrapped and replaced after their 
productive capacity is exhausted. But the workers, the human 
assets applied for the production of goods, cannot be so 
scrapped. They live even after their usefulness as an agent 
of production is reduced to nothing. The worker has, therefore, 
a right of maintenance when his physical faculties decline to 
such an extent as to hinder him from any gainful physical work. 
Moreover, if the employee is held responsible for a portion 
of the cost, he will co-operate v/ith the administration and 
secure economy in the working of the scheme. The principle of 
joint-contribution has found an eloquent expression in the 
almost universal uniformity of its adoption as the result of a
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combination Idf considerations of administrative, financial 
and political feasibility justified by various arguments 
based on a variety of premises.
Although it cannot be indisputably held that social 
security and fringe benefits increase the efficiency of the 
working force directly, it cannot be disproved too. Financ­
ially, the employers' contribution is a profitable source of 
income and the employer can be easily made to agree to pay it. 
In the opinion of the ILO, "It has been the employers' contri­
bution that in most countries has made social insurance finan­
cially feasible, and while arguments may be adduced against 
it as well as for it, so ''convenient a source of revenue is 
not likely to be abandoned easily by governments."^ But the 
mere temptation on the part of the governments to squeeze 
the employers* purse cannot justify it, particularly in the 
modem age of democracy and parliaments, t^ has to justify 
a levy of payroll contributions on employers for the finance 
of social security. Such levies are justified on the said 
grounds of providing life-long subsistence to the labourer 
from the profession he adopts, even though he may not be able 
to work for the whole of his life due to old age or other 
inability. In fact, it is a solace to his single-handed 
effort in maintaining a provision for his old age that comes 
in the form of employers' contributions or the State supple­
ments. And both of them have a contractual liability in this
1. ILO: Social Security Principles, pp 32-33.
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respect apart from having a moral obligation too. It is 
true that the old age security scheme is a long-term scheme 
and shows its effects sometimes after generations, yet it 
has been rightly stated that "in the long run, when benefit 
effects, hard to measure but very real, of income security 
have had time to show themselves on morale and health, in 
improved industrial relations and in greater stability of 
internal market, employers will surely find that productive 
efficiency has so increased that the charge of their contri­
butions is amply compensated. It is, then, to employers as 
a group, the trusttes of the productive system, rather than 
as individual owners oif shareholders of particular under-
1
takings, that social insurance is likely to bring advantage.” 
Moreover it is possible to secure higher contributions under 
a jointly-financed scheme than under an individually-financed 
schema, and the government may, thus, be able to float the 
scheme without having to tax the general tax-payer to any 
great extent for this purpose. Employers’ contribution, in 
addition, helps in the matter of administrative expediency. 
Collection can be easily secured through the employers who 
can deduct the employees' shares from their respective wages. 
Thus, the joint contribution renders compulsory insurance 
feasible for the mass of industrial workers who constitute 
the class that is directly the pivot of the subject-matter 
of this work.
Besides.that, employers as a class have provided, since 
long, various fringe benefits in India and abroad. In the
1. Social Security Principles, p 33»
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United States, employers instituted the first pension scheme 
fo r the benefit of their workers in 1875* Lloyd George, 
while introducing the IMemployment Bill in the House of 
Commons on Ath May 1911, quoted the letter of German employers 
that the big employers in particular and employers in general 
v/ece willing to increase their contributions to national 
insurance for providing increased benefits to employees on 
their Own accord.^ In France, social security and other 
supplementary costs paid by employers in the textile industry 
constituted nearly one half of the wage bill. .Table III.7 
shown on the next page shows the percentages of wages paid by 
the French employers for these benefits.
In the United States, there were 17,700,000 employees 
covered under private pension and deferred profit-sharing 
plans. This constitutes about 25 per cent of the aclavely
*engaged population. The total contributions of the employers 
and the employees amounted to $ 3,900 and $ 680 millions 
respectively. In this way about 52.5 per cent of the private 
and 66.3 per cent of the private and public employees were 
covered under the employee-benefit plans.
In our own country, as revealed during the course of 
my personal investigations undertaken in connection with 
this \i?ork, several fringe benefits were found to have been
1. Peoples Insurance (London, 1912), pp 10-11.
* T^ e total population of the United States is approximately 
seventeen crores of which forty per cent is actively 
engaged. Vide; Economic Weekly, (Bombay), Dec. 13,1959, 
Vol. X, No. 50, Table I, p 1954, et seq.
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Table III.7
FRINGE BENEPITS PAID BY FRENCH EMPLOYERS
Items of cost % o f wage bill
Social security general scheme 11.0
tt Family allowances scheme 12.0
Industrial injuries scheme 3»0
Payroll tax. ... ... 5.0
Paid annual holidays ..* 7*5
Housing tax ... ... 1.5
Apprenticeship tax ... ... 0.7
Medical services ... ... 0*4
Unemployment insurance benefit scheme 0.8
Subsidiary pensions scheme ----  Senior staffs 1.5
— — —  others 2.0
Non-obligatory social charges ... 2.0
Total 47.4
SOURCE: U.K.Ministry of Labour Gazette, September, 1959,
reproduced by Indian Labour Gazette, Vol. XVII, 
No.5 & 6, November and December, 1959.
provided by the enlightened employers. ,I have discussed 
some of these provisions relating to old security in Chapter II, 
Besides that, the Elgin Mills Company, Kanpur spent a sum of 
Rs 136,817 on 'Workmen and Staff Welfare out of a total value 
of production of Rs37,137,747, during the year ended 30th
September, 1958. !Ehe Company also expended Rs 144,095 and 
Rs 109,067 respectively during the two preceding years which 
accounted for 0.35 and 0.34 per cent of total cost of product­
ion respectively. The Morarjee Goculdas Spinning and Weaving 
Company limited, Bombay, made a provision of Rs 185,000 each 
year during the three years preceding 30th June, 1959 for 
Staff V/elfare. The Company also spent Rs 342.05 on Workmen’s 
Welfare. The Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company Limited 
Delhi, also paid the following amounts during the last four 
years preceding 30th June, 1959:
(in thousand rupees)
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1956 1957 1958 1959
Welfare Expenses 416 468 469 393
Grant to Officers' Pension 
Trust. 393 • • • « « #
Retiring gratuities 223 225 137 372
Employees* Benefit Trust Fund 165 188 602 710
Total* 1,196 881 1,209 1,476
SOURCE: Annual Reports No. 68, 69, 70, and 71.
* Totals may not agree due to approximation.
The employer-sponsored plans bear testimoney to the fact 
that the employers realise the beneficial effects of fringe 
benefits. Therefore, it may be concluded that any resistence 
of employers is not serious and genuine. On the basis of the 
desirable effects that a pension scheme may produce, they 
will be willing to contribute to the scheme.
(c) The State .
The schemes of social insurance instituted by lav/ involve 
the coercion of the individual and a partial regulation of 
enterprise on the part of the State. But regulation should 
not be taken to mean the only ceiling of the interest to be 
shown by the State in social problems. The concern of the 
State, as a political institution i^with those problems which 
concern the majority of population. Eradication of crime, of 
whatever description, is a constant headache of the statesmen, 
and perhaps, it has been the raison d’etre of State from 
the very beginning. Crimes stem, in majority of cases, 
from the incofee inequalities that baffle the mindS of reformers 
today. It is, therefore, the bounden duty of the State to 
see that inequality of income is reduced and destitution is 
prevented. Destitutes and paupers are a social liability 
and the social institutions, most important among them, the 
State, owe a duty to pay them. And the poorer sections of 
society can most conveniently be protected by the device of 
social insurance. State has, since long, maintained poor 
houses and public hospitals. The cost of such maintenance 
has long been recognised to be public responsibility. Old 
age, if left unprotected and uncarded for, tends to produce 
insances, destitutes and paupers, the care of whom is doubt­
less a State responsibility. Old age security does not only 
produce social good but it also creates political stability 
through a happy, contented and prosperous nation.
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Just as the State is responsible for national security, 
it is responsible for social security too. Education is 
held to be the responsibility of the State; but it coraes 
after the basic needs of food, clothing and shelter have been 
satisfied. Hence the State contribution to a scheme of social 
security. This has led sometimes to the suggestion that 
social insurance like national defence and security services 
should be financed from the public exchequer and the cost of 
these services may be recovered from the general tax-payer 
according to their ability to pay. But there seems one 
fallacy in this approach to the problem. While national 
defence services always confer benefits not exactly measurable 
in case of individual tax-payer —  a fact which may justify 
its finance form the general exchequer, social insurance 
confers in all cases measurable benefits on individuals who 
may be called upon to pay for it pro rata. While general-tax 
device is equitable and convenient for financing national 
defence services, it is inequitable and unjustifiable for 
financing social seeurity services, specially in case of those 
individuals who can bear a portion of the cost, if not the 
whole of it.
Unilateral finance of social security is called social 
assistance. Social assistance as a technique of coverage 
has been discussed in the previous pages. It may be said 
here that on practical considerations, this device is not the 
best one for the protection of the aged industrial v/orkers.
In the first instance, old age security being a costly project, 
v/ill entail a heavy burden on the State coffers. The general
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tax-payer will be burdened consequently. Moreover, this is 
opposed to social policy. Old age assistance device selected, 
the claim of the entire population for old age benefits 
irrespective of occupations will be more tenable and less 
questionable. It will be unjustifiable to provide security 
to aged industrial working men and leave the aged agricultur­
ists and other sectors of population uncovered. It is against 
the cannons of public expenditure in a democratic set-up to 
confer special benefits on a particular section of population 
out of the general revenues unless that section is not comple­
tely destitute. Industrial workers, though needing social 
security in old age, do not constitute that class in a greater 
degree than does the agricultural population or domestic 
workers. Besides, it is neither a v/orkable proposition nor 
a desirable one in view of the cost and administrative impli­
cations which may prove prohibitory. In addition to that,
State pensions are stigmatised with a smack of charity. This 
will be disliked by self-respecting people; and any great 
and unnecessary dependence on State should be discouraged too. 
Heavy State responsibility towards the finance of such schemes 
cannot be defended at the expense of developtoental projects 
v;ith which Indians heading forv/ard. Hence, the State should 
contribute to the cost of old age scheme only partly not 
entirely.
As has been noted above in the beginning, old age is 
financed in socialistic countries entirely by the employers 
and in individualistic countries the State does not participate
at all. But in democratic welfare states such as Great 
Britain and Federal Republic of Germany, tripartite liabi­
lity to the finance of old age insurance schemes has been 
established. India is neither an individualistic country 
where all state intervention is despised as socialisation of 
private life, nor is she a totalitarian State where wages 
can be adjusted in such a way that social insurance contri­
butions can be charged from the employees in disguise, and 
employers may apparently pay the whole cost. As discussed 
above, employees themselves, their employers and the State 
should all bear their share of cost-burden pro rata.
State participation in the finances of social insurance 
schemes has been the crux of the problem in India since long. 
The Government have shown great alacrity to repudiate out­
right that they owe any financial responsibility towards 
such schemes. Vihen the first sickness insurance scheme was 
proposed, for introduction in 1928-29, they opposed the possi­
bility of any State contribution. Likewise in 1940, the pro­
posal of the industrial workers at the First Labour Ministers’ 
Conference held in the month of January for the introduction 
of a sickness insurance scheme was approved only after a 
clear understanding that the State would not be required to 
contribute. This repudiative attitude on the part of the 
State has been responsible for the late introduction of social 
insurance in India, g^ain, when Prof. Adarkar submitted his 
report on sickness insurance, he was probably aware that the 
Government would not agree to contribute. Thus, he made two
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recommendations for the financial structure of the scheme#
One presupposed that the Government would not contribute; 
and the other was based on the presumption that they would.
The financial structure of the present social security measures
have already been discussed. The State assumes no financial 
responsibility under any of the present schemes except under
the ESI scheme under which the Central Government undertook
to meet two-thiids of the cost of administration for the 
first five years, and the State Governments have to bear one- 
fourth of the cost of medical benefits incurred in connection 
with the insured persons.
This attitude is unhelpful and discouraging. If the State 
wills to fulfil the obligations which the Constitution pledges 
and if the State is genuinely interested in securing the 
welfare of the public, it must face the light and bear a 
portion of the cost. It is heartening to note that the U.P. 
Goveniaent has instituted an Old Age Assistance scheme financed 
by the State exchequer. The Punjab Government is also con­
templating an identical scheme. But what is required is not 
an Assistance scheme of this type but a well-founded old age 
insurance scheme which may meet the need of the hour.
FLAT VS. WAGES-RELATED COKTRIBUTIONS
 ^ Contribution of the parties to finance may be either- 
flat-rate with no relation with the earnings of the in^ 
whatever or they may be related therewith. Flat-rate 
butions are charged equally from all beneficiaries 
for identical contingencies irrespective of the ' 
receive. The basic superstructure of flat-rat
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and flat-rate benefits is raised on the foundation presumably 
for the provision of a national minimum of goods and services 
necessary for maintenance. Therefore, flat rates do not take 
cognisance of the standard of living formerly enjoyed by the 
beneficiary. Since benefits are quite unrelated to earnings, 
they may be much less than the earnings of the hi^ly paid 
people covered under the plan.
The great advantage of flat-rate benefits and contributions 
lies in the fact that it economises the cost of collection 
and lightens the cumberous burden of complicated calculations.
It also economieses in stationary and clerical staff necessary 
to be maintained for keeping wage-records etc., if calculations 
are based on the previous earnings. However, the technique 
of flat-rates is defective in many respects. In the first 
place, being unrelated to previous earnings it disregards 
previous standard of living. This puts the beneficiaries to 
practical difficulties. Man is a social being. He has to 
maintain his social standing. If his standard of living shrinks 
down suddenly as a consequence of living on pension insurance 
benefits v/hich provide only minimum subsistence income, he is 
likely to suffer a social affront which the social insurance 
attempts toward off. Moreover, it can only provide national 
minimum which may be itself a disputable sum. It should 
change with every change in the cost of living if the scheme 
is to serve any real purpose. Besides, this technique can 
only provide a bare minimum; those who want to live compara­
tively better must find means for themselves. Again, such 
contributions may not be equitable in their effects. If 
flat-rate benefits are greater than the wages in sweated
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trades they may kill the incentive to work and the contribu­
tions may prove verj'' high. This is harmful morally as v;ell 
as economically. If the contributions are fixed at a rate 
higher than just the sum which the least-paid employees 
should have paid under an income-related contribution scheme, 
it will have its repercussions and recessive effects on the 
insured class in the least-paid groups. In addition to this, 
on the other side of it, the well-paid employees may easily 
escape their equitable share of burden. Thus, the flat-rate 
basis totally ignores the law of diminishing marginal utility 
of income on which the theory of progressive taxation is 
based. It is in the nature of loading equally a cornel and 
a mule which is not only inequitable but cruel too.
Graduated rates of contributions on the basis of earnings 
of the insured and on the payroll of the employers are equit­
able to parties concerned* The low-income group pays lower 
amount of contributions commensurate with his income and a 
better paid employee contributes higher sums corresponding 
to his ability to pay. This is not regressive in affect and 
the net sacrifice on the insured as a class is comparatively 
lesser. Again, graduated rates may be adjusted to earning 
which facilitates the maintenance of an even standard of 
living for the beneficiary not much below one enjoyed by him 
in his working life. No doubt, it involves complications 
in fixing the contribution rates and calculation of benefits; 
it requires voluminous wage-records ( or income records) of 
the beneficiaries. But the advantages of the system out­
weigh its disadvantages*
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The use of flat-rate contributions and flat-rate^ lDenefits
has been a traditional and prominant characteristic of the
social security system of Great Britain almost since the
enactment of her first pension law in 1908. Lord Beveridge
affirmed the approach in his Report by including the flat-
rate system among the six fundamental principles of his scheme.
However he envisaged that "The flat-rate of benefits proposed
is intended in itself to be sufficient without further resources
to provide the minimum income needed for subsistence in all
normal cases.” Xhe principle was embodied in the post-V/ar
itlegislation of her National Insurance Act 1946. But due 
to its obvious demerits, graduated rate principle has had to 
be accomodated, at last. In the National Insurance(Amendment) 
Act 1959, she departed for the first time from the principle 
of flat-rate system unrelated to earnings for both contribu­
tions and benefits to which I have already -referred. The 
new legislation retains the existing flat-rate system and 
superimposes on it a graduated system with contributions and 
benefits related to wages. Recently, Sweden has also changed 
over to Graduated-rate principle. And this, I think, is a 
preferable principle. It may be noted that in case of social 
assistance schemes, which require no contributions from the 
beneficiary and which primarily aim to provide a minimum
1. Op.Git. para 305-306.
2. ibid, p 122.
9 It may be noted that the British social security system 
covers the entire population.
Vide Social Security Bulletin, Loc.Cit. November, 1959.
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subsistence, flat-rate scheme of benefits is convenient and 
expedient. This practice is followed all over the world.
In India, as mentioned above, the contributions of both 
employers and employees are related to earnings in case of 
ESI and EPF schemes. The same principle has been adopted in 
the recommendations- of the Study Group. I prefer the gradua­
tion principle on the ground of equity and justice as also 
its practical usefulness. The earnings of the majority of 
v;orkers being snail, the flat-rate contributions shall have to 
be fixed at low sums convenient for the lowest paid employees. 
Thus, if the flat-rates are adopted in India, the contribu­
tions of the highly paid employees will be negligible in 
proportion to their wages, and the benefits provided to them 
will be meaningless.
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SUMMARY AND
CONCLUSIONS I The foregoing analysis shows that
social insurance is the most suitable 
device for old age protection in India. International prac­
tice in this field confirms the view that both employers and 
the employees should contribute as also the State should 
bear a portion of the cost. Although the existing schemes 
of social security in India are financed by employers and 
employees without state supplements. State should also pay 
for old age protection. Employees should pay because they 
are directly benefited; their employers are also indirectly 
benefited, through increased efficiency, stability of labour 
force, reduction in absenteeism and good industrial relations 
in general. The State should also pay because it is a \7elfare 
State. It has not only to protect people from internal
disorder; but it has also to prevent crimes and ameliorate 
the conditions of the poor. Since poverty anywhere consti­
tutes a danger to prosperity everywhere and encourages crimes, 
it is desirable that State should assist the prevention of 
poverty
The contributions and benefits may be flat rate or 
graduated rates. The former are inequitable and can be con­
venient for the provision of minimum subsistence only which 
is, in most cases, divorced from the previous standard of 
living. Percentage rates are free from these defects and 
they secure more income with comparatively lesser net sacri­
fice. Hence, they are preferable to flat rates*
This Chapter mainly discussed theoretical foundations 
of a tripartite scheme of old age security. In the next 
Chapter, I propose to discuss the factors influencing the 
proportionate share of liability in the finance of such 
schemes as well as the apportionment of such cost between 
the Central and State Governments.
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CHAPTER IV 
COST IMPLICATIONS OF OLD AGE SECURITY
Cost is the impact which falls on the parties providing 
the finance to the scheme as considered from their respective 
points of view. In the previous Chapter, I observed that a 
trio^ogy of insured persons, their employers and the State 
should be held resnonsible to finance the scheme of old age 
security. The purpose of the present Chapter is to analyse 
the factors influencing the proportionate share of the parties. 
Cost of pensions projects far into the future and in 
ordinary cases, it is almost negligible in the beginning but 
for the administrative and fstablisliment expenses. No bene­
fits are payable during the first few years of its incention 
due to imposition of contribution and other qualifying condi­
tions for the entitlement to various retiral benefits. The 
cost rises gradually for a Tong period snd the 'peak of the 
load' is not reached until after forty to fifty years, or 
perhaps even longer period, after the plan has been put into 
operation,According to the Government Actuary's report, 
the Beveridge Plan for Great Britain was estimated 
to cost £ 126 million in 1945 (the year of start) and £ 190 m« 
in 1965 for meeting the cost of retirement pensions. In 
other words, the cost of retirement pensions after ten
1. Conant, Op.dt., p 144-.
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and twenty years was estimated at 150.8 per cent and 238.9^ 
respectively, of that in the year of its inception. The 
actual cost of retirement benefits in Great Britain during 
1957-58 was £ 482 m, out of a total expenditure of £ 683 m. 
on account of National Insurance. This is 382^ of the base 
year estimates, and more than 1^% of the total cost of 
national insurance in 1957-58. In the United States, retire­
ment benefits under the U.S. Social Security Act amounted to 
S 17.15 m. in 1940, $ 148.11 m. in 1945, $ 651.49 m. in 1950, 
$ 3747.74 m. in 1955 and $ 6722.87 m. in 1958. This pheno­
menal rise in the cost of American social security scheme 
(including Survivorship, Disability and Invalidity) is 
partly e^lained by the far-reaching changes introduced by 
legislation that followed 1940 in respect of coverage, types 
of benefits, amount of primary benefit, retirement and the 
variations in the maxima and minima of pensions, and partly 
by the fact that the cost of pension schemes rises v/ith the 
passage of time as more beneficiaries qualify for benefits 
later on. The cost of pensions, generally, is not precisely 
predictable.
Although the cost of a pension plan cannot be exactly 
estimated, there are determinate factors that influence it 
in one v/ay or tbe other. They are; the amount and types of 
benefits and beneficiaries method of financing, retirement 
age, longevity and mortality factors, stability of the 
population covered under the plan and investment pattern of 
pension funds and administrative requifements of the scheme 
etc.
As already discussed/the responsibility for providing 
finance should be apportioned between the insured persons, 
their employers and the State, They are the beneficiaries —  
direct or indirect —  of any scheme of social security.
Their proportionate shares should be commensurate with theier 
respective- ' abilities to pay and equitable as between them 
inter se. The Income Security Recommendation (1944) is in 
favour of lower income groups; but no precise rule has been 
suggested for the degressive reduction of the contribution 
rates on behalf of the low wage-eamers. It opines that the 
contributions of the low-paid employees may be subsidised 
by the employers and the State.^  In case of income security 
for the contingency of old age, the contributions of the 
employees must, in no case, be greater than the sum that 
may be sufficient to purchase such security from private 
institutions. Social insurance is essentially a device to 
make a collective provision for an individual risk. It is, 
therefore, against the principle of equity if the insured 
person is required to pay more than the level of premiums 
charged by the private life insurers for identical pensionary 
rights. Moreover, the contribution rates should also avoid 
hardship to all the insured persons of small means. "The 
contribution of an insured person should not exceed such 
proportion of his current earnings taken into account for 
reckoning benefits as applied to the estimated average 
earning of all persons insured against the same contingencies,
1. Op.Cit., p 32.
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would, assuming such persons to contribute while earning 
from the minimum age for entering employmEnt onv/ards, yield 
a contribution income the probable present value of which 
would equal the probable present value of the benefits to 
which they may become entitled? PresSnt value had been 
defined as "The amount which if paid at once, could take
*place, account being taken of the accumulation of interest 
at a given rate, of the payment of one or more sums of a 
given amount at one or more future dates'i"^  Thus, if P be
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the amount of pension at different dates, Pt^+ Pt2+ Pt^+*.*
Ptj^  or SP will be the present value of probable benefits.
And if Xt^ , Xt2 » Xt^ ..,Xtj^  are the periodical contribution 
by the parties concerned, and if 2A be the interest calcu­
lated at compound fate on the accumulated sums, the present 
value of contributions will be 2 X or + SA-CXt^+Xtg+Xt^+o.* 
Xt^ )f (2A), which should not be greater thanS P. But in 
addition to the mathematical considerations, there are other 
factors which wield equal influence in fixing the share of 
the insured persons. They are the present level of earnings, 
cost of living and the pressure of collective bargaining. 
Family composition of the insured population also influences 
the amounts of contributions as well as benefits to a great 
ext ent.
The effect of the level of earnings in the country 
concer]^ ed is demonstrated on the amount of benefits and 
contributions as both are linlced to them, and it cannot be
1. ILO., Actuarial Technique and Financial Organisation of 
Social InsurancV. (1940)* P 14 footnote.
disregarded without hazarding the soundness and feasibility 
of the scheme itself. Contributions of the insured persons 
earning low wages must be commensurate with their capacity 
to pay, and benefits must not discourage gainful employment. 
For, if benefits are equal to or more than their wages, it 
will discourage work, and will stimulate malingering.
Although the problem of malingering is not so alarming in 
case of old age insurance, yet in case of invalidity it is 
ever present.
Family composition has its own bearing on the responsibi­
lity of the wage earner to maintain his dependents which 
reduces his capacity to pay. The larger the family of depen­
dents, the lesser his capacity to pay. Lastly, the pressure 
of collective bargaining is also important. If the employers' 
association is more influential an' organization than the 
trade unions of the workers, the contributions of the employees 
tend to be larger (unless the government intervenes). The 
reverse will happen if the case is the other way round. But 
it may be noted that this is the case of the bargained plans; 
in the statutory schemes the contributions do not generally 
follow a trial of -strength but they are fixed on some pre­
determined policy though there is some pressut>e of the res­
pective organisations of the employers' and the employees 
howsoever remote and indirect it pay be.
The ESI Act, 1948, gives due consideration to the 
principle of the capacity-to-pay as between workers inte^ * se, 
when it exempts the lowest-wage group (those earning less 
than one rupee a day) from any financial responsibility
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although they are entitled to receive benefits admissible 
under the plan. The Study Group has recommended equal rate 
of contributions for employers and employees at 8-1/3 per 
cent of the wage-bill« This recommendation regarding the 
rate of contribution has been made on the assumption that 
the State will not be contributing to the scheme. As a 
matter tff fact, since the employees and employers are 
already contributing to the EPF scheme, it v/ill have no 
adverse effect, if both the parties are made to contribute.
But it may be added th^ their share should be fixed after 
deducting the share of the State. In principle, the employees 
should pay equal to their employers and vice-versa. But the 
above observations bring to the conclusion that a subsidy 
from the State and employers in respect of the contributions 
of the low-paid employees will result into a lesser rate 
for all employees as a group than the contribution fates 
of the employers.
In the foregoing pages, I have discussed the rationale 
of employers' contribution. The Income Security Recommenda­
tion of the ILO (1944) suggests that "Eliiployers may be 
required to contribute, particularly subsidizing the insurance 
of low wage-earners, as much as half the total cost of benefits 
confined to employed persons,..”  ^ Therefore, half the cost 
be borne by the employers; but the phrase "particularly 
subsidising the insurance of low wage earners" signifies
1. Op.Cit., p 52.
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that the proportion o f employers! contributions in case 
of such workers should be automactically more than fifty 
per cent.
It may again be noted that the old age contingency does 
not admit of experience-rating. Ilie incidence of its cost 
cannot be varied with the incidence of old age in the covered 
population as between different employers or industries 
inter se. The contingency requires the fixation of an age 
of retirement uniformly applicable in covered industries.
At this age, the workers must take leave of their employement; 
and old age being the last stage of life preceding death 
cannot be avoided by human ingenuity. Hence the cost-reduc- 
tion is not possible on the basis of experience-rating as it 
has been possible in case of employment hazards or unemploy­
ment insurance schemes.
In order that the introduction of old age insurance 
scheme may not tell upon the employuent or price-level, 
the levy of payroll contribution must bear a reference to 
the capacity of the industry to pay. Views differ as to 
the test of this capacity. Some hold that a regard must be 
had to a fair return of capital and remuneration to manage­
ment and a fair allocation to reserves and depreciation on 
fixed assets so as to 'keep the industry in a healthy condi­
tion. ’ This view can be challenged on the ground that it 
centres round the residual claimant theory of wages and all 
the objections applicable against that theory are applicable 
against this too with equal force. On the other side, there 
is the viw that payment on account of workers must precede 
all other payments *as long as it does not encroach on
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capital,..' Different criOteria have been suggested to test 
the capacity of the industry to pay. More important among 
them are area and industry relationships, cost of living, 
profit, volume of product, elasticity of demand of the 
product, supply conditions of the labour market etc. But as 
may be seen, many of these criCteria are subject to different 
interpretations. This all may / ' require a series of investi­
gations into the elasticity of supply of capital and organi­
sational ability in a particular industry, an inquiry into 
the rates of profits in other industries, mobility of labour 
and capital to other lines of activity, possibility of similar 
regulations in other industries and so on. But it may be 
said in conclusion that the proper measure of gauging the 
capacity of the industry to pay should bear a reference to the 
demand situation of the product, and the possibility of 
tightening up the organisation so that the industry could pay 
higher contributions without involving itself in trouble.
The ultimate test lies against the background that the burden 
of the increased rate should not be such as to drive the 
employer out of business*
The capacity of the industry to pay may signify the 
capacity of all industries of the country or, all the units 
of a particular industry or, the capacity of the particular 
employers. In some countries, such as Australia and New 
Zealand, the capacity-to-pay is calculated with reference to 
all industries in the country taken together. As it is, no 
special concession is shown to depressed or sweated industries, 
But it may be noted here that Hew Zealand has a small area
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and Australian industries are also not scattered. It renders 
it feasible to determine the capacity for the whole country. 
Nevertheless, this basis may be adopted while fixing the 
minimum wages; but for old age insurance which cannot possibly 
be implemented in the country as a whole simultaneously, the 
entire country for fixing paying capacity cannot be taken into 
account. This basis can only serve to show that certain 
industries or units could afford to pay as much as certain 
others.
Capacity may bear a reference to a particular region also. 
Regional determination of the paying capacity can serve the 
purpose of drawing up a schedule of priority for the introduc­
tion of the scheme as between two regions. This ignores the 
effects on competition between units of the same industry 
situated in two different regions. Paying capacity may also 
be determined unitwise. But this will neither be convenient 
nor practically useful to do so. Efficiency of managerial 
units, ' economies of location, size of units and internal 
and external economies enjoyed by different units sometimes 
differ so widely that an investigation into the paying capa­
cities of individual firms is liable to produce an accumula­
tion of odd facts which may not be brought to concord.
A§ observed elsewhere, an all-out provision of income 
security should be the long-run objective of labour policy.
But the fact that some industries may be paying old age 
security contributions, would lead the way to find out 
measures facilitating the introduction of the scheme to all 
industries. Confining the provision to selected industries 
v/ill neither be equitable between industries inter se nor
( IV.9 )
will it be consistent with the objectives of the social 
policy in general. It does not, however, mean that all indus­
tries should be covered simultaneously. Agriculture, to 
quote one example of industry in which the measure of income 
security is postponed, cannot be covered in India too side 
by the side with other organised industries. Nevertheless, 
this industry needs social insurance as much as any other.
The only hurdles in the way are of purely technical and 
organisational nature. Therefore, it will have to wait for 
some time for its turn for the extension of old age insurance 
till the conditions become stabilised for this step. Adop­
tion of a priority schedule with regard to region and indus­
tries is, therefore, the way out of this impasse. Paying 
capacity should be, as such, determined on industry-cum- 
region basis.
Another factor is the cost of living of the’working 
class, which has a powerful bearing on the trade union agita-^  
tion for a wage increase. Employers' contributions are, 
a sort of bribe, it is alleged, to hush down such agitations. 
Even more powerful is the influence of the fact that the cost 
of living is 'itself determined by the prevailing wage-level 
to a great extent. If the latter rises, the former cannot 
remain unchanged. The cost of other elements of production 
viz. raw materials, rent, interest on capital etc. are more 
or less fixed on the basis of long term contracts, and 
possibility of vertical integration of industrial units. 
Therefore, a rise in the price of the industrial product 
faises the industry's profits. Increased profits also widen 
the margin for making contributions to the schemes of v/orkers’
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benefits including old age insurance.
The economists believe that the marginal physical 
productivity of labour is the maximum which the employer 
may be willing to pay to the labour as a class in wages and 
fringe befits and other wage supplements including social 
security contributions. Thus, if social security contribu­
tions raise the labour cost above the level of marginal 
physical productivity of labour or its price, the employees 
are likely to resist any such scheme of contributions. In 
Pigure 1 the level of employment is measured on the OX axis 
and the wages including all supplements, on the OY axis,
MPP represents the marginal physical productivity of labour, 
W the prevailing wage-level. The employer will not favour 
to Day any social security contribution for OM employment.
If WW'represents the payroll social security contribution, 
he will try to retrench labour to OM' so that the wages plus 
social security contributions may equal the marginal physical 
productivity of a unit of labour to M*N'.
If the retrenchment is permitted, the employer may 
adopt the policy of substitution of labour by other factors 
of production. This process will be carried to the extent 
so that
= MPPb = ... MPPn = MPPl
pb pn pi
(MPP stands for the marginal physical productivity of the
factors a,b,n; and p is the price of respective factors and
1 stands for labour)
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The marginal cost of the product MCx xnll be greater 
jthan the price Px so long as the least-cost combination is 
not reached. At the point of least -cost-combination,
nrra ^ p p ^  ^ p p ^
The profit of the individual firm will be maximum when the 
MCx = Px. Therefore, the employer will try to equate the
price-product relations of all the individual factors of
production with MCx, the marginal cost of the product x^till 
it becomes equal to Px, the price of the product x. At this 
point
p a + pb = p l =  pn = MCx -  Px
MPPd MPPb MPPl MPPn
If On the other hand retrenchment is not possible under 
the legal restrictions (as under the existing Indian schemes), 
he^will require to nibble the share of other factors of pro­
duction to make up the difference V/NKW'* However, if the 
efficiency of labour rises as^consequence of payment of benSfits 
under the scheme, so that the marginal physical productivity 
curve MPP rises to M'P'P' the structure of the organisation 
may not be affected at all.
But in a sense it is eversimplification of things. Marginal 
productivity of labour is more often than not immeasurable.
Thus, it is very difficult to construct the MPP curve.
Moreover, social security schemes, specially old age insurance 
scheme, show their effects in a very long run; and adjustments 
in the productivity and price or retrenchment cannot be as 
precipitate as desired. In the long run the curve MPP may
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also assume any other shape due to intervention of a variety
of factors. Moreover, least-cost-oombination is a hypothetical
state and it is possible to achieve it in the conditions of
perfect competition. In U.P., there is neither perfect
competition, nor retrenchment is so easily realisable due to
regulations. Therefore, in the short run, MCx may rise due
to impossibility of retrenchment which will tell upon Px.
It.is likely, therefore, that the social security levy on
employers raises the prices of the products of the industries
in which the scheme is preposed to be introduced. But since
ideal-resource-combination cannot be claimed to have been
achieved in industries of U.P. the additional cost may be
toabsorbed in the profits or shiftedj^ some other situs.
According to the estimates of Dr. A.N.Agrawala, a compre­
hensive social security scheme covering employment injuries, 
sickness, maternity, medical benefits, unemployment, old age 
invalidity, and non-industrial accidents, and survivorship 
including the cost of administration require 31 per cent of 
the wages for financing these schemes of which old age, and
*survivorship ihsurance require 17 p.c. The Study Group 
have estimated 16-2/3 per cent of wages as the total contri­
butions required for financing the scheme of old age and
survivorship pension-cum-gratuity. Of the total contributions 
the employers are made to bear half the burden, i.e. 8-I/ 3
* Insurance in India, Op.Cit, p 815*
** Op.Cit. Para 79.
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per cent of payroll. Wages and salaries paid to different 
employees of industrial establishments differ in proportion 
they bear to the total expenses of production. The following 
table shows the percentage of total value of sales paid to 
employees as wages and other remunerations.
Table IV.1
PERCMTAGE OF WAGES AI^ D SALARIES TO TOTAL VALUE OF SALES
(INCLUDING NET PROFITS)
(IV .14 )
Year ending The Morarjee 
30th June. Goculdas
Spg.and l-Vg. 
Co.Bombay.
The D.C. 
Delhi.
I
.M.The Elgin 
Mills * 
Kanpur.
Averages
195^-56 20.1 10.7 • • 15.4
1956-57 22.7 10.6 27.9 20.4
1957-58 20.4 11.2 19.0 16.9
1958-59 20.3 11.9 19.6 17.3
Average. 20.9 11.1 22.2 17.50
Source: Annual Reports of the Companies for various years.
* Yeais ending 30th October
The above table demonstrates that the share of employees' 
remuneration in the Bombay "ill was about twice that in the 
Delhi Mill. It is, however, explained by the difference 
in efficiency and rates of remuneration. The average remunera­
tion of the Delhi Mill for the four years was only 11.1 per 
cent of the t o t a l  expenses of production including net profits. 
This was 20.9 per cent in the Bombay Mill and 22.2^ in the
Kanpur Ilill. The average for all Mills for all years v/as 17.5 
per cent. According to the findings of Dr. C.C.Agrawal, the 
share of employees remunerated up to Rs 400 p.m. in the total cost 
of production is only about 15^ * If this lower estimate is 
adopted the employer’s share of contributions according to the 
recommendations of the Group (8-1/3 per cent) will raise the 
cost of production by about 1.5 per cent. If, on the contrary, 
the averages of the table No. IV.1 are adopted for calculations, 
the employer’s contributions will add to their cost of production 
about 1.5 per cent more. According to the averages of Elgin Mills 
Kanpur, cost of production may fise by 1,8%, This percentage 
is, as can be seen, not an alarming one that may justify the 
resistence of employers against the introduction of the scheme 
of old age insurance. It may also be borne by the consumers if 
shifted on to them.
In so far as the financial participation in social security 
scheme is concerned, the State has always played a dormant role. 
Neither in the ESI scheme nor in the EPF scheme of India, the 
State makes any contributions. The Income Security Recommenda­
tion of the ILO (1944) suggests that:
"(1) The residual cost of benefits should be met from taxation.
(2) Among the elements which may be properly be included 
in residual cost are;
(a) The contribution deficit resulting from bringing 
persons into insurance when above the minimum age 
for entering employment.
(b) The contingent liability involved in guaran­
teeing the paynent of .basic invalidity old
( IV.15 )
1. Op.Cit., p 52.
a g e ,  and s u r v i v o r s '  b e n e f i t s  and th e  pajmient o f  
unemployment b e n e f i t  when unemployment p e r s i s t s  
a t  an e x c e s s i v e  l e v e l ;  and
( c )  S u b s i d i e s  to  th e  p e r s o n s  o f  s m a l l  m e a n s . ”
A cco rd in g  t o  t h e s e  reco m m en d atio n s ,  th e  S t a t e  i s  r e s p o n s i b l e  
f o r  m eeliing th e  e x c e s s  o f  c o s t  o v e r  e x p e n d i t u r e ,  c o n t r i b u t i o n  
d e f i c i t ,  th e  c o n t in g e n t  l i a b i l i t i e s  and s u b s i d i e s  to  th e  
lo w e s t  p a id  g r o u p s .  Thus, i f  th e  minimum a g e  f o r  e n t e r i n g  
i n t o  c o v e r e d  employments i s  f i x e d  a t  20 y e a r s ,  i t  w i l l  be  
n o rm a lly  e x p e r ie n c e d  t h a t  a  s i z e a b l e  p r e p o r t i o n  o f  em p loy ees  
w i l l  be j o i n i n g  s e r v i c e  a f t e r  t h i s  a g e .  But su c h  w orkers  
w i l l  be i n s u r e d  i f  th ey  h av e  n o t  a l r e a d y  a t t a i n e d  th e  maximum 
a g e  o f  e n t r y  l a i d  down by th e  schem e. Then, th e y  may q u a l i f y  
f o r  b e n e f i t s  on a cc o u n t  o f  f u l f i l l i n g  c o n t r i b u t i o n  and o t h e r  
q u a l i f y i n g  c o n d i t i o n s .  I t  may be  found in  th e  lo n g  run t h a t  
th e  p r o b a b le  p r e s e n t  v a l u e  o f  th e  c o s t  o f  t h e i r  p e n s io n s  i s  
more than  th e  v a l u e  o f  t h e i r  t o t a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  T h is  e x c e s s  
may be c o v e r e d  by S t a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  M oreo v er ,  any scheme  
o f  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  c o n t e m p la t e s  to  c o v e r  th e  lo w - p a id  p e r s o n s  
e s s e n t i a l l y .  T h e r e fo r e  an a p p r e c i a t i o n  o f  th e  l i v i n g  c o n d i­
t i o n s  o f  su ch  p e o p le  l i e s  in  c h a r g in g  no c o n t r i b u t i o n s  from  
them, a  f a c t  t h a t  h a s  a l r e a d y  r e c e iv e d  w ide r e c o g n i t i o n .  As 
s t a t e d  e l s e w h e r e ,  th e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  p a t t e r n  o f  th e  ESI scheme  
d e m o n s t r a te s  th e  a p p r e c i a t i o n  o f  t h i s  p o in t  by g r a n t i n g  
exem ption  from  any c o n t r i b u t i o n s  f o r  th e  f i r s t  w age-group  
e a r n in g  l e s s  th an  one ru p ee  p e r  d a y ,  w h ile  t h e i r  e m p lo y e r s '  
f u l l  r a t e  o f  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  h a s  been f i x e d  a t  RsO.44 p e r  em ployee  
in  t h i s  w a g e - c a t e g o r y .  I f  th e  g u a r a n te e d  minimum o f  p e n s io n s  
p a i d  to  t h i s  w age-gro u p  e x c e e d s  th e  t o t a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  p a i d
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by their empflioyers plus any interest earned by the fund 
partaining to their account (It may be noted that interest 
will be credited to the employees' share of the fund pnly 
in case of individual accumulation system), the State' share 
should be
S = ^ Pt - ( 2 X Tf;. 2 a ) 
where S is the share of the State.
Again, there feay arise a contingent liability on account 
of many factors such as unforeseen deaths and excessive number 
of dependents per insured person. Moreover, actuarial esti­
mates are based on averages which may err on the wrong side 
too. Thus, if Ct be the contingent liability at different 
times the State's share on this score will be S = 2 Ct 
If 2D be the total cost of administration, the total liabi­
lity of the State under a scheme of pensions will be
2  S =:2Pt - ( S X  +I?A)+ 2TCt +27D 
State's share also depends on certain objective considera­
tions such as the size of the Government budget and adminis­
trative share of the State in the scheme. This resolves 
itself into a discussion of the budgets of the Governments 
and the distribution of the cost of social security between 
the centre and the State governments.
Size of the Central budget has increased in India by 
more than three times over the pre-War figures. The total 
budget of the Central Government in 1938-39 was only of the 
order of Rs84.47 crores but it rose to Rs 361.19 crores in 
1945-46, the first peace-time budget after the cessation of 
hostilities. This shows an increase by 328 per cent necessitated
(IV.17 )
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by V/ar-expenditure. Although revenues also rose, rise in 
expenditure, hov/ever, has been steeper than that in the 
revenue. Over the same period, it increased to 569.4 per 
cent. Since then, the budget figures have constantly risen. 
Although the revenue expenditure of the Central Goverament 
has risen both on developmental and non-developmental heads, 
the rise in developmental expenditure has been steeper. The 
following table shows the expenditure of the Central Government 
on the developmental heads:
Table IV.2
DEVELOPMENTAL ... . EXPENDITURE OF THE CENTRAL 
AND STATE GOVERNMENTS
Amounts in fs lacs
Y e a r s
D E V E L 0 P M _E N T A L
C E N T R E* S T A T E S^
Amount In d e x Amount In d ex
1950-51 39.50 100 196.21 100
1951-52 82.41 209 356.46 182
1955-56 108.09 274 387.15 197
1956-57 154.14 390 381.73 194
1957-58 179.50 455 436.43 222
1958-59 209.25 529 480.96 245
SOURCE: I n d i a  1960 t a b l e 112-114.
* comprises irrigation and multipurpose river schemes, ports, and 
Pilotage,Light-houses & Light-ships,scientific departments, 
education,medical,public health,agriculture,rural development, 
veterinary,cooperation,industries and supplies, aviation, 
broadcasting,civil works, post-war construction and eleetric 
schemes, community development projects, national extension 
service, and miscellaneous departments*
It is evident from the above table that the expenditure 
on developmental activities has risen both in the State and 
the Central budgets. This shows that the Government is 
assuming progressive role in the developmental activities.
The programmes of development that have been introduced in 
India are an index of the Government interest in this behalf. 
Another thing that the table helps to indicate is the fact 
that the developmental expenditures in the Central budget 
have risen to more than five-fold while that in State to 
less than half of it ( 245^)* This points to the rigidity 
of the State finances and expending role of the Union 
Government. Social services also constitute a sub-head,of 
the developmental expenses. Hence it is likely that the 
expenditure on social services will increase with an increase 
in the overall expenditure on developmental heads.
Expenditure on social services includes Education,
Medical and Public Health, Agricultural Development, Co-opera­
tion, Cottage Industries and expenditure on Refugee Rehabi­
litation. They are supposed to confer social welfare. In 
the V/estern countries like USA, and UK, a high proportion of 
national expenditure is claimed by social services. In 1913 
34.6 per cent of the public budget was devoted to the provision 
of social services in U.K. This percentage rose to 41.2 in 
1938 and 46.3 in 1949 and by 1930 it had reached 50 per cent.
In the United States, social expenditure claiiaed nearly 43 per
cent of the public budget; but the per centage is on a preci-
1pitate fall. This may be due to comprehensiveness of social
1. Vide Peacock,A.T., Income Redistribution and Social Policy 
Ed. London, Jonathon Cape, 30 Bedford Square, 1954), p 272.
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security and near abolition of private expenditure on medical 
services in Great Britain; whereas, the sickness insurance 
schemes are operating in only four American States.
In less developed economies; this proportion is not 
usually above 15 per cent. The following table gives the 
expenditure in the countries of the ECAF5 region.
Table IV.3
EXPENDITURE ON SOCIAL SERVICES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES OP THE
E.C .A .P .E .R EG IO N  (1954-55)
( IV.20 )
, Total Es^ iendi- (3;As percentage
expendi-ture on of (2)
C O U N T R I E S  ture. social
2 services. 4
31
million Afghans). 1,141 87^ 7.7
Burma (million Kyats,actual)<.1,148 119 10.4
Ceylon (million rupees). 921 259 28.1
Indonesia(million Rupiah,1955)16,316 1564 9.6
Japan(thousand million Yens) 1,052 300^ 28.5
Malaya (million Malayan 
Dolars .1954). 863 137 15.8
Thailand(million Beht) 1955. 4,983 342 6.9
SOURCE: Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East. 1956,(U.N.p
Bangkok, 1957), table-1, p 189 et seq.
* Total expenditure includes current expenditure, capital
outlays and loans and advances (net)granted by the Govt., but 
it excludes debt redemption, contribution to sinking fund and 
transfer to reserve funds.
a Expenditure on education only. During 1955-56, social services 
included expenditure on education,food storage and Public 
Health.
b. Includes pensions to government employees.
It is amply clear from the above table that expenditure on 
social services has been less than fifteen per cent in all 
but three countries. In Japan it was 28.5 per cent, in Ceylon 
28.1 per cent and in Halaya 15,8 per cent. It may be noted 
that per capita incomes in Japan and Ceylon are higher than in 
less-developed countries.
In India social services are the responsibility of the 
State governments except for Refugee Rehabilitation which is 
financed by Centre. Uttar Pradesh spent Rs2,634.82 lakhs on 
social services during the year 1957-58 (according to revised 
estimates). Budgeted estimates on this head during the next 
year allocated Rs2,906 lakhs. The table No. IV.4 shown on 
the following page Shows the social service expenditure of 
the U.P.Government on revenue account: It is evident from
the table No. iy*4 that.more than a moiety of expenditure onA - C ♦ i
social services is claimed by education. Medical and public 
health combinedly shared about a little more than one-fifth 
of expenditure on social services. Strictly speaking, only 
these two heads (Public health and medical) are directly 
related to social security. They received about 5 per cent 
of the total expenditure of the State in the year under 
review. Pe# capita expenditure on these two heads comes to 
about R5 0.90* This was Rs 84 during 1952-53* On the other 
hand, the expenditure on security services (Administration
1. Taking U.P.’s population at 750 millions.
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Table IV.4
EXPENDITURE ON SOCIAL SERVICES IN UTTAR PRADESH ( ON REVENUE 
ACCOUNT ) FOR THE YEARS 1957-58 AND 1958-59.
Heads of Expenditure
1960-61
Budget 
Estimates 
amounts 
(Rs lag^ iS),
Percentage 
of the 
revenue.
Education. 1,727,28 13.9
Medical. 465.36 3.5
Public Health. 226.41 1.7
Agriculture. 409.88 3.1
Veterinary. 195.85 1.5
Co-operation. 204.46 1.5
Total. 3,229.24 ■"25.2
SOURCE: India, I960. (The Publications Division, Ministry
of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India), 
P 454.
of Justice, Police and Jails) claimed and Rs1,325.38 out of 
the budgeted estimates for 1960-61. This is a little over 
ten per cent of the total revenue expenditure and gives per 
capita average of about Rs2* This shows that the internal 
security services are more expensive in U.P. than social 
security services. Ihe extent of economy in internal security 
services will determine the funds that may be spared for 
social security seri^ices. The former confer only negative 
welfare in the sense that they prevent social illfare. If 
the internal lav and order situation of the State improves, 
it will be possible to minimise expenditure on security 
services* Then, it may also be possible to spend greater 
amounts on social services.
Another head of expenditure in the Central Government 
budget which it is desirable to keep at a minimum is defence. 
It was Rs 4 9 .50 crores in 1939-40 but rose to a peak of 
Rs 395.49 crores in 1944-45. IXie to international tension 
and cold war between the capitalist and communist blocks 
and due to Kashmir muddle which has strained good relations 
with our next door neighbour, Pakistan (more so in view of 
her policy of Alignment and U.S. military aid), defence 
expenditure has grown into a great Bugbear of the Central 
finances. Chinese incursion and other security measures 
required for the protection of our borders have brought in 
their train fresh causes of concern and caution. It cotild 
not have been, th e re fo re , possible for India to reduce her 
defencelever since the outbreak of the First World War. 
Armament programmes and other military preparations in the
( IV.25 )
international field have rendered it necessary to prepare 
ourselves for national emergencies despite our policy of 
non-alignment and faith in peaceful co-existence. It has 
devoured the share that could have been spared for financing 
social and welfare services. India's defence budget has been 
disproportionately high ever since the war years. Although 
the proportion in the 1950’s declined almost constantly, the 
actual amounts spent on defence have actually risen from 
164.13 crrores in 1950-51 to Rs272.26 crores in the budget of 
1960-61. Still about 29 per cent of total expenditure is 
being claimed by defence during the last budget estimates.^*
If the international situation improves and the defence 
expenditure could be brought in the vicinity of 20 per cent, 
a sizeable amount will be spared for other welfare and develop­
mental activities^ It may be noted that the defence expenditure 
in China (Mainland) was 6,500'million Yuan or 22.1 per cent
of total expenditure during 1955; it was contemplated to
2bring it down to 20 per cent during the next year.
In India an expenditure of Rs 553 crores was incurred 
on social services during the period of First Five Year 
Plan. This was 22.6 per cent of the size of the Plan.
During the Second Five Year Plan period, the expenditure on
( IV.24 )
1. The Eastern Economist. March 4, 1960.
2. Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East« 1956, p 90.
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this head rose by 77.5 per cent but the proportion on this 
head declined to 19.7 per cent. The following table gives a 
detailed account of these provisions;
Table IV.5
EXPENDITURE ON SOCIAL i3ERVI«KS DURING THE TWO
First Plan Seoond Plan
Heads of expenditure. Amount
Rs
Crores
io o f 
total 
size 
of the 
Plan.
Amount.
Rs
Crores
ioot to^al 
size of 
the plan*
Education. 164 7.0 307 6.4
Health. 40 5.9 274 5.7
Housing. 49 2.1 120 2.5
Welfare of Backwards. 32 1.3 91 1.9
Social V/elfare. 5 Ocgi 29 0.6
Labour & Labour welfare. 7 0,3 29 0.6
Schemes of educated 
unemployed. 1 ■ J - 5 O.f
Rehabilitationo 136 5.8 90
.o
1.9
Total 533 22.6 945 19.7
SOURCE: INDIA, I960, table 92/199.
The share of housing, welfare of backward classes, social
welfare and labour and labour welfare has increased in the 
Second Plan both in size and proportion, while that on 
rehabilitation has been drastically reduced. This is due 
to the near solution stage of refugee problem. Scheme for 
educated unemployed has featured as a new item during the
Second Plan. Although social and labour welfare have been 
given additional share, yet the amounts on these heads are 
not sufficient when compareed to the nature and size of the 
problem. It is quite clear that labour and labour welfare Kjve 
not been allotted even one per cent of the Plan. But it may 
seem that the Government is alive to its liability for 
financing these services. The above discussion shows that 
the Government can assume a progressive attitude for the . 
finance of social security schemes and can afford to contribute. 
Future prospects are also encouraging. A low ebb in the 
international tension in future, solution of the refugee 
problem and reduction in the security service expenditure as 
a result of the establishment of local judiciary ioay enable 
the Government both Central and Uttar Pradesh to spare funds 
for financing social security scheme for the protection of 
the aged.
A discussion of inter-govemmental distribution of 
financial responsibility towards old age insurance scheme 
will not be out of place at this stage. In New Zealand, 
and Great Britain, national schemes are centrally financed; 
in Australia, GommenweaElth shares more than 92 per cent of 
national welfare services’ cost while the rest is borne by 
the Territories. In Canada, the Dominion shares aboat 85 
per cent while in the United States, Federal Government 
subsidises States for more than 56 per cent of the cost of 
income maintenance schemes where the government is under 
legal obligation to make contributions.^
1. Barnes, E.I4. Op.Cit., p 212.
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Nevertheless, determinants of financial responsibility 
between the State and the Centre are governed by some objective 
and policy considerations. In the first place, nature of the 
financial resources of the two levels of governments is a 
strong basis for the division of the financial responsibility. 
The Constitution of India lays down the legislative juwsidic- 
tion of the Union Government under a four-fold classification. 
There are certain taxes which are exclusively the right of 
the Union Government.^ It imposes and collects them, and 
appropriates them for its use in entirety. These imposts 
are corporation tax, customs and import duties, capital taxes 
(excluding the agricultural capital), and surcharge on income 
tax. There are other taxes levied and collected by the Union 
Government but shared with States. Income tax, (on non- 
agricultural incomes), central excise duties on tobacco and 
other home products of this type are such taxes. Another 
type of levies is imposed and collected by the Union, but
they are wholly distributed among the States.^ They include
/Estate Duty, (non-agricultural property), terminal taxes on 
railway, sea and air (non-traffic faresj^  stamp duties on stock 
exchange transactions and taxes on newspaper sales and purchases 
and advertisements. A fourth category of taxes is that which 
includes taxes levied by the Union,but collected and retained
(IV.27 )
1. Article 271.
2. Article 2?0.
3. Article 269.
4. Article 268.
by the States, ' such as, stamp duties, excise duties on 
medicinal and toilet preparations as mentioned in the Union 
list. State Governments have been given legislative powers 
to collect land revenues, agricultural income tax, succession 
and stamp duties on alcohol, liquors, and opium. This shows 
that the revenues of the States are rigid as compared to that 
of the Centre, while they have to undertake more and more 
responsibility regarding social and welfare activities.
Bjsiness location ?nd tax competition between States 
inter se is another crictarion for fixing the financial 
responsibility between the Union and the State. If the States 
are to finance the social security schemes on their own without 
any aid from the Centre, they will pay different sums to 
social insurance institutions. They shall have to raise this 
sum from the general tax-payers. Thus, it may place unequal 
burden on the taxpayers of two States. General attitude 
towards the Central and State Governments also plays a 
significant role in the allocation of cost. If the States’ 
activities are confined to the most necessary ones such as 
administration of law and order and judiciary, they will 
have to be placed no burden for social security contributions.
In the same yay, if the residence requirements of the scheme 
are a long domincile in the State, the State shall have to 
bear greater burden. In India, States have less responsibility 
with regard to social welfare and labour matters have been 
included in the concurrent list of legislative powers. There­
fore the contribution to the insurance scheme will require a 
subsidy from the Centre.
(IV.28 )
The observations bring to the conclusion that the 
centre should make grants to U*P* for more than a half of 
the latters liability for retirement pension scheme. This 
will encourage other states to implement similar schemes.
In fact as in case of ESI scheme a portion of contributions 
should be required from the non-implemented areas and since 
the EPF scheme is already in operation, competitive strength 
of U.P.industries will not be jeopardised as the employers in 
other states are also paying their share to the EPP scheme.
No doubt, schemes of old age assistance (whicCh will essen­
tially cover the entire aged population) such as one already 
operating in U.P. should be left on the choice of the States 
as in the United States. The entire cost of such schemes 
should be iiorne by the States*
Total Government contributions to the pension scheme 
may assume either of the two forms —  permanent contributions
to
at a fixed rate or grants-in-aidj^ insurance institution equal 
to the cost of defined items. If the latter is preferred 
the total CrOvemment’s share will be equal to
2Pt +2Ct +SD +E4-EX 
This will vary from year to year, ilxed rates of contributions 
by the Ctovemment will have no string attached to the extent 
of need and the purpose for which they can be utilised by 
the insurance institution. They can be utilised for any 
purpose within that scheme. If the Government makes contri­
butions to an integrated scheme of social security, the social
( IV.29 )
insurance institfltion will be free to utilize the whole income 
(which includes Government contributions too) for paying cash 
benefits, or medical benefits, unemployment benefits or old 
age pensions.
Grants-in-aid, on the other hand^may be conditional or 
unconditional. Conditional grants may be made for specific 
purposes (i*g« for meeting the cost of administration), or 
they may be general-purpose grants* Conditional grants 
must be used for defined purposes in a defined way and the 
Government must see that they are so used. The controversy 
between the conditional and unconditional grants r^ ajes round 
the point of freedom of action. Under the unsxjonditional 
grants the Institution will have freedom of action. If, however 
such grants are intended to raise the standard of pensions or, 
if it is the desire of the Government that they should be 
handled in a specific way in the national interest, the condi­
tional grant is the only proper way of participation in the 
finance.
Government subsidies may also be in kind. It may meet 
the cost of administration or provide the administrative 
machinery itself. Subsidy can also take the form of cost of 
living allowance. Under this form of subsidy, the benefits 
should be properly linked to the consumer price indices. But 
this is a disputable affair. Government may also subsidise 
in the shape of benefits in kind such as issue of food coupons 
or spectacles to the aged and artificial limbs to the in­
valids. Food coupons are not a desirable form of benefit in 
kind. Ihis will tantamount to socialisation of consumption
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and have a stink of over-statism in private affairs. But the 
other two kinds of subsidies are desirable, because if the 
price of these things is paid in cash,it is possible that the 
cash is utilized for other purposes and the intended articles 
may never be purchased by the beneficiaries. Moreover, the 
market prices may be higher than the reasonable prices of 
these articles. Therefore, these appliances may either be 
provided by the Government directly or they may be sold at 
subsidised prices at the fair price shops exclusively meant 
for beneficiaries on producing sufficient identity.
It may be noted here that in India, it is the Government 
that took initiative in providing social insurance in whatever 
form it was; and it is the Government that is a senior 
partner in the govemajtice of the scheme at present. There­
fore, in my opinion, the State should contribute in fixed 
proportions in each contribution period and there-should be 
no conditional or unconditional grants-in-aid over and above 
this, for, the State cannot assume unlimited liability in 
financial matters as in Great Britain.
A conclusion may now be arrived at regarding the propor­
tionate contributions of the parties —  i.e. the employees, 
the employers and the State. Since the self-employed and the 
non-employed cannot be presently covered, their case has been 
left out of consideration. The employers should, in principle, 
contributes equal to employees. But since the foregoing 
d isc u ss io n  b rin g s one to conclusion  that the lowest-paid 
employees may be exmpted from making any contributions as in 
case of the ESI scheme, or at least they should be sufficiently
( IV.31 )
subsidised in their share, employees' share may be a little 
less than that of the employers. Again the Government should 
subsidise the joint contributions, for the present upto 10^ 
of the total contributions. Thus, of 16-2/3?^  of payroll, the 
Government should bear 1-2/3 per cent; the rest 15 per cent 
may be shared by the employees seven per cent, and employers 
eight per cent* Thus, the entire cost will be shared between 
the employees, the employers and the Government in the propor­
tion of 7:8:1-2/3 or 4-2L48:10. Out of the 10 per cent share 
of Government, the Centre should make grant-in-aid equal to
6 per cent and the rSst 4 should be borne by the U.P*
------------------- . - t  -
Government. The total financial responsibility of the two 
levels of Government may be estimated as follows:
Total factory workers in U.P.^ 2,68,195
@
Average wages per worker (Annual) Rs 1,584
Total Annual Wages Rs 42,48,20,880
Annual Goveiment contribution @ 1-2/3 Rs 70,80,348
Centre 1 ^ 42,48,209
U.P. 2/3 28,32,139
It is quite clear that this would not be an aierous burden on
the coffers of the state, and it can be saved with a little 
caution. However, it must be distinctly understood, that these 
proportions are not based on any unchangeable premises.
* Indian Labour Journal, (Ministry of Labour and Qnployraent,
Government of India), March, I960, Vol. I, No. 3, p 314.
§ Report of the Study Group of Social Security, 1958,
Annexure I, para 3 (Average of all age-group earnings)*
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They embody the conclusions of this discussion and thus, are, 
at the best, arbitrary. But they provide a basis for discussion 
In fact, no proportion, whatever, can be said to be exact 
and unchangeable. As such, many different combinations of 
these proportions may be suggested. Hence, they should not be 
treated with any strict sanctity about them. But, they provide 
as a useful guide even if different proportions are adopted.
CONCLUSIONS I According to the preceding discussion,
----------- * factors influencing the quantum of the
cost of old age s'ecurity are the amount and types of benefits 
and beneficiaries, the retirement age, longevity and mortality 
factors of the covered population, stability of the labour 
force, withdrawal equity and vesting rights granted under the 
scheme, investmnent of funds of social security, and the 
administrative efficiency and needs of the scheme. 33ie total 
cost determined in this way should be shared between the 
beneficiaries, their employers and the State in agreed pro­
portions. Ihe proportionate contributions of the employees 
should be determined with due consideration of the fact that 
they should not be required to pay more than the probable cost 
of their pensions. Moreover, the low paid employees should 
be subsidised by their employers and the State. Their contri­
butions should neither be inequitable nor shouldtli^  kill 
incentive to work. In fixing the employers’ share their 
capacity to pay should be assessed on industry-cum-region 
basis for the introduction priority. Contributions should 
not tell upon their cost of production adversely nor should 
they curtail employment. The share of the Government should
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bear reference to its financial resources, and the responsibility 
for providing social services. Its share may be in the form 
of a fixed per centage of cost from year to year or alter­
natively, it should bear the cost of deficit on account of 
contingencies and low contribution by certain employees and 
administrative cost. In my opinion, Government'd share should 
be a fixed percentage of total cost. On the basis of the 
above observations the beneficiaries, their employers and the 
Government should share in the proportion of 42:48:10, or 
7:8:1 2/3 per cent of the total cost of 16-2/3 per cent of 
payroll. The Government share should be apportioned between 
the Centre and U.P* in the proportion of 6:4* This will put 
the ratio among the beneficiaries, their employers, the centre 
and the State as 7:8:1:2/3 or 42:48:6:4 respectively. In the 
next Chapter, the nature and effects of these contributions 
will be examined with reference to each party.
( IV.34 )
COST OP OLD AGE INSURANCE; NATURE AND EFFECTS
In the foregoing chapter, factors influencing the 
proportionate share of employees, employers and the State were 
discussed. In this Chapter, an attempt has been made to 
assess the nature and effects of these contributions on 
the contributive parties.
The nature of contributions differs from party to party 
and their effects are not identical in all cases. Old age 
insurance scheme, as has already been discussed, envisages 
to cover the workers in sjpecified industries. Hence, the 
insured employees would comprise only a segment of the 
working population. The employers, who are the other party 
to finance, enter into exchange relationship in respect of 
their product with the entire population of the country in 
so far as they are the consumers of the product in considera­
tion. Since the employers’ contribution form an item of the 
cost of production, they will be passed on to the consumers 
in general via the market of the product. In addition to 
this, the State contributions to the old age insurance scheme 
will be recovered from the general taxpayers, who constitute 
a broader section of population than the insured persons. 
Therefore, not only a discussion of the effects of the cost 
of old age insurance to the insured persons, their employers 
and the State is necessary, but its effects on the community 
in g e n e ra l, capital formation, and foreign trade is also 
imperative to understand the full implications of the scheme.
CHAPTER V
( )
(a) Effects on the insured
As has already been stated, the insured persons will be 
the first party to make contributions to the scheme. It is, 
therefofe, in the fitness of things that the effect of contri­
butions on this group is studied before others. It was 
thought desirable in course of the discussion in the Chapter 
III , that contributions should be linked to the wages of the 
employees covered under the scheme* It was also stated that 
the contributions of the employers and the employees both 
will be collected from the employers concerned. It is simply 
a matter of convenience and administrative expediency inasmuch 
as the scheme does not entirely depend on this technique of 
collection, so that it is not fundamental to the nature of 
the scheme. The employers are entitled to deduct the employees* 
share of contributions from their respective wages. There­
fore, the first effect of paying the contributions on behalf 
of the employees will manifest in the form of reduced wage 
packet to them on the payday* But the effect of contributions 
in this form is one aspect of the scheme. A study of this 
side of the problem to the entire exclusion of the other side 
of it, creates confusion and is misleading. The plan of old 
age insurance brings fruit in the shape of various retiral 
benefits; pensions to the retiree, and the invalid, dependents' 
benefits to widow and his survivors after his death, with­
drawal benefits, and gratuity on retirement etc. The levy 
of contribution may compei the wage-earners to curtail their 
consumption. This will have an adverse effect on the standard
o f  t h e i r  l i v i n g .  But i n  a b s e n c e  o f  a  p e n s io n  sc h e m e jth e y  
w i l l  make p r o v i s i o n  f o r  t h e i r  r e t i r e d  l i f e  s i n g l e - h a n d e d l y  
which w i l l  b e  c o s t l i e r  t o  them th a n  o ld  a g e  in s u r a n c e  c o n t r i ­
b u t i o n s .  A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  i f  th e y  do n o t  make p r o v i s i o n  f o r
t h e i r  o ld  a g e ,  t h e i r  s t a n d a r d  o f  l i v i n g  w i l l  m ost l i k e l y  s u f f e r
to
a  g r e a t e r  s e t  b a c k  d u e ]a b s e n c e  o f  income i n  t h e i r  d e fu n c t  
l i f e .  H ence, th e  s h r in k a g e  i n  th e  s t a n d a r d  o f  l i v i n g  w i l l  b e  
more th a n  r e t r i e v e d  i n  o ld  a g e .  M oreover ,  th e y  would pay  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  a t  th e  maximum r a t e  o f  8,3% o f  w ages w h ereas  
t h e  maximum r a t e  o f  b e n e f i t s  w i l l  b e  4 3 *7 5 ^  o f  w ages which  
i s  more th an  f i v e f o l d .  To t h a t  e x t e n t ,  t h e  d i s a g r e e a b l e n e s s  
o f  th e  c o s t  o f  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  i n s u r e d  p e r s o n  h a s  
t o  s u f f e r ,  w ould b e  recom pensed  by th e  p l e a s a n t n e s s  o f  b e n e f i t s  
when th ey  w i l l  b e  a c t u a l l y  d i s b u r s e d  t o  h im .
I t  was o b s e r v e d  i n  th e  f o r e g o i n g  p a g e s  a s  a  p r i n c i p l e  o f  
a l l o c a t i n g  t h e  c o s t  to  th e  em p lo y e es  t h a t  t o t a l  b e n e f i t s  
r e c e i v e d  by him s h o u l d ,  i n  no c a s e ,  f a l l  s h o r t  o f  t h e  amotmt 
o f  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  p a i d  by him to  t h e  schem e. In  o t h e r  w o rd s ,  
th e  p r o b a b le  p r e s e n t  v a l u e  o f  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  s h o u ld  n o t  b e  more  
th an  th e  p r o b a b le  p r e s e n t  v a l u e  o f  th e  b e n e f i t s .  S t a t e d  
p l a i n l y ,  s o c i a l  in s u r a n c e  s h o u ld  n o t  b e  c o s t l i e r  t o  th e  
b e n e f i c i a r y  th a n  p r i v a t e  l i f e  in s u r a n c e  c o n t r a c t e d  f o r  
i d e n t i c a l  b e n e f i t s .  I t  s h o u ld  b e  n o te d  a t  t h i s  s t a ^ e  t h a t  
t o t a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  each  i n s u r e d  p e r s o n  a r e  much 
m ore th an  t h e  amount a c t u a l l y  p a i d  by him on a c c o u n t  o f  th e  
fact t h a t  h i s  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  a r e  s u b s i d i s e d  by h i s  em p lo y ers  
and th e  S t a t e  ( u n l e s s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  i t  r e p u d i a t e s  i t s  f i n a n c i a l
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responsibility)* This is ’social' element of Insurance which 
lowers the cost of benefits to its direct consumers. In 
mating an appraisal of the scheme, therefore, its cost aspect 
should be linked to its benefit aspect*
Extent of social insurance consumption may be based on 
the theory of public finance according to which there is 
nothing objectionable in pushing up the consumption of social 
insurance to a point where the marginal sacrifice imposed on 
the consumers is less than the benefits accsruing from it 
(from the consumers view-point)* The problem may be studied 
in a more factual way. It is evident that benefits paid 
over years will always be more than the contributions made 
over time. The Ogive curve of contributions and benefits of 
an insured individual will yield a graph as given in figure 2. 
In this figure, OX axis measures years of contributions and
I
benefits, and GY apcis measures the amounts. It is evident 
from the pjevnsal of the graph, that cumulative contribution 
curve rises up to forty years of the age of entry. This is 
the maximum period for which the benefitiary can contribute 
if he enters the covered employment at a minimum age of entry 
say, 20 years. It also shows that cumulative benefit curve OA*
rises more steeply than OA, the total contributions curve.
This is because of the fact that benefits are paid at a highel*
rate of wages than the joint-contributions of all the parties.
(This may be recalled here that the total contributions to 
the proposed pension scheme according to the recommendations 
of the Study Group are 16-2/3^ of wages while retirement
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pension are 43.75 per cent of such wages. Even the total
dependents' benefits will be higher than the total contribution).
toBut the benefit curve stops only afterjyears of its start.
This is based on the assumption that the expectation of life 
at 60, i.e. the age of retirement recommended for the purpose, 
is 10.1 years for males and 11.3 years for females. If the 
beneficiary dies, the retirement pensions stop to be paid; 
but the dependants' benefits up to a maximum of two-thirds of 
retirement pensions would still be payable (in case there 
are dependants)* According to the family statistics adopted 
by the Study Group for the purpose of calculations, the first 
youngest child for an insured persons aged up to 60 years was 
ten years of age.^  He will be twenty after ten years. If 
orphans' benefits are admissible up to 18 years (for a child 
receiving education, according to the recommendations of the 
Group), he will receive benefits no longer after the death of 
the insured. The Group have also adopted the age of wife 8.0 yrs 
younger than the age of the husband. Thus, a man dying at 
70 will leave a wife of 62 who is likely to survive him for 
13 years. On an average, total benefit period in case of an 
insured person will, likely, be el<|gnated to 20 years of 
which ten years will be of full benefit period and the remain­
ing ten years will be the period for maximum of dependents’ 
benefits. Therefore, the total benefit curve flattens after 
about ten years of retirement. In this graph, AX' is longer
1. Op.Cit., Annexure I, 6.
2. Ibid.
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than KX’ indicating that at that point, total benefit exceeds 
the total contribution paid. A'K represents the deficit, 
which should be covered by other incomes, such as interest 
on the investiients of the pension fund. If the total of such 
incomes exceeds A'K, it will represent surplus on an individual's 
account. Though surpluses and deficits may arise on individual 
accounts, but for the scheme as a collective whole, neither 
deficits nor surpluses should exist.
Workers contributions viewed in context with the benefits 
received by them, represent a sort of horizontal redistribution 
of income. Under an old age insurance scheme, income is 
transferred horizontally, and through time. On the one hand, 
income is taken from the workers and then it is transferred 
back to the same group at times when a number of that group 
grows poor in old age. Thus, redistribution over time is a 
substiti;te to planning savings on these lines. It is inter- 
group transfer of income because income is transferred from 
one group of workers to another who have generally same tastes, 
aspirations, fears pleasures, and psychological attitude 
towards life. Therefore, workers' contributions will be in 
the nature of a regressive tax if money taken from one hand 
is not trsinsferred from the other to the members of the same 
group.
The total bill of ESI scheme collected from the workers 
has been sharply regressive up to the year 1956-57. The 
table on the next page shows the contributions and benefits 
made by and paid to the workers under the scheme.
( V.6 )
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Table V.1
CONTRIBUTION AND BENEFIT POSITION OF THE ESI SCHEME
(1952-53 to 1958-59)
(amounts in Hs lakhs)
Years C O N T R I B U T I O N S  Benefits Bene-■ fitsEmployers' Elaployees Joint ^
4
1 2 3 4 5 6
195:^ -53 1,31 31 1,62 7 4
1953-54 1,76 35 2,11 25 11.7
1954-55 1,88 97 2,85 47 16.5
1955-56 2,25 240 4,65 136 29.2
1956-57 2,59 322 5,81 238 40.9
1957-58 2,83 352 6,36 376 59.1
1958-59 2,90 381 6,71 415 60.3
SOURCE: Statement XXXVI, ESIC Report, 1958-59.
This table shows that up to the fifth year of the implemen­
tation of the scheme, benefits were less than even the contri­
butions of employees. In the sixth year, they were slightly 
more than them. Joint contribution by the insured persons, 
and their employers have throughout these years been more 
than 150 per cent of the benefits paid to the insured persons# 
Conversely said, benefits paid represented roughly sixty 
per cent or less of total joint contributions. Figure 3 
presents a visual view o f  the cost and benefit aspects of the 
ESI scheme. This reveals that benefits rose after the third
R*. Cuoiits Fisuxs 5; G raph shoi^w g  CoAtTiuBUTiOJf
year and the curve of benefits travelled slightly upper than 
the employers' contribution curve in the fifth year and 
afterwards, though the benefit curve always followed a lower 
course than the joint-contribution curve. The reason of 
this phenomenon has been, in the first instance, that many 
insured persons did not qualify for benefits due to 
imposing’ contribution conditions. Secondly, ade<iuatd 
medical services v;ere also not provided in the beginning.
In the third place, contributions were collected from the 
employers in the non-implemented areas also though no benefits 
were payable in those regions. This meant that contributions 
accumulated. Fourthly, actuarial estimates for morbidity 
have been higher. This resulted into the fixation of higher 
rates of contributions than actuarially necessary. However, 
the scheme has been passing through the transitional sta^ e. 
Therefore, actual cost of benefits cannot be estimated at 
this stage. It cannot be said that contributions are high 
merely because in few years there is a surplus. However, 
this h ^ resulted into the accumulation of a fund to the tune 
of Rs 13.92 crores by the end of 1958-5^
Although, nothing can be said with precision, yet it 
seems that contributions contain an element of poll tax and 
as such are regressive. Nevertheless, the ESI scheme is in 
the experimental stages yet. Hence, the peak of the benefit 
period has not reached so long. Besides, the Corporation has 
to carry on constructions of buildings to house its dispen­
saries and hospitals, offices and sanatoria. This is a
* According to the valuation Report for that year.
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costly affair. But after the completion of these projects, 
the rates of contributions auid benefits shall have to be 
revised in the light of the experiences gained. This line 
of approach shall require a little modification in so far as 
the old-age insurance is concerned. Under this scheme, no 
benefits shall be payable for a minimum qualifying period and 
contributions shall go on accumulating. Even for many years 
after the benefits have started to be paid, normal experience 
will not be gained. As the actuaries opine, the peak of the 
lead will be reached about some fifty years after the initia­
tion of the scheme. This will permit a considerable time for 
re-thinking over th^ scheme. At this stage, it is to be 
recalled that the cost of old age insurance will be borne 
by the insured in collaboration with other parties. Therefore, 
this leads us to the discussion of employers' position vis-a^ 
vis their contributive share, and the nature and effect of 
cost on them.
(b) Effects on the Employers
Of all the factors of production, labour is alone in- 
dispensible. But unfortunately, it was universally held that 
labour was just like a commodity in respect of its sale and 
purchase, or demand and supply. However, it has been lately 
realised that a worker has a head and a heart too. This has 
resulted into enactment of legislations giving a human status 
to dehumanised labour. Slogans to protect it against various 
risks encountered from womb to tomb, are often heard. Social 
security is one of such measures which protect the income of 
the labouring class in times of its involuntary stoppage.
( V.9 )
Labour renuneration, whatever form or guise it may assume— 
wages, salaries, dearness allowance, welfare benefits, social 
security contributions or otherwise—^constitutes an element 
of the cost of production. Therefore, social security contri­
butions made by the employers should be studied in proper 
perspective. It will help to analyse labour cost into proper 
classifications and thus, crystallise an employer-attitude 
towards it.
Rit it is a sorry feature to note that the problem of 
labour remuneration has not been studied in proper perspective 
except for a tangentical treatment in the Profit and Loss 
Accounts of the undertakings. If a scaling of the Annual 
Reports of the companies is done, one is unable to categorise 
suitably various amounts spent on labour on account of wages 
and fringe items. Schedule Vl-Part II of the Indian Companies 
Act, 1956, lays down the legal requirements of Profit and Loss 
Account of a joint-stock company. According to this, the 
expenditure on each of the following items, inter alia, 
should be separately shown: (1) Salaries, v/ages and bonus,
(2) Contribution to provident and other funds, (3) Workmen 
and Staff Welfare expenses. This is the prototype arrangement 
of items and this betrays a lack of dynamism in its treatment. 
New problems are cropping up every day in the field of labour 
and industrial relations which require dynamic treatment.
These are quite new problems unknov/n in the past. In con­
text of new environment, the accountants cannot afford to 
remain unaffected by these sweeping changes. They have
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tremendous responsibility to adjust their profession to the 
changing contours of social relationships introduced by 
precipitate industrialisation and Five Year Plans, to the 
changing attitude in employer-employee relations aided by 
new personnel-administration attitude, productivity movements, 
development of corporate structure in subsi::::titution for proprie­
tory ownership, detailed mechanisation in work and office and 
the last but not the least, Government's adoption of 'socialife- 
tic pattern of society' as its ultimate goal.
Various legislative measures in the field of social 
security and labour welfare require the following types of 
payments to be made over and above wages and salaries: (1) Con­
tributions to ESI scheme (2) Contributions to EPP, (3) Gratuity, 
(4) Bonus, (5) Retrenchment and Lay-off Compensation, and
(6) Welfare expenses. Treatment of various labour and employee 
remuneration items in the Profit and Loss Account of under­
takings presents a veritable museum of eddities under the 
heading "Payment to and Provision for Etaployees*" Sometimes 
one finds lumping together of all salaries, wages, commission, 
to manage®srand payment to sub-contractors under one head.
In other simply "Wages and Salaries" may be shown without
giving any details whatever. Besides this, further complications 
arise due to the fact that the term wages and salaries may 
include a variety of payments. In a manufacturing concern, 
wages may be direct or indirect. Indirect wages may, on 
further sub-classification, be found to belong to factory or 
office, administration or distributions. Lack of proper
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classification of these heads is encouraged (in one sense) by 
law" itself which leaves the matter at the sweet will of the 
accountants. Advantage of dealing with such items separately 
in a systematic way cannot be overemphasized. Normal wages 
separated from the overtime wages may reveal useful information 
to the management itself that may subsequently help modify 
its policy.
Pew writers on Accountancy have ever thought seriously 
of the payment of social security contributions as an element 
of cost although this is as important as the treatment of 
Reserve for Ba.d Debts or of Goodwill which are discussed 
threadbare in the text books. The result has been the growth 
of varying practices in their treatment by accountants.
W.W.Biggs says that "The employers' contributions to National 
Insurance which is deducted from wa^es payable to workers, 
will be treated as wages in Cost Accounts. The contribution 
made by the employer, however, may be regarded as an indirect 
expense and apportioned between the factory, office and selling 
departments of the business. The details required for the 
apportionment, will be furnished by the Wages Book* Alter^ 
natively, as the employer’s contribution is definitely part 
of the cost of employing the workers, it may be added to their 
wages and added to their direct expenses."^ Thus, he seems 
to be vague and indefinite and does not suggest any clear- 
cut policy. In course of my discussions with Accountants
1. Cost Accounts, p 88.
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of some Companies, I came to learn that contributions to the 
ESI and the EPF schemes are treated as overheads by some firms 
and as prime cost by others. This is a confused idea. The 
treatment of such contfibutions depends upon the fact v/hether 
they are paid on behalf of one category of workers or the 
other. Thus, contributions to the social security schemes 
should not be always supposed to represent overhead cost which 
is to be minimised at all costs but they should be given the 
status of that category of wages to which they belong. In 
this way, they should not be looked upon as an unnecessary 
evil for temporary treatment. Social security is a necessary 
cost incurred on the employment of workers. As such, it 
should be treated accordingly. If the contributions belong 
to direct labour charges, they will constitute an item of 
prime cost; if they are paid on the wage bills of travelling 
agents and salesmon, they should be recognised as distribution 
costs. Social security contribution on office salaries 
and administrative salaries will also find their due repre­
sentation. They will be treated in the same way as the wages 
or salaries to which they belong. The management will not 
try to avoid the contributions as such but i,., will think 
that it is the different type of wages that should be controlled 
and not the contributions independent of wages. Thus, if the 
factory oncost is avoidable, so will be the contributions to
social security scheme calculated on the wages belonging to
ithis element of cost/production. Proper analysis of contri­
butions will, thus, change the attitude of management tov/ards 
the scheme of social security in general.
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Social security contributions have also been treated as
an excise duty on a factor of production. On the other
hand, some writers think it to be an indirect business tax and
still others as an employment tax. Before judging the nature
of social s€icurlt^  contributions levied on employers, it is
advisable to understand the fundamentals of t^ itself. Tax
has been defined differently by differents authors. Seligman
holds that "A tax is a compulsory contribution from the
person to the government to defray the expenses incurred in
the common interest of all, without reference to common benefits
conferred.Here, from the phrase ’person to the government'
is of vital interest for this discussion. Old age insurance
contribution is not necessarily made by the employer to the
Government -- it is rather made ever to the social security
institution. Moreover, ^common interest of all' is a broad
phrase to admit of any specificity like payment of benefits
to the retirees. C.F.Bsstable defines tax as "the compulsory
contribution of the wealth of a person or body of persons for
2the service of public powers.” The conformity of social 
security contributions to this definition ia out of the question 
as its purpose is never the service of public powers. Indian 
Taxation Enquiry Committee (1924-25) have also come out with 
a definition that "taxes are compulsory contributions made by 
the members of the community to the governing body of the same
( V.14 )
1. Quoted by Dr.R.N*Hiargava, Public Finance (Chaitanya 
Publicating House, Allahabad, 195^ p
2. Ibid.
towards the common expenditure without any guarantee of a 
definite measured service in return.”^  This definition bases 
on the foundation of an absence of quid pro quo. But it is 
obvious that contributions of the employers guarantee benefits 
to his CTiployees. For this reason, they represent a proportion 
of wage-bill of their employees payable to the insurance 
institutions in order to finance the benefits guaranteed to 
employees in the event of the occurrence of specific contin­
gencies.
Whatever be the nature of such contributions, the following 
points are distinctly discernible in their case. In the first 
instance, they are compulsorily payable. Secondly, they vary 
with the wage bill. Thirdly, they are related to certain 
benefits though they do not render direct /quid pro quo alv/ays. 
And lastly, they are an element of cost of production. The 
last characteristic poSnts to the fact that like other elements 
of cost of production, they, will be passed on to others to the 
pos3 sible extent. Indeed, the first impact of the levy 
will be borne by the employers themselves. But a tax being 
analoguous to a counterfeit coin, everyirbody wants to pass it 
on to others. It rests where any further shifting is not 
possible.
Shifting of a tax Is only possible if the tax under 
consideration pertains to a ’commodity' with regard to which 
its producer enters into exchange relationship with other 
parties. The money burden of tax can be shifted backward or 
forward. If the social insurance contribution is shifted to
t. The Report, para 11.
( V.15 )
the employees in the form of paying them wages lower than the 
previous rates by the amount or a part ,of the amount of such
contribution, this will illustrate a case of backward shift­
ing. But alternatively, contributions may be passed on to 
the purchasers of the commodities produced by such employees 
on whose wage bills contributions are payable. Then, it will 
constitute a case of forward shifting.
Theory of incidence of employer’s contributions resolves 
itself in an inquiry into the proportion wherein its money 
burden would be shared between the employers by way of 
increase in the cost of production and by the employees by
way of a wage-reduction on account of and incidental to the
levy. This proportion depends on the respective elasticities 
of supply of labour by the labour institutions and the 
demand for it by employers. The proportionate burden on 
employees and employers is me3,sured by dividing the elasticity 
of supply with the elasticity of demand (both for labour). 
Mathematically expressed
Employers* share: Employee's share:: e.s.:e.d.
where e.s. is the elasticity of supply of labour and e.d., 
the elasticity of demand for it. Hie e.s. is measured as the 
proportionate ch^ge in the quantum of employment r." 
divided by the proportionate change in the wages received; 
and e.d. is measured as the proportionate change in the quantum 
of employment divided by proportionate change in wages offered.
( V. 16 )
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in Figure 4 DD is the demand curve for labour, and
SS is the supply curve for labour. PM is the amount of
wa^es paid to the employees in the pre-contribution state.
After a levy of employers’ contribution equal to TQ, the demand
for labour shrinks so that D*D' is the new demand curve of
employers for the employment of labour. OP, the quantum of
empl03rment in the pre-contribution state contrsicts to OP' in the
post-contribution situation. According to this graph
e.s. PP> / OP
~KT / MP
and
e.d. PP» / OP
QK / HP
!Eherefore, the burden of total contributions TQ will be
shared between the employers and employees in the ratio of
e.s. ; e.d. Or
PP» / OP . PP» / OP 
KT / MP ’ QK / MP
or (PP» / OP)(QZ / MP) : (PP* / OP) (KT / MP) 
or QK:KT
The foregoing analysis relates to normal cases where both the 
demand and supply curves of labour are elastic and where the 
least-cost-combination has already been achieved in the 
pre-contribution period. In case the employer is a monopsonist 
in the labour market, his demand curve will be highly elastic 
and will run parallel to the base. Then, points Q aiad K 
coincide. Therefore, the entire contributions v/ill be passed 
on to the oaployees in the form of reduced wages and the 
employers would not share any portion of the contribution burdeaJ
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\Ihere the i.’orkers cannot afford to stay out but are prepared
supply
to accept t;hatever wages are offered them,/for labour will be 
inelastic and will run parallel to the QY axis. In this case 
points Q and K will again coincide and the burden on the 
employers will be nil; the employees will share the whole 
burden of contributions of employers by accepting reduced 
wages. Conversely, when the employees’ organisation is a 
monopolist in the labour market, the supply curve will be 
highly elastic and it will run parallel to the base. In this 
case points T and K will coincide so that the burden of 
employers' share of contributions on employees will be nil 
and employers shall have to pay their contributions in full*
In a case where the demand curve is inelastic, it will be 
perpendicular on the base and will run parallel to OY axis*
Here again, T and K will coincide and the entire burden of 
employers’ contributions will be borne by employers themselves 
and the employees shall share no portion of it.
The foregoing discussion pertains to a case of backward 
shifting of employers' contributions. The burden of tax 
shared in this way between labour and employers, it will lead 
to forward shifting on the part of the employer who is a 
producer of c<^odities at the same time, while simultaneously 
being a purchaser of labour. Forward shifting may be done 
by charging higher prices from the consumers of his product 
in consideration. Since the employer's contribution that 
could not be shifted to employees will now enter the cost of 
production, the cost curve of the producer will now be inflated* 
In Figure C is the cost curve of the producer and R is the
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revenue curve or price curve. After bearing KQ portion of 
the contributions that could not be shfited to labour, the 
new cost curve C  will travel above the old cost curve C*
The old equilCibrium point M will now rise to Q. The tax
►
burden KQ will be apportioned between the producer and the 
consumers in the proportion of KN and NQ respectively. Thus, 
the actual money burden of contributions out of the total 
contribution TQ will be only KN on the producers. Of the 
rest, TK will be shifted to labour in the form of wage-cut and 
NQ to the consumers in the form of increased price of the
product in consideration. However, as in the case of backward
shifting, the situation of curves will change with change in
the elasticities of demand for product on the part of the
consumers and its supply by its producers. In case of a 
perfectly inelastic demand curve, points K and N coincide 
and price will rise with the full amount of tax and producers 
will shift their entire burden on to consumers. In a case of 
perfectly elastic demand curve, points N and Q coincide so 
that the burden on the consumers will be nil and the producers 
will carry the full load of their share. In a case of perfectly 
inelastic supply curve, points Q and N will coincide and the 
entire burden of tax will be borne by producers and the 
price of the product will not rise on this account# In a case 
of perfectly elastic supply curve, points N and K will coincide 
and entire tax burden QK will be passed on to consumers.
Taking an over-all view, it may be said that in case the 
employer is a monopsonist in the labour market and a monopolist 
in the commodity market, he will shift the entire tax burden
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either to labour or to consumers or to both whichever course 
is expedient for him and maximises his'net monopoly revenue’*
On the contrary, if the labourer’s organisation is a monopolist 
and consumer class is monoppsonists, no portion of the employers 
contribution will be passed on to other parties and entire 
burden will be sustained by the CTiployers*themselves. It may­
be noted that, retrenchment or wage-cut may be prohibited by
be
law. In that case, the position of labour will/that of a 
monopolist. However, perfectly inelastic or elastic demand 
or supply curves are hypothetical cases. The reality lies 
in bfetween these two extremes. The elasticity of demand of a 
commodity depends, among other things, on the extent of post- 
ponability of consumption. For example, demand for staple 
food articles is highly thou^ not perfectly, inelastic.
Their consumers can neither substitute other articles for 
these to any material extent nor can they curtail or postpone 
their consumption materially. Other articles may have modera­
tely elastic demand or supply curves. However, the foregoing 
analysis helps as a torch-bearer to the problem of shifting 
of social insurance contributions and the possibility of its 
influencing the price of the product in the market and its 
effects on the employment of labour. The discussion only 
discloses that there is a theoretical possibility of shifting 
the employers' contributions in the first instance to the 
employees in the form of wage-cut and then to the consumers in 
the form of increased prices of the product. Thus, firstly, 
the whole burden of the employers' contributions will not be 
borne by them; and secondly the rise in the prices will not be
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equal to the amount of the employers' contributions though it
may form the upper ceiling. The argument also gives to
understand that the burden of contributions between employers
inter se may sometimes, be uneven depending on their ability
to shift it. This ability differs from case to case and
Region to region. This may in its turn influence their decision
regarding allocation of resources between man-power and labour-
saving devices. Some countries, like New Zealand have,
of
therefore, adopted the method/taxing profits in stead of 
taxing on wage-bills in order to make the burden more equitable 
as between employers. This has an additional advantage of 
leaving the rate of substitution between the fsictors of pro­
duction (resource-allocation) unchanged and thus not affecting 
employment of labour. But at the same time, it is uncertain 
in respect of the amount that will be realised for financing 
the programme and therefore, it is not suited to conditions 
in India, where tax evasion is a wide-spread hobby and profits 
are amenable to different interpretations by different parties.
It may be noted at this sta^e that the above discussion 
has ignored the effects of benefits done to employers. Social 
security benefits increase the productivity of labour and also 
reduce absenteeism, auid disinterest in work ( and consequently, 
minimise the waste of raw materials and tools). They also 
increase the loyalty of the workers in the long run which is 
very helpful for sound personnel management. All these 
advantages, if and v;hen realised, lower the cost of production. 
In this way extra savings in cost tend to inflate the profits 
of th§ producers. Thus, the expenditure on account of contri­
butions may be more than recompensed in the long run. But one
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thing should be clearly confessed. Though, old age insurance 
scheme does increase the efficiency of labour force, its 
health and morale, but it does not do so in the working life 
of the beneficiary. Benefits accrue to the employee after 
the cassation of gainful employment, and at a time when 
increased efficiency is a mockery to talk of. Hence, the 
employer is not likely to be benefited much for sometime. But 
this stabilizes market conditions by ensuring an even flow of 
purchasing power. Hhis will keep up the size of their consump­
tion in their old age. This will include the consumptSon of 
the products of the industry covered. It will^  thus,increase 
their turnover and hence profitability, and consequently push 
up the production. It also saves worry to.; workers. The 
certainty of getting subsistence in retired life spares funds 
for other necessary consumption in the working life such as 
medical treatment and better nutrition, which could have been 
possibly set aside for future provision. Labour is prone to 
take a short run view and the effects of a pension plan may 
not be immediately shown. American experience shows that an 
introduction of employee-pension scheme does not necessarily 
bear a positive correlation with the various indicators of 
good industrial relations in the short-run. The following 
table summarises the results of introducing employee-benefit 
plans in 254 American firms. The results presented in the 
table No. V*2 show that the pension plans have been the least 
effective in minimising strikes or labour turnover or 
increasing efficiency or loyalty of the working force. But
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86 81 87
8 7 0
25.6 34.6 47.8
27.9 49.4 55.2
50.0 63.0 80.6
Table No. V.2
EFFECT OF EMPLOYEE-BENEFIT PLANS ON INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS
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Effects of Plans _ P L A N ^ __________0 F
Pension Bonus Profit-sharing
No* of firms 
Strikes
Reduced labour Turnover^ 
Increased Efficiency % 
Increased Loyalty %
SOURCE: Karunakaran, Profit-sharing in India (Thesis submitted
for the degree of Ph.D. in Economics, 1956, M.U., 
Aligarh), page 159, taken from US Senate Report 610.
the facts are incomplete. In the first instance, the various 
indicators studied are influenced by a variety of other factors, 
and it is not known in the present case how far were they 
working simultaneously. The study is not again comparable 
over time. For instance, the ntunber of strikes in the past is 
not known so that the effectiveness of the plans may be 
gauged. Moreover, much depends on the administration of 
personnel too. Since the same undertakings with no change in 
organisational set-up were not selected for the purpose of the 
study successively, nothing can be said about the part played 
by those factors on the betterment of industrial relations. 
Hence, the results are not exactly as they seem. Nevertheless, 
it has been agreed that "a pension scheme is too remote to be
an effective output incentive and those figures suggest that
it is not outstanding in securing employee goodwill. Yet on
its merits, no one could deny that a pension scheme is one of
the most beneficial long term means of raising the status of
the employee."^ This observation, particularly the last one,
should not be belittled. Industry as a whole has a very
long life in the industrial history of nations. Hence, if a
plan is beneficial to the industry as a whole in the long
run, it is worth attempting and the short-run considerations
to odd employers may be disregarded.
In so far as the discussion on backward shifting of
employers' contributions is concerned, it may be related that
it is a myth that the wages of the employees will be depressed
as a repercussion to the introducing of a scheme of old age
insurance. Wages of industrial workers are already 60 low as to
permit any further cut. It has also been rightly observed
that "people—— particularly in the lower income groups—
are defensive of their standard of living, and try to ensure
2
themselves a certain take-home pay.” It is not possible to 
effect a wage cut, particularly in this country where there 
is hardly any margin for savings and the employees' contri­
butions will reduce their pay-packet too. The ES.I, and the 
EPP schemes are in operation for the last eight years.
1. Karunakaran, Profit-sharing in India, p 159.
2. Peacock, A.T. income Redistribution and Social Policy. 
OpjCit., p 47.
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Under both the schemes, a v/age-cut on account of employers’ 
liability for the contributions is illegal. Thus, adequate 
legal safeguard is available to workers. The study of the 
effect of the employers’ contributions will remain incomplete 
if a reference is not made to the mobility of industries to 
Other regions in order to evade the payroll levy. Thus, if the 
old-age insurance shcme is implemented in U.P. alone, the 
employers may be tempted to shift thfeir undertakings to other 
centres outside U.P. If this is not possible, they v;ill be 
seriously ptit to disadvantages in the home market where the 
producers of other States may offer competition by cutting 
p r ic e s .  This f e a r  may be alleviated by bannin,p^ the im ports 
from other States. But this will give rise tb' many problems 
in the field of the inter-State trade and commerce. Here, 
if may be noted that shift of capital is not as easy. Moreover, 
the employers covered under EPP schemes are paying contributions 
in all States. Thus, the coversion of the EPP scheme into a 
pension scheme will alleviate such disadvantages. In unimple­
mented areas, employers may be levied special contributions 
which will put all of them on equal footing irrespective of 
the area of their productive operations.
(c) The State
The proportion of cost of old age insurance to industrial 
workers which the Government should bear needs be met from 
the coffers of the State which is made up of the revenues 
realised from the general tax-payers. Thus, the State shall 
have to raise the fund from taxes in v;hatever guise they jn'iy 
wear.I-S)st of the operations of public finance resolve into a
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series of purchasing power* These transfers are made by 
taxation or otherwise from certain individuals to the public 
authorities and back again from these authorities to other 
individuals by way of public expenditure# Therefore, the cost 
of social insurance realised from the general tax<*payer in 
the form of taxes will essentially be a redistributive measure 
of national income*
Income is redistributed by the State by taxing the 
comparatively rich and then by transfering the proceeds to 
the underdog, throu^ the machinery of public expenditure.
The Cambridge formula of taxation asserts that the rich should 
pay more than they think they pay whereas the poor should 
think they pay more than they do* Whether this fictitious 
equilibrium of errors is maintainable or not, it has been 
widely held that the rich have greater taxable capacity than 
the poor* This contention is based on the assumption (and to 
a great extent on the fact) that the rich with their oppulence 
are in a position to consume even those commodities whose 
consumption is less needed socially and less intense subject­
ively, and thus, postpdinable, while the poor have to post­
pone more intense and less dispensable wants* This has result­
ed in a natiOHal disequilibrium of consumption as between the 
different strata of population* Its consequence is manifest 
in the accrual of a lesser than attainable social welfare*
Prof* Robbins, however, challenges the validity of this assump­
tion and maintains that the law of diminishing marginal utility 
is not scientifically verifiable* He says that, " It is safe
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to say that a great majority of English economists accepts 
them as axiomatic. Yet with great diffidence, I venture to 
suggest that they are in fact, entirely unwarranted by any 
doctrine of scientific economics.”^  He further expresses the 
view that "In Western democracies, we assume for certain pur­
poses that men in similar circumstances are capable of equal 
satisfactions# Just as for purposes of justice we assume 
equality of responsibility in similar situations as between 
equal subjects, so for purposes of public finance, we agree 
to assume equality of capacity for experiencing satisfaction 
from equal incomes in similar circumstances as between econo­
mic subjects* But althou^ it may be convenient to assume this, 
there is no way of proviiog that the assumption rests on ascer­
tainable facts*But in my opinion, if scientific analysis 
is carried too far, the whole edifice of economic science will 
collapse, for it bases for the most part of it on human psy­
chology# Apart from psychological and physiological differen­
ces between man and man, which is the gift of inequality of 
opportunity itself and has thus, grown into a self-generating 
and self-perpetuating force, the whole mass of evidence in 
the measurable part of human life points towards conclusions 
favourable to the assumption of equality of average human 
behaviour in similar circumstances# Average hiaaan reaction 
to the various stimuli of luxuries, comforts and necessities 
may be safely assumed to be identical all over the surface 
of the g lo b e* A hungary man w il l  p re fe r  a  loaf of bread to 
an otherwise most pleasant piece of orchestra music*
1* An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science 
(Macmillan and Co, London, I949), p 13 7 ,
2. Ibid. p 140
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The entire foregoing discussion boils dovn to the 
statement of the law of diminishing marginal utility of money 
incomes to men at large which states that the marginal utility 
of a unit of money will be lesser to a rich man than to a poor* 
Therefore, if wealth is transferred from the ricl^  to the poor, 
it will confer greater benefit on the poor than its infliction 
of sacrifice on the rich* In figure. 6^ YD is the curve measur­
ing the marginal utility of money. If B has an income equal 
to OB and A tequal to OA, marginal utility of money to B is 
DB and to A it is AK* Total utility of money to B will be 
equal to YDBO and to A equal to YKAO* A is a poor member of 
society and B is richer# Total utilities of income enjoyed by 
A and B jointly will be equal to YKAO + YDBO* If a tax equal 
to BB* is imposed on B and afterwards the proceeds of this 
tax are entirely transferred to A by means of public expendi­
ture ( AA’ s BB* ), the total utilities of money in the post­
taxation situation accruing to A and B will be equal to 
YK’A'O + YD'B‘0 which is greater than the total utility in the 
pre-taxation state ( YDBO + YKAO ), because the gain by pub­
lic expenditure accruing to the poor i*e* KK'A'A is greater 
than the loss of utility to the rich i.e* DD‘B'B> as can be 
graphically viewed. Hence, the assumption that welfare will 
be maximised by progressive taxation as a tool of income re­
distribution may be appreciated*
But the above analysis is too simple* It must be dis­
tinctly understood that the operation of public finance is 
concerned with the maximisation of social welfare which is 
the state in^society is happier not the individual members of 
it* Social welfare is not necessarily the sum total of
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individual welfares* Society is composed of heterogeneous 
individuals who do not behave always in the same way. Welfare 
itself being a subjective phenomenon, is really hard to 
measure. But, objectively, social welfare can be said to be 
maximum when in the post-reorganisation situation ( via tax­
ation and expenditure or social insurance levy and benefits ) 
a number of individuals gets a combination of goods and ser­
vices that it prefers to one possessed in the pre-reorganisa^ - 
tion state, and nobody is worse off than he was before* But 
this generalisation is distorted by the fact that in the post­
reorganisation situation some may be worse off too, ( And 
this is almost irremediable*) For this a principle of compen­
sation is said to be in operation* Stated plainly, if the ' 
loss on the one side is more than compensated by the gain on 
the other side, social welfare will be maximum* Moreover, the 
evaluation of social welfare is based on social objectives 
rather than individual considerations* Thus, greater social 
welfare may be attained notwithstanding the loss to^  some mem­
bers being compensated by the gain to others*
In all the economies of the world, two problems are of 
supreme import* One is the problem of production and the other 
relates to the distribution of national income, and raising 
the standard of living of the community* Sometimes, under-con^ - 
sumption and maldistribution of national income may do taore 
harm than the actual shrinkage in its size* Hence, for deve­
loping economies like India, both an increase in the size of 
national income aid its redistribution are equal^important*
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Both should be carried on simultaneously, otherwise it may be 
discovered after the size of the 'cake* has increased that it 
has grovm. too delicate to admit of any cutting and redistri­
bution without tearing it asunder* It may then require a 
drastic revolution to carry on the plan of redistribution, 
which may itself retard the growth of national income and the 
history of poverty may repeat itself* Therefore, as Prof*
J.K. Mehta says: " We need both economic growth to be looked
after and allocation of resources and distribution of wealth
•1to be properly effected*"
An old age insurance is the measure of redistribution of 
income* It redistributes income horizontally with inter-group 
transfers within the working class* It also transfers income 
vertically from the employers and the general tax-payers ' 
to the insured class* Hence, the State should not grudge the 
payment of contributions to such schemes. It is only a tool 
to produce public- welfare through a selective device* Society 
will gain much from it because benefits are intended to main­
tain the homeostasis of the society in the absence of which, 
it will lose resistence to social maladies and consequently, 
its growth will be hampered* Today, the State exists to 
effect public welfare* Thus, it will be in the nature of dis­
charge of its normal duties that it should pay old age in­
surance contributions* It will facilitate the business of the 
State in producing social well-being*
( V . 5 0  )
1* Lectures on Modem Economic Theory. Chaitanya Publishing 
House, Allahabad, 1959, p 69*
(d)# The Effects on Consumers in General
Had the effects of the cost of old age insurance been 
confined to the insured, their employers and State the above 
discussion might have ended. But due to the diffusive nature 
of its cost, an? element of complication creeps in* This is 
due to the fact that the such plans affect a larger section 
of population than the group covered under them* Since every 
individual is both a consumer and a producer, the effects of 
such schemes are to be considered in that light*
An employee is a producer of service while he is a con­
sumer oi^ommodities he himself produces* Thus, the incidence
of social security contribution may be two-foid on him* in theincreased
shape of a cut in wages and in the form/increased price of the 
product* But the consumer is a much wider term* It is not ne­
cessary that the employee is a consuaer too ( of the article 
in consideration)* But the consumers of the article may be 
affected as discussed in section (b) above* Ultimately that 
proportion of the employers’ contributions which cannot be 
passed on to others will enter into the cost of production and 
consequently may push up the prices** So also for th0 State’s 
share* The State may realise the cost of social insurance 
from the general tax-payer by imposing fresh social insurance 
taxes or a proportion of income tax or other State revenue 
may be earmarked for this purpose* An indirect tax e*g* sales 
or purchases tax may also be levied* Income tax can be made 
progressive and the burden may be made to conform to the res-
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pective abilities of the taxpayers to pay the tax. Sales tax 
will, on other hand, be regressive#
For assessing the net effect of old age security scheme 
on the general consumer, a reference to the last Chapter is 
necessary* It was seen that 16-2/3 % o f wages will be required 
to finance old age insurance scheme* Of this, Government^both 
Central and State together, will share 1-2/3^of wages and the 
employers 8% thereof* If the State recovers the cost by impo­
sing sales tax, and the employers cannot shift any portion of 
their share of contrihutioni total burden on consumers will 
not go beyond 9-2/3% of wages ( 8% employers* and 1-2/3^ State 
share )♦ It will be about 1*55^  of the cost of the product*
This will be the maximum burden that the consumers may be called 
upon to pay in the shape of increased prices*Ihat is, by no 
crieterian, a heavy rise in the prices* Moreover, the contri­
butions of the employees and employers to the EPF scheme are 
alrady being realised which if raised to 8-1/3/5 will necessi­
tate a very insignificant further rise in the prices* In addi­
tion to this, sales taxes are State levies* Hence, the Centre's 
share of one per cent of wages will not enter the price of the 
product* This will further lower the net burden on the consu­
mers. Nothing very alarming will ensue on this score as such*
A question may be posed here: If the employers and State 
both recover their share from the general public, why not re­
cover the whole cost of old age insurance from the general 
tax-payer? In other words, this will amount to preferring
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a jsocial assistance technique^  which, as I have already dis­
cussed^  is not a suitable technique of protection. Old age in­
surance is a productive of social good# The aged population 
is either maintained by its liable relations who are them- 
iielves poor or it takes to beggary when it is maintained by 
the general public* Therefore, a scheme of paying old age
>I
pensions will raise the propensity to consume of the poor 
class, which is good for the employers too and the nation in 
general as it will raise their standard of living#
(e)* Other Effects
It is alleged that old age insurance scheme will affect 
the competitive strength of the covered industries in the 
foreign market. If however, the production is solely meant 
for foreign markets, the impact of payroll contributions will 
be manifest on the foreign trade to the extent aS discussed 
in section (d) above# That, we have seen, is not an alarming 
proportion and t: there seoas no danger of losing foreign
markets on this account alone. Moreover, the Export Promotion 
measures ma^ li^iten the severity of the consideration if it 
is a^ all manifest#
' Old age benefits may change the pattern of consumption 
by pushin^p the consumption of the articles mainly consumed 
by the aged. But the present pattern of consumption of the 
general population is too rigid to accomodate for such consi­
derations, nor the benefits are expected to be so liberal to
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a choice on thS part of the beneficiaries beyond the limit 
of necessaries*
The fear of adverse effects on employment is also not 
based on facts* Substitution of factors of production is not 
as easily attainable as it can be theoretically analysed* 
Moreover, the substitution takes place as^step towards ration­
alisation, which is long overdue even without the introduction 
of such sch^es* Except with the consent of the government and 
willingness of the trade unions, retrenchment is not possible* 
The EEF scheme does not seem to affect employment situation 
adversely. Hence, a pension scheme which will be a virtual 
conversion of EPP into a pension payment will not change the 
situation*
It is often argued that the levy of payroll taxes on 
employers will adversely affect the process of capital for­
mation* But capital formation depends on the level Of savings 
and the investment market within the country. If net profits 
Of industrial establishments are any index of savings and 
henee of capital formation, it can be maintained that the 
available evidence does not show that the profits of indus­
tries have declined as a repercussion to the levy of pay­
roll contributions under the ESI or the EPP schemes* Accor­
ding' to the findings of Dr* G.N. Arora, " Taxation did not 
affect also the capacity of the industry to save and reinvest, 
as is evident from the fact that net profits of industry 
were not affected adversely by the total taxes.So far as
1, Taxation of Industry in India, (Vora and Co* Bombay, 1956) 
P 137*
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the investment market is concerned, it is not governed by- 
considerations of social security levy. Moreover, a pension 
scheme itself produces large funds which may push up the 
creation of social capital in the country* This problem 
will be taken up in the next Chapter#
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SYMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS | To recapitulate the foregoing dis­
cussion, the cost of old age insurance is borne by the employees 
and their employers and the Government* For the insured, it 
is in the nature of compulsory savings# This is a tool of 
horizontal redistribution of income between workers inter se# 
Since the take-home pay of the employees is reduced due to 
the payment of contributions^ the present: standard of living 
may suffer as a consequence. But, the inflow of an even incofee 
in the retired life more than retrieves this loss#
For employers, contributions are an element of labour 
cost of production thou^ the accountants have paid little 
attention to the problem# It is shifted backward and forward 
and the net burden on the employers may be less than fee ac­
tual contributions* The maximum rise in the cost of production 
may not, thus, be more than 1*5^ * Thus, the fear that the 
employers’ contributions will jeopardise the competitive 
strength of the industries into the international fiel^ or 
the internal market is without foundation# X&tfOdUOtiOft of 
old age insurance scheme in U.P. alome may create regional 
disparities in the competitive strength of the employers; 
but since the employers are already paying their share under
the EPF scheme, its conversion into a pension scheme will 
not entail fresh burden on U.P. employers.
State contribution is a. device of redistribution of 
income* This may increase the burden on the tax-payers; but 
in this case too, this burden will be insignificant# More­
over, it is justified because it is productive of social 
good#
Old age insurance contributions will not affect capital 
formation because it depends on a variety of factors quite 
independent of social insurance scheme. Evidence also does 
not justify this fear. As a matter of fact, the introduction 
of old age insurance results into the accumulation of large 
funds which step up the process of capital formation and 
help creation of social capital* I propose to discuss in the 
next Chapter, the importance of social insurance funds in the 
national economy fully.
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PART THREE
JLDMINISTRATIVE IMPLICATIOHS OF OLD-AGE INSaRAHCE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND INVESTMENT OF PENSION FUNDS
In the previous Chapter, a reference was made about 
the accumulation of pension funds* The present Chapter is 
concerned with the financial management and investment of 
such funds* The subject-matter of this Chapter has been 
divided into two broad sections; The first section discusses 
the financial systan suitable for the adoption of pension 
schemes ab initio and the second is an examination into the 
investment policy of such institutions* The size of a pension 
fund is itself governed by the financial system of the scheme* 
A discussion of this problem should, therefore, precede others 
in order to make a full appraisal of the problem*
1* !Qie Financial Systen of Pension Scheme*
The type of the financial system to be adopted by social 
insurance institutions depends, inter alia, on the nature of 
the risk provided for* It determines the expediency of balan­
cing income to expenditure over short, secular or a fairly 
long period of time* Contingencies covered under social insu­
rance schemes are classifiable into short-term, long-term and 
secular ones* Contingencies related to morbidity are generally 
of short duration* Unemployment requires a long-term planning* 
In the short run, there may be a boom condition in the em­
ployment market to the virtual elimination of unemployment 
from the territory as experienced during; the period of Wars* 
But depressions in economic activities and consequent dete-
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rioration in the CTiployment situation are experienced over 
a long period with a sort of rythmic sequence# Therefore, 
the coverage of this contingency may require a long-range
IS ^policy* Nevertheless, since this an avoidable contingency, 
it needs no perpetual planning. Old age needs a perpetual 
planning; in no case can it be eliminated altogether* But 
even thie long-period contingencies may be financially ad­
justed over short periods* This problem needs a detailed
discussion so that a suitable system may be evolved for th?
iproposed pension scheme*
Based on time element, there are two financial systems.
One is the budgetary system** and the other is the actuarial 
reserve system. The budgetary system of financial adjustment 
consists of the mechanism whereby an equilibrium is mainr* 
tained between its resources and outgoings over a short 
period of time, usually a year. It is like government budgets 
in which revenues are raised for estimated expenditure for 
the year* And, perhaps, this has given it its name. According^ 
the I i ' ILO, ” The assessment system aims fiit maintaining a 
current equilibrium between income and outgo by adjustment of 
contributions or, occasionally, of benefits."^ The basic
* USSR claims to have abolished unemploymait since 1930,
when the entire world was in the grip of a severe depression. 
According to Maurice Dobb, "Since 1930, when the cons­
truction of projects of the First Five Year Plan substi­
tuted labour scarcity for unemployment, the unemployment
benefit scheme has been officially suspended..... ♦"
Soviet Economic Development Since 1917. Routhledge and 
Eegan Paul Ltd* London, 1957, pp 371-372*
** Also called Assessment, Pay-as-you-go, or Distribution-of- 
Cost System*
e Also called Accumulation or Capitalisation System.
1* Approaches to Social Security* p 78
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principle underlying this system is that the total income 
from contributions and subsidies etc* should be sufficient 
to meet the cost of benefits and administrative expenses 
over the period, say, a year* The system, thus, avoids all 
elaborate and complicated calculations regarding actuarial 
estimates* Under this system, contributions are based on
* intelligent guesswork'* The working of the scheme in the 
course of the year reveals the discripancies if any and the 
rates of contributions are adjusted to remove it accordingly* 
In this way, by what may be called a trial-and-error tech­
nique, the rates are stabilised* The unit of periodical ad­
justment is generally one year and the accounts are finally 
closed at the end of the year* In the beginning of the next 
period, the scheme is run on a clean slate* Strictly speaking, 
there are no funds as the closing balance of each year may be 
negligible* More so, these balances are to be eliminated by 
the aforesaid trial and error* In fact, those who assert that 
the budgetary system is preferable, belong to the unorthodox 
school of thought. They maintain that social insurance is 
more social and less Unsurance’* Therefore, it need not 
strictly conform to the private-insurance principles and that 
it should be more understandable and less complicated*
Actuarial Reserve system, on the other hand, bases on 
the orthodox philosophy of a strict application of the prin­
ciples of private insurance to social insurance and that it 
should be 'actuarially sound'* It calls for elaborate calcu-
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lation of various actuarial estimates and is consequently 
complicated* It takes into account in fixing contribution rates 
mortality rates, retirement rates, invalidity,; withdrav/al, 
widowhood and remarriage rates, rate of interest and estimate 
of administrative expenses. On the basis of these estimates, 
the present value of future benefits and future income is 
found out* Then, taking the rate of realisation into account, 
the probable cost is levelled down and the rates of contribu­
tions are adjusted accordingly*
Accumnlation system may be operated on individual or 
group bases* Under an individual accumulation plan, contribu­
tions paid by and on behalf of each insured person are enter­
ed in his individual account for the purpose of accumulating 
the sum needed for paying benefits to him, account being 
t^en of compajBd rate of interest* This system has been fol­
lowed in the EPF scheae of India, This is a strict applica­
tion of the principle of life insurance to social insurance*
The total value of future contributions and interest on his 
accpunt should balance the future liability for paying him 
benefits. In other words, this is a scheme of compulsory sar- 
vings, the accumulated balance of which is returned to the 
beneficiary in instalments*
Besides, there may be collective accumulation system.
Under this system, the cost of benefits for the whole group 
is recovered from the identical rates of contributions from 
the members of that group* This takes into account the inertia 
of large numbers and the individuals of the group stand to­
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gether in sharing the risk of old age* Under this system, 
the insured persons may be grouped according to 'generations* 
or ’wage-classes’• The former implies the grouping together 
of persons bom in or about the same year# The latter is done 
according to the earnings of the insured. This is based on 
the calculation of average annual contributions which satisfy 
the conditions of financial equilibrium for an insured group 
assumed to be financially independent, either indefinitely 
or over a specified period of time*.Under accumulation systems, 
periodical valuation of liabilities and assets of the scheme 
are made* Pund is smaller initially but it accumulates progres­
sively* In one sense, the accumulation system is based on the 
assumption that if the future generations turn against old 
age insurance and decide to stop the payment of further con­
tributions, the accumulated fund should be sufficient to 
liquidate all obligations undertaken in respect of those who 
have already established their rights for benefits or to re­
turn the contributions received from them.
In between the assessment and accumulation systems, 
there may be modified systems. Under the former, lack of 
funds is a serious drawback in times of emergencies. Therefore, 
by setting a higher rate of contributions than what is actual­
ly required, a Contingency Reserve iUnd may be created* This 
may be drawn upon in emergent circumstances*
For short duration contingencies, budgetary system may be 
profitably adopted. But, in case of long-duration contingencies.
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and for those contingencies which are more or less certain 
to occur, accumulation system may be more suitable. It may 
be noted that the Beveridge plan envisaged a consolidated 
system of the budgetary type* But, State subsidy has been 
a powerful factor in the British social insurance scheme to 
effect an adjustment* Revenues of the State to be made over 
to national Insurance Rmd are voted to the tune of the de­
ficit left after adjusting other incomes* Though weekly con­
tributions are based on actuarial estimates, yet the scheme 
is not actuarially funded, as the contributions are utilised 
to meet the current claims of benefits on account of older 
beneficiaries and contributing parties have not been paying 
contributions throu^out the working lives of the insured 
at the rates appropriate to meet the level of benefits to be 
paid to then ultimately* The only fund v/hich is being built 
up to meet the liabilities of the scheme, however, consists 
of assets taken over from the former schemes and the surplus 
arising from the working of the current schemes in the eaiv- 
lier years* Ihe pension scheme is now underwritten by the 
Exchequer for the period 1955-60 up to a maximum of £ 325 m* 
of deficiency. In this way, in spit® of the fact that the 
flat rates were originally assessed to be of actuarial equi­
valence to the value of benefits payable under the National 
Insuaance scheme during the future life time of the insured 
entering the scheme at the minimum age, and on the assump­
tion that the balance not required for current benefits for 
those entering later, was accumulated at compound rates of
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interest until required to pay pension benefits, it has never 
been the Government's policy to build up actuarial reserves 
for pension liability on a natioanl scale* This has led to 
a serious criticism of the government policy on the part of 
the insurance actuaries* It has been alleged that, "One of 
the consequences of ‘non-funding* system of finance is the 
creation of a permanent gap between expenditure and income 
from contributions etc. No wonder that insurance men have 
never taken kindly to the use by the State of the word 
’insurajice' for a process that flouts almost every recognised 
insurance principle.
In the United States, the method of financing is the
-has
actuarial one, though it/never been fully applied and the 
realisation of full contributions has been postponed many 
a tMe. Nonetheless, the programme is in close actuarial 
balance since the level premium equivalent of contribution 
rates varied from the estimated level premium cost by no 
more than one-fourth of one per cent* of covered payroll. The 
level premium cost of Old Age and Survivorship Insurance 
programme is 8,27% of the payroll (at intermediate cost es­
timates) and the level premium equivalent of contributions 
is 8.02^ of payroll* These rates are, however, subject to
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Vol* CLXXVII, May 1954, p 536*
* The level premium is the per cent of covered payroll that, 
if charged from now on indefinitely into the future, would 
produce enough contribution and interest income to the 
fund to provide for the cost of the benefit payment and 
administrative expenses*
2* Social Security Bulletin,Loc. Cit*, February 1959, p 4*
periodical re-examination in order to take account of emer­
ging experience and changing conditions*
In India, Prof* Adarkar in his Report on the Health 
Insurance for Industrial V/orkers, examined in some detail, 
the merits of the budgetary system. He preferred it for the 
following reasons# In the first instance, he thou^t that 
non-availability of data will be a serious handicap in working 
out the actuarial estimates* Secondly, cost of sickness insu­
rance varies from year to year* Hence, budgetary system is 
more suited to take account of changing experience* Thirdly, 
that India had no definite rules for retirement and entry 
from and into industrial force* It was, therefore, difficult 
to estimate probable income and cost under the scheme*
Fourthly, annual budgets will be adjustejfl more easily* Fifthly, 
it is easier to understand and administer* Then, capitalisap- 
tion system could estimate only cash benefits and the sickness 
schemes pay medical benefits too* Hence, in order to avoid 
dichotomy of financial system within the same small scheme, 
budgetary system was preferable* Lastly, he opined that the 
actuarial system has not worked well in Great Britain; thus,
it should not be adopted by choice in India* He, however,
d
suggested the creation of/Contingency and an ^idemic Reserve
The ILO experts who reviewed the Adarkar Plan endorsed his
suggestion, ruling out the necessity of any Reserves* They
maintained that the excess cost of medical benefits was the
responsibility of the State Governments; and that non-arisal
of benefit claims in the initial six months of the schoae 
tbdue/non-fulfilment of qualifying conditions would automically
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result in a surplus* Thus, no reserve was required#
It may be noted that the contentions of Prof* Adarkar
iiam>
were quite reasonable at that for his scheme, but now they 
need reconsideration# Non-availability of data is not so se­
rious a problexntoday as it was thin* ^e working of the ESI 
and the EPF schemes have produced valuable data on which ac­
tuarial estimates may be based. Moreover, old age is morg or 
less a definite contingency* Its cost can be estimated in 
advance faitly* Under a, pension scheme, benefits are almost 
negligible in the beginning and they rise afterwards; thus, 
an accumulation system is more suited for mounting tfcost of 
later years may be provided under this system by accumulating 
funds* Again? a permanent industrial force is emerging in 
India too and the pension scheme would further stabilise it* 
There are definite rules of entry into employment and retire- 
ment age may/easily fixed and enforced now* Periodieally, 
estimates may be reviewed easily if the data are available 
Slight variations that may be required to accoi^date emer­
ging experience, may be easily carried into effect* As for 
the con^ lication of the system, it is nohow complicated for 
beneficiaries. If actuarial complications lend soundness to 
the scheme, in my opinion, they are worth the trouble* More­
over, if the capitalisation system has nfet been enforced in 
the U.K. that alonejjustify its discarding* In the U.K., State 
assumes unlimited liability to meet the deficit of the scheme 
which cannot be expected here in view of i W  repudiation of 
any financial liability and her resources and commitments in
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other respects. In India, the scheme has to be started on 
a clean slate and the surplus of various schemes of Great 
Britain transferred to the N.I. Scheme will have no parallel 
in our case to serve as a cushion to absorb the shocks of 
emergencies.
Actuarial technique of finance bears a resemblance to 
private insurance which is governed by the attitudinal ap­
proach of the consumers of insurance. Actuarial reservss are 
required to be created in private insurance for the fact that 
an insurance office may go out of business due to pressure 
of insurmice market or the consumers may become less 'insu- 
rance-minded' and they may shift their custom to some other 
form of old age protection. This may necessitate the liqui­
dation of all claims that have already matured or the return 
of premiums already received without any current receipt of 
income. But, however, public progranmes need not be so whim­
sically governed, Grovemment has the power of eminent domain. 
It can excercise compulsion. In this way, a continual inflow 
of contributions maintains the solvency of the fund indefi­
nitely, If the raison d'etre of the actuarial reserves is 
the psychology of fear that the posterity may be unwilling to 
tax itself for the payment of benefits to the old age insu­
rance beneficiaries, there is no guarantee against an equal 
irresponsibility on the part of the insurance institutions 
to declare themselves insolvent and refuse to own liability 
touards their past obligations, A generation seeking 
opportunity to repudiate its past obligations v;ould hardly
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hesitate to raid the pension fund if this seemed expedient.
But this is true if the public bodies participate in the 
finance of the scheme. In case of employer-employee financed 
schemes, the Government has no liability to guarantee the 
solvency of the Fund and the contribution income has to be 
sufficient to provide for the full cost of the scheme.
Position does not change if the Sta£e participates in the 
finance to the extent of making fixed contributions and 
does not assume responsibility to meet the deficit arising 
on the working of the scheme.
Over and above these considerations, the actuarial 
reserve technique of social insurance finance exerts nega­
tive influence during full employment period. Since under 
this plan, a continual expansion of benefits takes place, 
and this approach requires that future benefits be fully 
covered by present contributions, prospective future dis­
bursements will always be greater than current disbursements 
and current rates of contributions, if they are to provide 
fully for future disbursements, should necessarily be in 
excess of the rates of current benefits. This gives the 
af)proach a negative characjer. The depressing force of the 
system will more than absorb the stimulus to consumption 
provided by current benefits. An actuarial basis of finane- 
ing calls for another consideration. The retired person who 
has contributed in his working life, has carried on productive 
activities then; but he is disbursed benefits after retire­
ment from work when his productive activity ceases. He will, 
thus, consume from the present production of good? and
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services; for, though his contributions can be funded, goods 
and services cannot be so funded. It will, in this way, 
create a productionwise disequilibrium.
A pay-as-you-go scheme has much to recommend itself as 
an alternative. It has not inherently depressing effect of 
an actuarially funded plan. The benefits under this plan 
are more or less equal to contributions both taken as a whole 
within a given period of time. Therefore, what is taken 
from one hand, is given back from the other. The net effect 
will be nil, because the depressing effect of contributions 
will be ©ffset by the expensive effect of benefits. Moreover, 
expenses in each year or period are met from the current 
contfibutions which fora a part of the cost of current pro­
duction. Thus, it will have no adverse effect on production- 
wise equilibrium. Moreover, the contributions will be smaller 
per rupee of future benefit claims, giving it an anti-depressive 
character. Wien a plan is put on a national basis and there 
is no danger of its cessation in future^  - . it will be 
superfluous to create a full actuarial reserve. On national 
basis, however, such a fund will provide practically no 
additional security* The assets of the fund will be normally 
invested in order to earn a potential rate of interest. If 
the investments are made in Government securities (which is 
the usual practice of the social insurance institutions) the 
indebtedness of the Government to the public will now travel 
via the Fund. V/hatever benefits are payable to the bene­
ficiaries by the fund will now be partly paid by the Govern­
ment in the form of interest on securities. In order to meet
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the debt claims, the Government will tax the people. Thus, 
public will bear the ultimate liability of such payments. 
Therefore, actuarial soundness under a capitalisation system 
is no more established than under a pay-as-you-go scheme, 
but for the fact that the former will earn interest which 
the latter will not. However, the fact must be properly 
appreciated that public indebtedness also confers benefits.
In the absence of the fund, indebtedness of the Government 
will shift in favour of some other party to which a higher 
rate of interest may be payable. This again will be ultimately 
realized from the general taxpayer. Therefore, the burden on 
the public will be indentical under the two schemes. But as 
has been said earlier, budgetory system has no stabiliAF^  ^
force either. In times of depressions, it assumes a peculiar 
characteristic. Since retirements are likely to be larger 
in such periods due to non-extension in service-terms of the 
retiring labourers, the contribution rates will have to be 
raised in order to meet increased benefits. Diminishing 
wage-bills will be taxed highly to yield larger income, or 
at least the existing level of income. Impracticable as 
this requirement is, a rigid application of budgetary system 
cannot be championed.
Thus, in times of depressions a departure from the strict 
principle of pay-as-you-go scheme would be inescapable. A 
modification may be effected by charging a little higher rate 
of contributions during a period of prosperity and creating 
a reserve out of the resultant surplus. However, the negative 
effect that is likely to ensue will be milder than under
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an actuarilLlly funded plan* This fund will be later utilised 
for meeting benefit payments in excess of current contributions 
during the cycles of depressions, A further modification may 
be effected by reducing the contribution-level itself during 
the periods of depressions and meeting the deficit by creating 
currency* (This is more understandable when the State itself 
iis a financing partner in the scheme guaranteeing to meet the 
deficit of the fund*) The additional purchasing power placed 
in the hands of the retired consumers in this way, will be a 
pump-priming process, \^ich will provide a stimulus to con­
sumption* During inflationary crests, the contributions may 
be adjusted to withdraw currency from the market and in this 
way to nullify the effect of inflation to that extent* Alter­
natively, status quo may be maintained with regard to contri­
butions and benefits during the peaks of economic activity; 
and during duller seasons, an artificial deficit may be 
created and bridged over by created currency. This would 
provide a stimulus to business activities.
The foregoing discussion is more relevant to a case in 
which the State is an unlimited partner so far as the deficit 
of the scheme is concerned. As it may be seen, the fund can­
not create currency. Therefore, the currency adjustments can 
only be effected by the State. In India, the Government is 
not prepared to assume such onerous responsibility* Hence, / 
an Actuarial Reserve technique may be recommended for adoption^ 
though full funding may not be applied with a religious 
sanctity* Since no actuarial ealculations can forecast the
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liability correct to the last single naya Paisa, a divergence 
between actuals and estimates must exist in any case. A 
fund may, thus^be built up. This will be a moral backing to 
the scheme and also a tangible thing of which resort may be 
taken in times of need. The management of this fund, its 
investment and handling is an important problem related to 
pension schemes.
2. Investment of Pension Fund
Social insurance institutions in general and pension 
insurance in particular, accumulate large funds. Therefore, 
it has been a practice all over the world to define the 
authority responsible for its investment and lay down policies 
in this behalf, that will govern the composition of the 
investment portfolio. Body responsible for the selection of 
investment securities from the general market must be created 
in order to achieve a good and co-ordinated investment policy. 
Such body may be a centralised organisation or a decentralised 
one. A centralised body for investment of funds of social 
insurance institutions is better equipped to handle the 
problem. It has the advajitage of easy realisation of a 
uniform national policy. It can also organise large-scale 
financial operations in the money market and ward off in­
opportune regional or local influences.’ All regions can be 
coordinated in the working of the plan. The fund will be 
placed in the hands of a Central Investment Board of Social 
Security. The Board will be responsible for choosing good securi­
ties from the investment market and purchasing them from time 
to time. In this way, the Board can provide services for the
( VI.15 )
preparation of decisions on investment problems based on full 
consideration of the actual situation of the entire holding 
of the Fund.
A decentralised body, on the other hand, has the advantage 
of better appraisal of regional needs. It arouses a spirit 
of healthy competition among the various sister bodies and 
lends them a sense of responsibility in management matters.
But the problem of co-ordination between the regional policies 
is formidable in case of decentralised institutions. Some- 
times the regional bodies may find themselves competing with 
each other in the same market which is to be discouraged 
always. However, co-ordination in the policies of different 
sister bodies can be secured by direct regulation and strict 
vigil and supervision of investments by the Government. It 
can also be effected by a Central Investment Board which the 
regional bodies may be made responsible to consult before 
investing their funds. The Central Board will have to chalk 
out a periodical investment plan. The investment will, in 
usual course, be selected by the regional bodies with the 
prior approval of the Central body. It may be noted that 
international practice in this respect, favours a Central 
body responsible for making investments. It will achieve 
uniformity in policies, ward off the problem of coordination 
and obviate regional prejudices. Thus, it will facilitate 
large schale financial operations also.
According to the British National Insurance Act, 194-6, 
the Minister is in charge of control and management of the
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Funds. But, surplus of the two Funds is to be made over to 
the National Debt Commissioner who invests them in accordance 
with such directions as might be given by the Treasuiy, in 
securities authorized as investments for Saving Bank Funds, 
(which are mostly Government or government approved securities) 
In the absence of any specific directions from the Treasury, 
the responsibility for selecting the best investments rests 
with the National Debt Commissioner. In this way, it secured 
the proper machinery for making investments and at the same 
time ensured quick action.
Under the provisions of the U.S.Social Security Act, 1935, 
the Old Age and Survivorship Insurance Trust Fund (OASIT), 
and Disability Insurance Trust Fund (DIT) are administered by 
a Board of Trustees with the Secretary of the Treasury as the 
Managing Trustee. The other members of the Board are the 
Secretary of the Ministeries of Labour and of Health, Education 
and Welfare. The Commissioner of the Social Security Adminis­
tration is the Secretary of the Board. The Managing Trustee 
invests the portions of the Trust Funds which in his ;judgment, 
are the likely surpluses over current expenditures*
When a pension insurance scheme will be fully implemented 
in India, the accumulation of reserves will raise the problems 
of their administration as they are likely to be greater than 
under the present scheme. The administration of such funds 
will necessitate creation of an Investment Board composed of 
the experts in the field of investment and financial management. 
Ttts will, no doubt, exercise its powers to invest moneys of
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the fund according to specific instructions and rules laid 
down by law in this behalf. The central authority of social 
security will exercise general supervision over the Board.
This will ensure a proper machinery through which the invest­
ment may be channelised. Moreover, it will also ensure proper 
utilisation of fund in the public interest and its supervision 
by the Central Investment Board en which all parties of finance 
will be represented will invoke confidence* it should be liable 
to be questioned in the Lok Sabha and be responsible to the 
general public for its activities, and to financial parties 
in particular.
, In the opinion of the ILO experts, "It may be useful to 
call on the services not only of experts particularly cognizant 
of the conditions of the money market and of the economic 
and social policy of the State, but also on representations 
of insured persons and their employers."^ It may be noted 
that the investment is a matter to be handled by the experts 
in that line of activity# It seems^therefore, that no useful 
purpose will be served by inviting the representatives of 
insured persons or employers. It is not in the fashion of 
collective bargaining that such representations will serve 
any useful purpose.' 'Oii the'oontrary, they may hold up quick 
decisions. Workers' representatives, unless of course hired, 
are not expected to give any useful advice in such matters.
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But a proper representation of parties of finance is useful 
for sometimes a layman's opinion is necessary to check "over- 
•expertism.*^  Moreover, it gives satisfaction to the parties that 
they are looking after their own affairs. A proper represen­
tation of the employees, employers and the State will, there­
fore, prove useful and particularly the last-named will 
apprise the Investment Board of the current Government 
policy. Nonetheless, the members of the Board must be experts 
on the various aspects of investment and must be fully conversant 
with the conditions in the stock exchanges.'
Determinants of investment policy particularly in case 
of pension insurance funds need an analysis now. This is 
important because the aim of a pension fund is not to make 
aggressive investment. It is, on the other hand, that the 
principal should be safe and realisable and a reasonable 
return on capital should be assured. The principal determi­
nants of Investment policy may, therefore, be said to be 
safety, liquidi^  and yield. Only after understanding the impact 
of these deteiminants^  it is possible to chalk out an invest­
ment policy.
Although "safety first” slogan has undergone a revision
in many cases, it cannot be ruled out for social insurance
institution^. As already stated, they should not indulge in
be
speculative activities and they must/sure about the safety 
of principal^  in all circumstances. There was a time when 
investment was taken to be safe if adequate collateral 
securities were offered. The primary emphasis was laid on
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specific security or lien on some property. But lien is 
no guarantee against the shrinkage in the value of property 
itself. Therefore, a lien is no useful protection independent 
of the general ability and willingness of the mortgagor to 
redeem his obligations. If the money is invested in commercial 
securities holding mortgage on business property, the success 
of the business will govern the worth of the mortgage.
Moreover, the pledged property is of little value outside the 
running business. IXie to the lack of its adapctability to 
other uses than one for which it was originally meant. Greater 
funds may be needed to run the business which, in most cases, 
the institution cannot afford. The property is also not 
easily transferable to the bondholder in case of a default.
A lot of formalities have to be undergone before they could 
be passed on to him. Sometimes, he may be compelled to accept 
alternative securities. Furthermore, even if the enforcement 
of the legal right is speedily done, the actual sale or 
ascertainment of his share in the value of property may involve 
unusual delays.
Safety, in fact, is determined by the ability and the
willingness of the debtor to pay and the margin of safety
in the value of the pledged property. Por the former, it
may be said that the businesses are never immune from the
vagaries of economic upheavals. In such cases, even the most
prosperous firms may be landed in difficulty and they may not
be able to redeem their debentures. Preference shares and
to
equity shares are equally amenable^stock exchange fluctuations.
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Therefore, ownership securities may be ruled out as safe 
investments for social security institution. The ability 
of the public to pay is always secure and sound. The Govern­
ment can meet its obligations by raising revenue through 
additional taxations and also raising funds from the public 
or by 'creating currency.' Therefore, frcm the view-point 
of safety, the government securities stand out unique, 
unless, of course, the government freezes the payment or 
refuses to honour its contracts, a fact which happens only 
in extraordinarily distressing circumstances.
Safety signifies two things: Firstly, the maintenance of 
the re^ l value of investments as regards the recovery of 
principal and secondly the conservation of the nominal value 
of invested capital. Inffe-tion reduces the real value of 
porperty. It also reduces the real worth of the income from 
investments. It must be seen that the firms in the stocks of 
which moneys are invested must make adequate provision for the 
depreciation and replacement of the assets on which the insti­
tution holds lien. In the absence of such provisions, the 
value of property as shown by the Balance Sheet of the firm 
concerned would not be the realisable value but merely the 
book value which may include a proportion of watered capital. 
Hence, in the event of liquidation, the entire capital invested 
in such assets may be lost.
These principles have been followed in all the countries 
which have social security schemes and in India too, it will 
be necessary to invest the funds in good securities. The
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United States Social Security Act restricts pennimble 
investments of the OASTF and DITF and the Unemployment Trust 
Fund to interest earning obligations of the U.S.Government 
and to obligations guaranteed as to principal and interest 
by the United States. Obligations of these descriptions may 
be purchased on original issue at par or subsequently they 
may be purchased in the market at prevailing prices. Their 
resale is also permitted, for, without this permission, there 
will be little liquidity in these investments which is so 
necessarily required for social insurance investments.
Besides, the Act authorises the insurance of public debt 
obligations exclusively to the Trust Funds redeemable at par 
together with interest. Before 1957, public issues scarcely 
made up ten per cent of the investment portfolio; but at the 
end of 1957, their share increased to fourteen per cent of 
the entire holdings of the Trust while in 1958, they regis­
tered a further increase by one per cent.^  ThisrhaS two 
implications. In the first place, the competition in the 
exchange is eliminated by issuing special bonds; and secondly, 
it means that variable yield securities and diversification 
in the investment portfolio have small limits. It also emphasi­
ses the importance of safety which is so essential for the 
investment of social insurance funds.
In India, eatlie;. the regulations of the ESI Act 1948,
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authorize the corporation to invest the funds of the corpora­
tion in Government Securities and fixed Deposits in the State 
Bank of India. The following table exhibits the face value 
of securities held by the Corporation during the last twoj.r 
years preceding 31st March, 1959.
Table VI.1
EMPLOYEES' STATE INSURANCE FUND INVESTMENT(1958-59)
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Types of Securities. 1958 1959
-
Amount Pert'’
cen-
tage.
■'f' , T Amount Per­
cen­
tage.
Central Goveimment 
Securities. 7,02,68,300 51 7,91,06,700 49
National Planning 
Board Loans. 5,82,21,400 42 5,82,21,400 36
State Government 
Securities. 72,06,900 5 1,85,47,300 11
State Bank Deposit\ 28,33,800 2 28,33,800 2
Cash at New Delhi. 30,00,000 2
TOTAL 13,85,30,400 100 16,17,19,200 100
SOURCE: ESIC, Annual Report, 1958-59, Appendix XXXIII,
p 144-145.
This shows that the entire assets of the Corporation were 
invested in various government securities except for a minor 
portion which was kept as short-term deposit in the State Bank
of India. From the view-point of safety, these securities 
are, no doubt, unchallengeable. But there is no freedom of 
action granted to the investing authorities in case otherwise 
better safe securities than these are available. When the 
pension insurance is implemented, this rigidity of definition 
of investible securities shall have to be rectified and to be 
given a wider scope to permit action when necessary. But it 
may be noted that this rigidity is not peculiar to India.
It has beeny)oted that the US Old Age and Survivorship Insurance 
Trust Fund was also invested in Government issues either by 
purchasing them from the market or by investing in securities 
specially issued for this purpose. The pattern of investment 
in India for some time shall have to look more to security
V
and safety and may sacrifice freedom of action in the interest 
of the former. Hence subject to the observations in the fore­
going pages, pension funds will be better in the public hands 
than in the private hands particularly at a time when the 
nation is striving hard to rise for a "take off” from the 
state it is in.
Yield is another important consideration for all invest­
ments which deserves a reference at this stage. In fact, 
without yield, investment is hoarding, a mere safe-keep of 
the fund. It is always barren and involves national loss.
The concept of yield is inseparable from investment. The fund 
of pension insurance may be invested in fixed-yield or variable- 
yield securities as referred to on previous pages. Among the 
fixed yield securities, Government funds or gOTremment'-guaranteec
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securities are the most prominent. Generally, they are 
considered the best for social insurance institutions.
Government guaranteed securities should be preferably redeem­
able so that in times of economic pressures, they may be 
realised or even at times If it is necessary to realise them, 
they should not depend on the whims of the stock-exchange for 
their value. Government securities may be issued by the Gentral- 
Govemment, State Governments or local bodies such as Municipal 
Corporations. If necessary, it should be ascertained whether 
any special taxes are earmarked for the payment of interest on 
such securities and creation of Sinking Fund for their redemp­
tion on maturity. Other bodies such as Chambers of Commerce* 
State enterprises, electricity and water supply undertakings 
also issue loans and debentures for financing their projects.
The Meeting of Experts on the Investment of the Rinds of 
Social Insurance Institutions (held from 5th to 9th December, 
1938) did not, however, favour such investments "unless such 
bodies have unquestionable and adequate resources with which 
to guarantee the payment of interest and repayment of 
principal..*”  ^ Again fixed-yield securities are also issued 
by land mortgage banks and building societies. If the purpose 
of such t^ i^zance is to finance schemes for workers’ housing, 
or such other projects particularly for thebfen^t of the 
insured class, there is no danger in purchasing them if 
adequate provision has been made by the issuing body for their
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1. ILO: International Labour Code. 1951 (Geneva, 1952),
Vol. II, Appendices, p 220.
repayment and interest* Loans: on mortgages made directly to 
the owner of the building should not be generally prefer­
red* If, however, it is done, adequate guarantee for interest 
and principal must be given by the debtor. Provision for dep^ - 
reciation and future prospects of the property should be as­
sessed by expert valuers beforehand* Commercial or industrial 
debentures and other creditorship securities should not be 
generally preferred* They may be purchased only if "in addi­
tion to affording sufficient security as to repayment of csfc- 
pital, they offer a yield markedly higher than debentures of 
the same kind issued by public authorities*”  ^ Preference 
shares of joint-stock companies are also a fixed-yield invest­
ment* They carry preference as to payment of interest or di­
vidend and sometimes they are redeemable too* Nevertheless, 
it must be distinctly understood that in case of liquidation 
of the company, they carry priority of claims for reps^ent 
of capital only on equity shares* They are entitled to be 
redeemed only after all the creditorship claims have been 
fully met* In my opinion, the insurance institutions should 
not indulge in purchasing ownership claims of this type* In 
extreme cases, they should be permitted subject to the con­
ditions laid down for the purchase of debentures*
Variable-yield securities may be loans to public autho­
rities not bearing any interest but carrying a gold clause 
or currency option* Such securities are sold in the market 
on discount* The competitive biddings among the investors
1. Ibid* p 220*
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afford the margin of income* The example of such securities 
is provided by the Treasury Bills held by the U.S* OASITF 
during 1957. Commercial securities are high-yield securities 
but they are risky investment* The ILO experts suggest that 
regulations should
”(a) set out a general definition of the conditioiss to be 
observed in the selection of investment, namely, suit­
able types of negotiable securities or of holdings in 
real estate; character or legal status of the borrower; 
duty to obtain a charge or preferential right as security 
for the debt; geographical distribution of investment etc.;
(b) draw up an exclusive list of the classes of investments 
which accord with the general definition and which are 
deemed in principle to satisfy the condition of safety
( acquisition of certain kinds of investments may be made 
sub;ject to the approval of the controlling authority to 
which the body charged with the selection of investments 
is responsible; and
(c) in order to enforce the safety of the whole of the invest­
ed holdings, prescribe an approved distribution of invest­
ments among the various classes included in the list#"1
If these recommendations are embodied in proper regulations 
thsey will secure a speedy investment of funds, a better geo­
graphical distribution of investment portfolio and finally, 
they will provide a sufficient guarantee that the funds are 
safe in the hands of the debtors and can be realised with no 
or little trouble in so far as the principal invested is 
concerned.
Sufficient security of principal and yield exist in case 
of the firms enjoying long-dated concessions from the govern­
ment or those enjoying monopoly in the market of their pro­
duce or operations* But such investments may be avoided by 
pension funds for their insecurity as to principal in most
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1* Investment; of the Binds of Social Insurance Institutions. 
Geneva, 1939, p 158*
cases and an element of speculation in all cases* Further, 
property may be held by the institution in rural or urban 
areas* In fact, it is inevitable for the institution either 
to hold or to hire buildings for housing its administrative 
offices, sanatoria, (in case of an integrated scheme covering 
sickness insurance too) curative or convalescent homes and 
other such establishments* If such buildings are owned by the 
insurance institution itself, they will yield an income in a 
negative sense, that is to say, they will economise in the 
recurring overheads to the extent of the rental saved. It may 
be advisable to hold such property either by acquisition or 
by construction whichever course is advantageous to the ins­
titution* In U.P. or for that matter in India, holding of 
rural property would not constitute a profitable investment 
for the present. But, if the curative and preventive medical 
services are to be carried to rural folk (which is a long- 
run policy, no douht), construction of ruaial letting property 
would be an additional attraction for the medical practition­
ers. If buildings are owned by the institution itself and let
to such medicos on concessional rates, they may be willing to
propertyset up their pharmacies there. Moreover, letting/is generally 
not available in rural areas. In such circumstances, construc­
tion of property will be imperative either by the government 
or by the institution for the purpose of housing its medical 
and office establishments in those areas*
Yield on the selected securities must be favourably com­
parable to the yield obtained by similar institutions for si­
milar securities. Nevertheless, safety and liquidity should
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not be sacrificed for yield* The U.S. Social Security Act,
1935, required that the investment of the Old Age Reserve 
(now OASITF) earn not less than three per cent as income 
from investments. But later on any reference to the minimum 
rate was dropped* The holdings of the Fund being generally 
long-term, the 1956 Amendment duly accomodated this conside­
ration, At present, the rate is the average rate "borne by 
all marketable interest bearing obligations of the United 
States.... . not due or callable until after the expira­
tion of five years from the date of the original issue*
The rate of interest earned by OASITF was 2.55^ during 1957*
During the first six months of 1958, it remained unchanged,
2but it rose to 2*57^ dmring the next six months.
The ESI scheme of India invested its funds in Govern­
ment securities and the balance of cash is deposited with the 
State Bank of India* These are fixed-yield investments* The 
Balance Sheet of the ESI Corporation as at March 31, 1959, 
showed that land and buildings valued at Rs* 10,28,167.77 
were wholly owned by the Corporation. Hospitals and Dispen­
saries owned by the Corporation and the State Governments 
jointly were valued at Ri 1,17,839.09 for the part of the 
Corporation* Other investments amounted to Rs, 16,17,19,200 
during the same period. This shows that in so far as variable- 
yield securities are concerned, they have not been accorded the 
pride of place in the investment portfolio. And this is not
1, Social Security Bulletin, April 1959, p 19*
2* Ibid* p 20,
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inexcusable as the variable-yield securities are highly spe­
culative in our country* As such, they do not constitute a 
good investment for a social insurance institution.
The average rate of interest earned by the Corporation 
was a little over three per cent* This is favourably compara­
ble with the rates earned by social insurance institutions 
abroad* Since an adventurous policy of investment is not de­
sirable for the pension insurance fund,it is better to be 
content with this rate of yield*
Liquidity is another important consideration in investing 
the funds of the pension insurance* Liquidity is required for 
meeting the normal payment of retiral benefits and for meet­
ing unforeseen contingencies, such as withdrawal benefits, 
survivorship benefits and the like. A portion of the fund 
should, therefore, be kept in liquid cash or easily and speedi­
ly realisable securities. The latter may necessitate the adopt­
ing of a proper time-table for the maturity of investments* In 
the absence of such a timing schedule, a hurried realisation 
of investments under distress or otherwise, may cause a dras­
tic shrinkage in the value of the holdings as well as loss of 
interest* Contingency Reserve Pund should, therefore, be in­
vested in easily realisable securities or kept in liquid form. 
The policy of the Corporation is, thus, up to the mark*
It may be noted that the investment policy of the Corpora­
tion does not seem to be based on a proper appreciation of the 
importance of geographical distribution of funds* During 
1957-58 and 1958-59, the actual sums invested in State
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Crovemment securities stood as follows:
Table VI.2
INVESTMENTS OP THE E,S.I. CORPORATION IN STATE GOVERNMENT 
SECURITIES DURING 1957-58 and 1958-59.
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1957-58 1958-59
Amount: Rs p«c* Amount Rs p*c.
4 % Andhara State Deve­
lopment Loan 1964 1 5,00,000 21 15,00,000 8
4 % Bihar 1967 ♦ « • • # 5,00,000 3
4i^ Bombay State Deve­
lopment Loan 1969 19,40,900 27 19,40,900 10
4i^ Kerala State Deve­
lopment Loan 1970 • • # • • 13,48,800 7
4 % Madras 1968 16,00,000 22 21,00,000 11
4i% I^ ysore 1969 5,79,300 8 14,79,300 8
H It 1970 • • # • • 1,40,100 1
4isJ U*P. State Deve­
lopment Loan • ♦ • # • 12,89,900 7
4 % West Bengal 1965 # • # # # 9,02,500 5
II ri II 1964 • • • • • 46,000 -
tt n It 1 9 6 8 15,86,000 22 46,19,800 25
'» tt 1 9 7 0 • • • • • 26,80,000 14
Total State Securities 72,06,200 100 1,85,47,300 100
SOURCE; Vide Table VI. 1
Thus,, it is clear that the largest share representing 
more than two-fifths of the total investments in State Govern­
ment securities during 1958-59 was claimed bj^ West Bengal* 
Madras claimed 11^  of this portfolio; Bombay 10^ ; Andhra and
l^sore 8% each* U.P. Government securities represented only 
7% of this portfolio during 1958-59 while they were conspi­
cuous by absence during 1957-58# Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, the 
Punjab, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh.were not represented 
at all* This bears testimony to the fact that no heed has 
been paid to an even geographical distribution of investment 
portfolio. In case of a pension fund, some formula shall have 
to be evolved in this behalf. Undeveloped and less-developed 
States should be included in the list as well.
The investment pattern of the Corporation also suffers 
from the lack of diversification. But it must be borne in 
mind that investment in government securities is beneficial 
to the society at large. At a time when the government is 
heading along with developmental plans, investment in govern­
ment securities serves doubly well. On the one hand, it con- 
foms to the utmost with the principle of safel?y; on the other, 
a sizeable fund is made available to the government for finan­
cing the developmental programmes. If the funds are let flow 
in the private sector, it will be dangerous in two respects.
In the first place, this may lopside the economic development; 
and, secondly, it is not a good investment from the view-point 
of safety, specially in times of economic crises.
■Qrpes of holdings which the Fund may acquire should be 
determined in consonance with the broad natioanl policy* Pen­
sion scheme being essentially a social service, must be rela­
ted to current economic and social problems of the nation. 
Therefore, its investments must lend support to the general
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economic policy so long as it does not offend against the 
principles of safety, liquidity and yield. Broadly speajcing, 
an integrated scheme of social insurance tends to provide re­
lief in cases of economic, social and biological contingencies. 
Utilisation of fund should provide and assist the provision of 
preventive services for these contingencies. Improvement of 
employment situation, provision for housing facilities, crea­
tion of new means of production, assistance to achieve the 
objectives of the Five Year Plans and improvement of community 
health are a few channels to which the investments of the fund 
may be diverted. Financing of new production projects creates 
employment which, in its turn, redistributes income. It im­
proves consumption and the standard of living of the commimity. 
It lowers the intensity of social contingencies like unemploy­
ment and the distress in the event of the death of the bread­
winner* Financing of health projects and provision of better 
housing facilities improves the efficiency of labour and as 
such the morbidity rate also goes down. They prevent sickness 
and economise in the cost of sickness insurance through the 
backdoor. Therefore, the finance of the projects of economic 
and social utility must be secured with the help of an en­
couraging policy of the State* The latter has to play its role 
by guaranteeing the repayment of the sum invested in such pro­
jects and underwrite a reasonable rate of interest. In the 
absence of favourable situation, use of the fund for the pur­
poses of economic and social utility projects may be vitiated*
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The Meeting of the Experts on the Investments of Social 
Insurance Funds held under the auspices of the ILO, lays 
down the cridteria for economic and social utilities* "As a 
criirterian of social utility”, the Meeting suggests, "one can 
accept the degree of influence exercised on the health situa­
tion, cultural level, and, in a more general way, on the liv­
ing conditions of the insured community in the first place 
and of the national community in the second place, by the 
compaign against disease, the improvement in the health and 
housing conditions, town-planning, the establishment of 
schools etc."^  In short, health, housing, town-planning and 
education projects are the general indicators of social 
utility. It again expresses the view thet:
"As a crirterion of the utility of investments for the nation- 
tional economy, one can accept the contribution made by the 
investment of insurance schemes towards, for example
(a) a harmonious distribution of agricultural production in 
the various parts of the country, the insurance funds 
being called on to assist in the development of natural 
resources and of production complementary thereto in the 
areas where the necessity is the greatest;
(b) the development of means of transport, in particular, of 
roads and waterways, in areas least favoured in this 
respect;
(c) the better geographical distribution of investments in 
real estates and in housing#"1
In S3 far as the question of achieving the cri^ Dterian of 
economic and social utility is concerned, the ESI Corporation 
has been authorised to finance measures to improve health etc. 
Since the funds is at present invested in Central and State
1. Op, Cit., p 219
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Government securities and the National Planning Board Loans, 
it is for the Governments and the N.P.Board to utilise the 
available proceeds for the aforesaid purposes* Of cource, 
with the Pive Year Plans in progress, it is of prime import­
ance that the proposed pension fund hold some special issues 
which are in agreement with various cristeria of investment 
and the proceeds of which are earmarked for financing social 
and economic utility projects* I have observed in the preced­
ing pages, a better geographical distribution of State loans 
is necessary* Presently, investment in ruaal letting property 
would amount to needless locking of funds since there is no 
possibility of covering rural population under sickness or 
old age insurance schegne in the near future*
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . assessment a«d
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capitalisation syst^is of finance applicable to social in­
surance institutions* The former balances income to expendi­
ture over short periods of time. It is easy to understand but 
it suffers from the lack of funds and in times of prolonged 
depressions, this assumes a negative character. It is suited 
to short-duration contingencies* Accumulation or capitalisa­
tion system is based on the accumulation of funds during the 
contributing life of the beneficiary, so that pensions and 
other benefits may be paid ou^the fund built in this way. 
Theri may be individual or collective accumulation systems* 
This system suffers from productionwise disequilibrium* It 
is depressive in effect as the current contributions per
rupee of future benefits are alwa^ greater. But the depressive 
character of this system of finance is nullified by the 
expansionist effect of the accumulated funds v/hen they are 
invested.
Sui^ jable system of finance is determined by the nature 
of contingencies covered. Considering the various conditions, 
a capitalisation system of finance may be preferred for a
pension scheme in our State and country both.
The fund accumulated under the capitalisation s^’-stem
should be invested in securities satifying the cricteria of 
safety, liquidity and yield to the utmost. Government 
securities are unique in this respect. The proceeds of such 
securities may be utilized for the promotion of the projects 
of social and economic utility. Even geographicq.1 distri­
bution of fund will avoid regional disparities. At present, 
investment in rural letting property cannot be preferred for 
there is no near possibility of carrying social insurance to 
the rural population in the near future.
A proper authority based on tripartite representation 
should be created for the investment of funds. This may be 
centralised or decentralised. The latter may achieve better 
regional distribution of funds, but the competition among 
the decentralised bodies presents a formidable problem of 
co-ordination. If the pension scheme is launched on all-India 
basis, a Central Board of Investment may be created for this 
purpose. It is in keeping with the international practice 
and v/ill avoid duplic tion v/hich in case of decentralised
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bodies is almost unavoidable, I have discussed only financial 
management of the scheme in the present Chapter v/hich is a 
part of the general administration of the scheme. I propose 
to deal with the administrative implications of the scheme 
in some detail. This forms the subject-matter of the next 
Chapter.
(VI^57)
ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF PENSION SCHEME
Launching of a programme of old age insurance is only-
permissive of the designed benefits and not a guarantee that 
they shall reach the beneficiaries too* Success of the pro­
gramme is, in fact, governed by the quality and effectiveness 
of administration, A sound administration is, therefore, a 
sine qua non for an old-age insurance schane, the beneficiaries 
of which do not only stand in need of economic amelioration 
but they are undergoing emotional perturbation at the time of 
the receipt of benefits so that they need a speedy assistance 
for emotional assuage too,
A good administration should be speedy, cheap and should 
leave no chances for collusion and dishonesty. It should also 
acctamaodate the view-points of the clientele in policy matters.
A speedy disposal of cases is not only helpful for the bene­
ficiaries alone, but it avoids a lot of trouble to the orga­
nisational machinery itself. Since the purpose of old age 
insurance scheme is to grant wherewithal for the purpose of 
securing victuals and other consumptional requirements, any
unnecessary delay due to laxity of control or bureaucratic
f
red-tapism would render the scheme quite meaningless for*the
*«•
beneficiary class, therefore, it is necessary that procedureal 
foimalities should be minimised and fracing and checking of
records and calculation and disbursal of benefits should be
\
as speedy as it does not involve sacrifice of accuracy and
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economy in administration. Economy implies that the maximum 
of advantages should be secured by incurring the unavoidable 
minimum of expenditure. Prevention of fraud and dishonesty 
is also a characteristic of sound administration# Although 
the problem of malingering is not so important in retirement 
as in case of sickness or accidents, there is always its pos­
sibility in case of invalidity on the side of tampering with 
the records. An effective administration should eliminate 
such chances.
Democratic representation has grown into a problem of 
topical interest in the present age of indmstrial democracy.
A pension scheme may be administered either by a government 
department or by some agency on which all the parties to fi­
nance are represented. The organisation of administrative set­
up on the basis of the clientele is advocated for its securing 
maximum service to th§ beneficiary group. Since their view­
point is accomodated in the formulation of policies, they may 
be benefited from the scheme in the way they like. But at the 
same time, the functions performed by social insurance organi­
sations have become so technical that they demand a high degree 
skill
of technical/ and frequently they are the province of an expert 
in that field. Such expert knowledge may be secured by hired 
rather than elected personnel. Moreover, the client-oriented 
agencies suffer from the lack of co-ordination of views and 
duplication of services. Por example, one actuary who could 
discharge his duties for the whole scheme, will not be suffi­
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cient in case of democTatic representation which, particularly 
suffers from the lack of mutual confidence in India. Ii;i that 
case, all the parties will engage their own seperate actuaries 
which will result in duplication and waste of efforts and re­
sources as a consequence, A client-oriented organisation is 
more often than not, negligent of the genuine policy of the 
scheme and is subser,vient to the self-interest of the pres­
sure groups represented*
The administration of a pension scheme can be broken 
into two parts: the organisational structure at the top of the 
scheme and the bureaucratic set-up for the day to day minis­
terial work. Fortunately, India has had social insurance tra^  
dition for some time past. Though it is not yet sufficiently 
stabilised, it will be useful to study the set-up of the pre­
sent schemes in order to understand the needs of an all-out 
scheme of social security and the problem of co-ordination and 
integration which will be needed ultimately.
A. Organisational Set-up
The administration of the ESI schane is the responsibi­
lity of the Qnployees' State Insurance Corporation which has 
been established in accordance with the provisions of the 
iSI Act, 1948(Section 3)* The Corporation is a body corporate 
having perpetual succession and a common seal. It enjoys auto­
nomy in its day-to-day affairs. In principle, it is neither a 
Government department nor a private body. It is constituted in 
the following manner:
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I. The Minister of Labour in the Central Cabinet in the ex­
officio Chairman of the Corporation.
II. The Minister of Health in the Central Cabinet is the ex­
officio Vice-Chairman.
III. Uve nominee members of the Central Government of whom at 
least three will be the Officials of the Government.
IV* One person each representing the erstwhile Part A and B 
States nominated by the respective State Governments.
V. One person to be nominated by the Central Government to 
represent the Part C States before re-organisation.
VI. Five persons representing employers to be nominated by the 
Central Government in consultation with their recognised 
organisations.
VII. Pive persons representing employees to be nominated by 
Central Government in consultation with the recognised 
organisations of the employees.
VIII. Two persons representing medical profession to be nomi­
nated by the Central Government in consultation with the 
recognised organisations of the medical practitioners.
IX. Two persons to be elected by the Lok Sabha.
The Corporation is responsible for the general governance of 
the scheme. In addition to this, it has been authorised to 
make regulations regarding the affairs of the Corporation and 
for carrying on duties to give effect to the provisions of the 
ESI Act.
For carrying out the official and executive duties under 
the Corporation, the Central Government have appointed a 
Directo3>General of the ESI Corporation who is the chief 
executive. He is assisted in his duties by an Insurance Com­
missioner, a Medical Officer, a Chief Accounts Officer and an 
Actuary. They are called Principal Officers of the Corporation. 
The day-to-day affairs of the Corporation are looked after
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considerationby a. Standing Committee# It submits cases foB< 
by the Corporation aid exercises any of the powers of the 
Corporation and performs any of the functions entrusted to 
it* The Committee has 13 members in the following way:
(a) a Chairman nominated by the Central Government;
(b) three members of the Corporation who are the Officials of 
the Corporation are nominated by the Central Government;
(c) three members of the Corporation representing such States 
as the Central Government may specify;
(d) six members elected by the Corporation as follows;
(i) two members from amongst the members of the Corpora­
tion representing employers,
(ii)tv<i> members of the Corporation representing employees,
(iii) one member representing medical profession,
(iv) one member elected by the Lok Sabha,
The Committee is responsible for all the functions of the 
Corporation subject to the latteri^ is superintendence*
Besides that, there is a Medical Benefit Council* It is 
not an executive body nor is it a policy-making organ* Its 
duties are advisory and consist of the following:
(a) to advise the Corporation and the Standing Committee on 
natters relating to the administiation of the medical benefit^  
certification for the purpose of^  the grant of benefits and 
other connected matters,
(b) to have such powers as well as duties on the matters relat- 
<ng to investigation of cases as may be prescribed in relation
to complaints against medical practitioners in connection with 
medical treatment and attendence,
(b) to perform any other duties specified in the Regulations.
The Council has the following members:
(i) the Director-General of Health Services to he the ex-
officio Chairman?
(ii) a Deputy Director-General of Health Services, to be no- 
minated by the Central Government?
(iii) the Medical Commissioner of the Corporation to be an 
ex-officio member;
(iv) one member each representing the erstwhile Part A and 
B States where the scheme has been implemented;
(v) three members representing employers to be nominated by 
the Central Government in consultation with the recognised 
organisations of the employersf
(vl) three members representing employees to be nominated by 
the Central Government in consultation with the recognised 
organisations of employees;
(vii) three members of whom one must be a woman, representing 
medical profession to be nominated by the Central Government 
in consultation with the recognised organisations of medical 
practitioners.
The Corporation has set up Regional Offices headed by 
the Regional Directors# In smaller Stages, Deputy Regional 
Directors are in charge of the affairs, They are assisted in 
their work by Assistant Regional Directors who are responsible 
for the supervision of local offices ^ d  inspection offices* 
There are also Regional Assistant Accounts Officers who look 
after the Accounts Branch of the Regional Offices, U.P. has a 
Regional Office at Kanpur. It is headed by a Regional Director.
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However, it may be noted that the Regional Office is more 
concerned with the bureaucratic governance of the scheme 
subject to the supervision of the Corporation*
A review of the constitution of the Corporation, the 
Standing Committee and the Medical Benefit Council reveals 
the well-known practice of Governments in underdeveloped 
countries to over-administer and under^finance* Administrative 
shares of the employees, the employers and the State in the 
three sets-up are distributed as follows:
REPRESENTATIVES ESI CORPORATION S. COMMITTEE M.B* COUNCIL
Employees 5 2 3
Bnployers 5 2 3
Government 26 7 21
Others 4 2 3
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Total 40 13 30
It is abmdantly clear that the Government have a lion’s 
share in the administration of the scheme* Their representation 
in the Corporation is 65^ » in the Committee 54^ and the 
Council 70%» Overall share of the Government is 54 out of a 
total of 83 members which represents about 65% of voting 
rights* But it may be remarked that the Government initiative 
is irreplaceable in underdeveloped countries for the institu­
tion of the schemes of social insurance* But, in the long run 
employees and employers shall have to be given greater share 
in the administration though a general supervision of the
of the scheme by the State may still be necessary.
Under the Employees' Provident Fond Scheme, the Central 
Board of Trustees is responsible for the governance of the 
schane* According to the para 3 of the Scheme, the Central 
Board of Trustees is to be constituted as follows;
( a )  a  Chairm an to  b e  n o m in ated  by th e  C e n t r a l  C3ovemment;
(b) three persons to be nominated by the Central Government;
(c) nominees of such State Governments as the Central Govern­
ment may, having regard to the jurisdiction of the Board, 
specify in this behalf;
(d) six members representjng employers in the industries or 
establishments to which the scheme applies nominated by the 
Central Government in consultation with the recognised or­
ganisations of the employers;
(e) six members representing employees in the industries to 
be nominated by the Central Government in consultation with 
the recognised organisations of the employees.
There are also Boards *of Trustees in the States. They . 
are composed of a Chairman and two members who are Government 
nominees and four representatives of employers and employees 
each. In this case too, in this way, the same pattern of an 
absolute majority of the Government members is visible; and 
the pattern of administration seems to cluster round the same 
pivot as under the ESI scheme.
The Central Provident Fund Commissioner is the chief 
executive officer of the Board. He is a whole-time Officer 
and is entitled to attend the meetings of the Board and par­
ticipate in the discussions but he cannot vote. The Commissioner
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is assisted in his duties by a Deputy who is in charge of 
a Special. Section* He is also assisted by four Assistants 
one each for Statistical and Accounts Sections and two for 
Enforcement Section. Moreover, there are foutteen Regional 
Provident Fund Commissioners who are full time officers in 
Bombay, West Bengal, Madras, Mysore and Kerala and part-time 
Labour Commissioners in the rest. The Regional Provident Bind 
Commissioner is assisted by Provident Fund Inspectors for en­
forcement and by Accounts Officers for collection of contribu­
tions and maintenance of accounts.
In case of social insurance, the administrative respon­
sibility should go with financial participation. The parties 
that contribute to the cost of the scheme should also parti­
cipate in the actual administration ofjthe scheme. According 
to the recommendations of the ILO, ’Representatives of the 
insured persons should participate in the management of insu­
rance institutions under conditions to be determined by na­
tional laws, which may likewise decide as to the participation 
of representatives of employers and of public authorities."^
The organisational set-up of the social insurance scheme 
in Great Britain is based on direct administration by govern­
ment department. The Minister of Pensions and National Insu­
rance is responsible for the administration of the cash bene­
fits payable under the Family Allowances Act, 1945, the Nar- 
tional Insurance Act, 1946, and the National Insurance 
(Industrial Injuries) Act, 1946. National Health Services are
1. International Labour Code. 1951, p 681
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the responsibility of the Minister of Health for England anJ 
Wales and the Secretary of State for Scotland. Administration 
of the National ^ Assistance Scheme is vested in the National 
Assistance Board. There are, nevertheless, National Insurance 
Advisory Committees and Industrial Injuries Advisory Councils 
that assist the Minister of Pensions in the perfomance of 
his duties under the two Acts. The Committee and the Council 
include the representatives of employers and the insured per­
sons. Their function is mainly advisory but the Minister may 
refer to them any other matter connected with the scheme.
In the United States, the Secretary of the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare is responsible for the adminis­
tration of all the aspects of the Social Security programme 
except the collection of contributions which is the responsi­
bility of the Bureau of Internal Revenue under the direction 
of the Secretary of the Treasury. The OASITF is managed by the 
Board of Trustees as referred to in the last Chapter. Social 
Security Administration is headed by a Commissioner of So­
cial Security who is responsible for the executive functions 
of the scheme.
As noted earlier, administration may be classified into 
policy and technical matters. In policy matters^mainly, the 
representation of the view-points of the clients is necessary, 
because sometimes, experts are so much occupied in technical 
details that they lose sight of the matters of policy. It is, 
therefore, advisable that the technical matters should be 
entrusted to the experts and quacks may not be allowed ’.
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to: create hurdles at every step while in all policy matters 
clients’ representation must be secured^ The problem of se­
curing truly democratic representation of parties in the 
administration of social insurance schemes admits of further 
intricacies in relation to the way adopted to secure it* If 
the beneficiaries and other parties are organised groups, such 
as employers and employees haviig their separate organisations^
V-
their representation is not so problematic* But when the bene­
ficiaries are unorganised like children and the blind, their 
representation becomes a problem* In such cases, it is essen­
tial to coopt public-spirited people who may fight out their 
case* Moreover, if the State can launch such programmes for 
the benefit of unvocal sections of population, one has to 
trust it as the custodian of their rights* In fact, the problem 
of lay participation in the administration of social insurance 
programmes at appropriate phases of policy formation is of 
vital import* Advice of a rarefied layman is sometimes more 
informative than the results obtained from the devotion of 
large sums by prdtvate institutions for research in the rele­
vant field of social policy* Besides, the way in which these 
results may influence the actual policy is roundabout and 
indirect* The client pressure groups may quickly influence the 
policy if their representation is available at appropriate • 
stages of administration. As a matter of fact, the clients 
have practical experience which is worth volumes of theore­
tical deliberations of the experts* Expert advice is mostly 
needed on the bureaucratic side of the administation* It is 
therefore, in the fitness of things to examine the bureaucratic 
machinery at this stage*
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B. Beaucratic Machinery
For securing a speedy fulfilment of procedureal formali­
ties, in order to reach the benefits to the victimDs of the 
contingency in time, and for prevention of fraud and elimi­
nation of chances of collusion so that the unscrupulous do 
not profiteer at the expense of poor beneficiaries, it is 
of prime importance that the bureaucratic machinery is so 
geared that no gaps are are left not the sli^test creaks 
go undetected. This problem may be studied under six distinct 
heads; (1) registration of covered employers, (2) registration 
of covered employees, (3) collection of contributions,
(4) Inspection, (5) disbursal of benefits and (6) Co-ordi- 
na;^ ion and integration*
1. Registration of employers
Prom the point of view of convenience and economy, the 
employers are the immediate link between the insurance insti­
tution and the covered employees* aaployers help in collection 
of contributions and the administration of benefits in many 
ways* It is^therefore, highly desirable to lay down a clear- 
cut definition of the tern "employer"* Due to existence of 
intermediate employers and contract labour, it was thought 
advisable to guard against the possible evasiSn of law by them* 
The ESI Act, 1948, therefore, introduced the concept of imme­
diate and principal employers. An immediate employer has been 
defined as a
"person who has undertaken the execution on the premises of a 
factory or an establishment to v/hich the Act applies or under 
the supervision of the principal employer or his agent, of
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the whole or any part of any work which is ordinarily part 
of the work of the factory or establishment of the principal 
employer or is preliminary to the work carried on in, or 
incidental to the purpose of any such factory or establishment, 
and includes a person by whom the services of an employee who 
has entered into a contract of service with him are temporarily 
lent or let on hire to the principal employer, ” 1
This definition covers all contract labour and those engaged
by intermediaries too. The principal employer means
"(1) in any factory, the owner or occupier of the factory and- 
includes the managing agent of such owner or occupier, 
the legal representatives of a deceased owner or occupier 
and where a person has been named as the manager of the 
factory under the Factories Act, 1948 ( LXIII of 1948 ) 
the person so named;
(2) in any establishment under the control of any department 
of any Government in India, the authority appointed by 
such Government in this behalf or where no authority is 
so appointed, the head of the Department;
(3) in any other establishment, any person responsible for 
the provision and control of the establisliment# "2
In order to enforce the provisions of legislation, all 
such employers must be registered with the insurance institu­
tion and full record should be kept of such employers* A 
contractor, an intermediary or a sub-contractor should be 
held responsible for the matters relating to the scheme accor­
ding to the degree of independence and financial risk inherent 
in his activity. The ILO also agrees with the view that where 
” the contractor or sub-contractor has been declared to be the 
employer, the 'principal employer' must be jointly responsible 
Under the provisions of the ESI sch"^ eme, the covered 
employers are required to furnish particulars regarding their
1, Section 2 (13).
2, Section 2 (17).
3, Administrative Practice of Social Insurance Institutions.
Geneva, 1955, p 23.
activities and the number of employers engaged by them. The 
establishment is occasionally visited by the inspecting staff 
and the facts disclosed by the employers are verified on the 
spot* The employers have also to disclose the full particulars 
of wages paid to the employees and then they are issued by 
the ESIC, Bnployer’s Code Number which is essentially quoted 
by the employees while making claims, declarations, complaints 
and at the time of filing other insurance documents.
Registration Numbers may be simple or coded. Simple 
Registration Numbers are serial^ly allotted in chronological 
order. This system is too simple and hence involves waste of 
time in tracing out the card of the employee. Hence, a code 
element is often introduced to indicate in a predetermined 
way, the territorial division in which the factory is situated 
or the local office to the jurisdiction of which the employer 
belongs. Code may also indicate occupational category of the 
employer. In the absence ofjanY territorial classification, the 
local officer of the insurance institution may be granted free­
dom of action for devising their own codes which must refer 
to the area allotted to them. There is no fear of duplication 
under this practice as each local office works independently of 
others though under the general supervision of the regional 
organisation* It also avoids too much centralisation.
Where the single undertaking is a vertical combine pos­
sessing several establishments they may be required to prepare 
seperate records, specially where some contingencies are 
covered on local basis and the establishments are situated in
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different regions* A cross-reference to the principal employer 
in such cases is, however^  necessary and "all these together 
will be regarded as being attached to .^.principal activity 
and will constitute a single ‘establishment*; its registration 
number will, therefore, be that appropriate to the principal 
activity....
Generally first registration follows a census of estab­
lishments taken by appropriiite authority whose duty it is to 
see that no establishment escapes registration# In case of any 
establishment being wound up, a number may become 'free', but 
it is risky to re-allot 'free' numbers to some other estab­
lishment*
After the registration of the employers is complete, 
a register giving necessary particulars regarding each employer 
and an index card may be prepared* In U.P. nickel tokens 
with short references are produced and kept for the ready re­
ference at the Regional Office, Kanpur. Employers of U.P. and 
India too, thus, are covered under the ESI and EPF schemes.
They are already registered. A pension scheme,therefore, will 
not require a fresh registration of employers and the existing 
arrangements xmder the two schemes may be profitably borrowed 
and utilised for this scheme too*
2* Registration of the Employees
Not only the registration of employers is necessary for 
running a pension schone, but the registration of the employees 
is all the more necessary f o r ,  the former is a means to 
achieve the latter end* Indirect registration of employees
1. Administrative Practicr of Social Insurance Institiations 
Op. Cit., p Z6 ’
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were more convenient, there was ai limited use of employers’ 
registration* Registration of covered employees is neither 
poosible without a reference to employers nor is it advisable. 
Its necessity arises due to the fact that " difficulties of 
communication, the sparsity of the population, ignorance of 
the objects of social insurance, illiteracy and similar factors 
convert the task of identifying insured persons into one of 
major administrative difficulty such as may seriously affect 
the practical application of the scheme."^  It is, therefore, 
necessary the employees should be registered with full parti­
culars such as name, date of birth, domicile, marital status 
and employers' Code Number. For substantiating the fact of 
their employment, a certificate from the employer may be re­
quired to be produced. Usually, the employer is required to 
forward the registration papers after confirming th§ entries 
so that no incorrectness is committed. Date of birth and of 
entering the employment should be verified with utmost care 
and reliability, particularly in case of retirement pensions 
because the benefits under such schemes are subject to the 
attainment of retirement age and fulfilment of contribution 
conditions*
On filing a Declaration Form, the regional office issues 
a temporary registration certificate. Vithin a few days the 
identity card of the insured person is handed over to him on 
producing the certificate. Under the ESI Regulations No. 11 
and 12, the employee has to fill in Form I ( the Declaration 
Form) which require/^ filling in of various particulars. The 
Form is to be countersigned and and forwarded by the employer 
or some official of the employing factory in order to avoid 
1. ILO: Administrative Practice... . p 7
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any misstatement. The facts disclosed are helpful to the 
employers and the insurance institution both at the time of 
verification of claims and calculation of benefits.
On the request of registration being received from the 
employees, they are assigned insurance numbers. It gives a 
distinct identity to the insured person and also helps as a 
reference to his index card and registers and other documents. 
As in case of employers' registration, employees insurance 
number may also be simple or coded. It may indicate regional, 
chronological or generation groups. The registration number 
must be short; nevertheless, it must contain all the particu­
lars which enable a rapid and accurate identification of the 
insured person. A numbering system must also admit of elas­
ticity so that if the scheme is extended, expanded or unified, 
it should not be necessary to change or overhaul the entire 
system with the attendent confusion, duplication and disloca­
tion of the basic administrative operations. The ESI scheme 
has an elastic system of registration with a combination of 
serial, chronological and alphabetical arrangement of insu­
rance numbers.
It is of great importance to decide as to what level
of registration is to be follov/ed ------ central, regional or
local. Central registration is more immune from the danger of 
duplication* But in a big scheme and particularly when it is 
implemented throughout India, with heterogenous characteristics 
of population, a central registration seems to be stupendous 
task. It may assume unmanageable dimensions* Therefore, the 
ESI scheme has adopted a regional registration. It may be 
noted that the contingencies against which this scheme pro­
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vides are more or less of regional character. Moreover, they 
are normally of short duration. In addition to this, the 
State Governments are made responsible for one-fourth of the 
medical cost and also for the cost of medical services to the 
beneficiaries in excess of the average cost assumed for the 
whole of India. These considerations justify a regional basis 
of registration. In Great Britain, registration and record­
keeping is centralised. It has been possible due to homogeneity 
of population characteristics and her small area. Under the 
contributory pension scheme of the United States, registration 
is required at central level. The Bureau of Old-Age and Sur­
vivorship Insurance of the Social Security Administration 
maintains a centralised wage-record in Baltimore.
level of registration is also governed by the type of con­
tingency and the area of its coverage.In case of India, re­
gional basis adopted for the ESI scheme may be retained for old 
age insurance scheme too. Central level of registration may 
cause delays due to vast expanse of India. But, records may be 
co-ordinated by notification between regions with mutual ar­
rangement, if the scheme is extended throughout the country.
Danger of duplication is more imminent in case of old age 
insurance than in other cases. There is great scope for the 
insured persons to qualify for benefits doubly. Duplication 
may also creep in due to allotment of the same registration 
number to two or more persons or allotting the same person 
two different numbers* The avoidance of the former type of 
duplication is easier. It may be done by printing insurance
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numbers on the registration cards beforehand, so that at the 
time of preparing the card, numbers are automatically allotted. 
By preparing index registers and card indices, the duplication 
may be further obviated. But the avoidance of the second type 
of duplication is a bit difficult, particularly in case of 
old age insurance. For, after putting in qualifying service 
in an establishment situated in one region, an insured person 
may get employed in another region and again qualify for be­
nefits of the same type and draw double benefits at the ex- 
pensE of the echeine# Sometimes, the same person may be em­
ployed under different name and particulars. Here the co-operap- 
tion of the employees and the employers is both vital for 
the running of the scheme. Discrepancies may be detected to 
a great extent if a centralised record is kept in alphabetical 
order. If these loopholes are not filled, the purpose of the 
scheme will be defeated.
Declaration of particulars about the family of the insu­
red is also required in order to ascertain and estimate the 
dependents' benefits when it becomes due. I have stated else­
where that this recognises the institution of joint-family as 
an established fact. But, in the eyes of law, the family does 
not signify a unit of household including all members of the 
joint-family wherein the living together of cousins, nephews, 
uncles and the like is not xmcommon* It takes into account 
only lineal relations who may be supposed to be dependent on 
the insured person. Therefore, the ESI Act, 1948, defined 
family as " the spouse and minor legitimate and adopted child­
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ren dependant upon the insured person and where the insured 
peson is a male, his dependent parents."^  Regulation 15-A to 
the Act requires the insured person to make a declaration of 
the particulars of his family on Porm A* Moreover, the insured 
person is required to intimate the Corporation any change e.g. 
birth of a nev child, death of a member, marriage of a daughter 
and so on, affecting the membership of his family^  within 
fifteen days of taking place of such change. These particulars 
are specially useful for a pension scheme as the family bene­
fits are a costly component of the entire cost of the scheme, 
V/hen the dependant's benefits are to be payable, the record 
of the family in respect of the employee helps in checking 
and verifying the benefits.
After completing the formal procedure, the insured person 
is issued an identity card made of hard stuff. On this card, 
the name, identification marks, employers' code number and 
some other particulars are briefly entered to make the in­
sured person identifiable prima facie. Sometimes, the insti­
tutions issue seperate family cards but there are others that 
enter the particulars of the family on the card of the insured 
person or his records. !Ehe identity card:< document is just in 
the fashion of University identity cards which the insured 
person carries at his person.
Identity document may also be in the form of a pass-book 
such as one used under the EPP scheme. This book isjuseful for 
pension insurance institutions* It may bear reference to date 
of employment and contribution performance of the insured
1, Section 2 (11).
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In case of vested rights being allowed to the insured, the 
book may be utilised to record the change of employers within 
the covered group of industries. Sometimes, a brief entry may 
record the emoluments received by him. It may record withdraw- 
als and advances received by him. The book may be changed if 
and when required. Another identity document may be loose- 
leaf coupons which are detachable and can serve as contribu­
tion cards too. The employer may take their help in prepara^ - 
tion of contribution- sheets of his employees.^ The use of 
a particular identity document depends on the requirements 
of the scheme. In case of short-duration contingencies, 
identity cards as described above may be useful* In mediumr- 
term contingencies, a loose-leaf card system may be useful. 
These cards may be destroyed after the expiry of the period 
of benefit for recording a specified number of contributions. 
For a pension scheme, a pass-book may be more useful*
The above discussion relates to registration of employees 
at the time of implementation of the scheme. The registration 
may be pre-implementation andopost-implementation both. The 
former is mainly requied for the purpose of ascertaining the 
prospective number of insured persons covered# If the scheme 
is introduced stagewise, all the employees who come within the 
pwrview would not be simultaneously covered. In such cases, 
a previous registration helps prepare a time-table for imple­
mentation. There is little difference in pre-implementation
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1. Administrative Practice of Social Insurance Institutions. 
Op. Cit., p 12-15.
and general registration except that of degree. Post-imple- 
mentation registration may be required for ascertaining 
further facts* It may also be required for those persons 
who leave one employer and join other within the covered em­
ployments. This is necessary for properly crediting the con­
tributions already paid by them.
In U.P. no fresh registration of employees either will 
be required as the existing machinery may be utilised for this 
purpose#
3* Collection of Contributions
Another important problem relating to an old age insurance 
scheme is the problem of collection of contributions. For 
successful operation of the machinery of collection of con­
tributions, it should secure maximum economy as well as flexi­
bility of procedure to ensure the inflow of contributions 
with reasonalbe regularity and necessary accuracy. It should 
render impossible the evasion of the Act by employers and 
insured persons should have an access to their individual re­
cords in order to check the compliance of their employers. 
Moreover, the employers should not be put to inconvenience 
in the computation of contributions. Besides, the system 
should admit of keeping the accounts ui>-to-date so that the 
ascertainment of one's title to benefits and actual disbursal 
does not involve avoidable delay.
Contributions may either be collected by payroll taxes 
or by stamp system. Under payroll system, the employer is re­
quired to submit to insurance institution an exhaustive list
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of his employees together with new entrants or departures 
with their dates of accession or departure giving full pal?- 
ticulars of wages, period of employment and contributions 
paid. Ihe records are then checked by the insurance institu­
tion and discrepancies, if any, are intimated to the anployer. 
Alternatively, contributions may be calculated by the insurance 
institution itself. In this case, the returns filed by the 
employers from time to time are used for calculations. Changes 
in wage-rates, accessions and departures are reported by the 
employers so that correct and up-to-date figures may be ascer­
tained. The institutions determine theamount payable by the 
employer and intimate him to it, so that payment may be expe­
dited. Another way of calculating the sum of contributions is 
that the basic sum of contributions is retained and the net 
amount payable is arrived at by adding thereto or substracting 
therefrom amounts applying to the variations in employment.
The system is profitably employed where the covered labour 
force is fairly stable. In case of an unstable labour force, 
the calculations regarding new entrants and labour turnover 
may not economise IoJ xxxlI^  . In India, it is well-known that 
labour force is of migratory character. Therefore, it is in 
the fitness of things that ■. complete and exhaustive reporting 
is brought into practice. In course of time, a retirement 
pension scheme tends to stabilise labour force. But it will 
be a hasty judgment to presuppose its realisation at an early 
date. Change-over from exhaustive to partial reporting, however.
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would not require any additional trouble; rather it would 
economise in it. It is, thus_, amenable to modification in the 
light of experiences gained by its working.
Another system of collecting contributions is to require 
the employer to affix stamps of appropriate denominations on 
the contribution cards of the employees v/hich are issued to 
them for the purpose for every collection period. The amounts 
of stamps, required for various wage-categories are printed on 
the cards and these cards are retained after making necessary 
entries at the institution. Each employee has a seperate card 
The institution keeps a record of the contributions. The 
stamps are generally quite distinct from the ordinary revenue 
or postage stamps and necessarily issued in denominations 
which represent the amounts of contributions for wage-catego- 
ries adopted. Sometimes, the stamps may be sold by post offices 
ais in the United Kingdom and sometimes they are sold by the 
Central Bank or its agents such as in India.
The ESI schem of India has entrusted the collection of 
contributions to the employers. Since non-tremployees and self- 
employed persons are not covered, sale of contributions does 
not present any difficulty. Regulation 15 to the ESI Act, 1948 
requires that the contributions should be paid by affixing 
stamps on a Contribution Card specially printed for this pur­
pose. The Card is 7"x4" in size* On one side of. the Card are 
16 columns meant for indicating contribution weeks. On the 
other side, there are 12 additional columns. On the top.
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blank* space is left for indicating contribution weeks included 
in the contribution period. There are also columns for mention­
ing the Department in which the employee work?, his insurance 
number, name, father’s name, shift of work, District Number, 
Qaployer’s Code Number, and occupation* A summary of contribu^ ' 
tions paid is also printed on this side. It is in a tabular 
form containing five columns. First column is meant for enter­
ing the value of stamps affixed. Since there are eight wage- 
categories, there are as many denominations of stamps too. 
Colimn (2) is left blank for entering number of stamps affixed. 
Column (3) is meant for the value of stamps in total which 
is obtained by multiplying the appropriate figures in column 
(1) with those in column (2). The fourth column gives the as­
sumed average daily wages. The fifth and last column gives 
space for the record of total ;>assumed wages which can be 
obtained by multiplying relevant figures in column (2) with 
that in column (4)* This is done by the office. On the expiry 
of the collection period, which extends to 26 weeks, the 
Card is submitted to the Regional Office where its entries are 
verified and checked. The Card is then filed for reference and 
the entries are transfered to proper registers.
Stamps may be sold to any one offering their prices like 
ordinary stamps. But in a mixed system, the selling agency 
may require an authorised proof for the purchase of stamps. 
This may be a "purchase roll" which is collected by the agency 
and then forwarded to the Office* This serves as a proof of
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collection of contribution and also serves to verify the 
actual collection on employer's account. Alternatively, em­
ployers may themselves be allowed to print their own stamps 
as in case of postage stamps. A record is kept by some mecha­
nical device and the price of the stamps thus printed is 
charged for given periods* Total value of stamps purchased by 
the employers is reported to the institution. Eiaployers' 
account is debited with this in a register prepared by the 
Office. Total contributions paid by the employers is then 
found out by a full reference to contribution cards of the 
employees submitted by the employer. This helps to detect any 
discripancy between the contributions paid and the stamps pur­
chased. The employee must also be authorised to check his Card. 
Thus, they are also informed about the contribution perfor­
mance of the employers on their account.
Under a pure stamp system of collection of contributions, 
the Office does not keep any record of the value of stamps 
sold. Any verification, therefore, is net possible. But under 
a mixed stamp system, the insurance Office is intimated of the 
value of stamps purchased by individual employers.lheir accounts 
are then verified with actual collection from them. Stamps are 
affixed on the Contribution Cards of the individual employees 
in denominations indicating periodical contributions appropri­
ate to the category to which they belong. There may be a 
stamp book in stead, v/hich serves the same purpose.. In addition 
to indicating the collections, Contribution Card also helps 
in ascertaing the benefits of the insured persons.
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It has been rightly remarked that " advisability of ap­
plying a given system of collection depends mainly on the cha­
racteristics of the insured population and the nature of the 
scheme; to be applied ( the level of education ajid sense of 
responsibility of employers and insured persons, the way in 
which wages are usually paid, the degree of emplojrment stabi­
lity, the risks covered and the system of calculating cash 
benefits)*”^  The level of education <xf U.P. *s industrial 
workers is low. Sense of responsibility on the part of the 
employers can be forced but on the workers' part it is diffi­
cult to secure in all case* This is so because they are a 
migratory mass and they do not realise the benefits of paying 
regular contributions, Hie system of collection of contribu­
tions adopted under the ESI or the EPF schemes is commensurate 
with the needs of the schemes. Employers are in a. better posi­
tion to submit the whole amount of contributions* Selling of 
stamps by the post offices would not be convenient for the 
sparsity of population covered and the ignorance of the gene­
ral insured population of the calcualation methods* But, if 
the inspection of the Cards by the insured is to serve any 
useful purpose, the Cards should be printed in regional langu­
ages which the majority of population can manage to understand 
rather than in Siglish according to the present practice.
There are two more points which deserve consideration at 
this stage. One relates to the period of employment and other 
to contributions* If the period of employment is counted in 
years, months or weeks, there may arise the problem of
1. Administrative Practice of Social Insuranee Institutions.
Op* Cit., p 33
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the calculation of fractional contributions. This may be re­
solved by ignoring the fractional period for which a person 
is employed. Calculations may be started from the next period 
immediately following it. To avoid disputes, specific rules 
for the conversion of wages into those applicable to contri­
bution period sh0>uld be laid down* The problem of contributions 
presents another difficulty regarding excusals due to sickness 
holidays aid absence without pay. These may be noted in the 
remarks column.
The period of collection may differ from the contribution 
period. In order to avoid inconvenience to parties, collec­
tions should be made at reasonable intervals. But, where 
collection period is as long as, say six months, a shorter 
period for the payment of contributions may be permitted. But, 
in such cases, full particulars of payroll may be submitted on 
the expiry of collection period.
Collections may be done by revenue officials, income-tax 
department or special machinery may be created for this pur­
pose. In the U.S.4.contributions are collected by District 
Directors of Internal Revenue. In order to avoid administra^ 
tive difficulties, some insurance institutions do not accept 
payrolls unless accompanied by the si^ due for contributions 
nor do they accept payment of contributions in advance. In 
Latin American countries, payrolls are accepted with contri­
butions only. This avoids much of additional work and adminis­
trative inconvenience as also it wards off unnecessary delaj;3 
in the payment of contributions by employers# In the U.S.A.,
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payments are generally made by cheques because no special 
stamps are provided for the purpose. The payroll report 
accompanies the payroll tax. This enables the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue to verify the correctness of the sum paid.
In addition to this, the process also enables the Bureau to 
post wages to the accounts of the employees* But the self- 
employed persons covered under the scheme make declaration of 
their earnings with income-tax returns.. However, collection 
of unemployment insurance tax involves a different procedure. 
There are two portions of the total tax ( 3.0 % of payroll ). 
90^ of the tax is collected by the State Governments and cre­
dited to their individual accounts. They are permitted to 
withdraw sums needed for payment of benefits,The rate is de­
termined in accordance with each Sate’s experience-rating 
system. The rest of the tax is collected by the Federal Go­
vernment. This is transferred to general revenues out of 
which sums are allocated to the States for meeting the admi­
nistrative cost of unemployment compensation scheme.^
In our case, the Regional Office is the collecting agency. 
The sums payable by the employers are submitted to the Office 
at the expiry of each collection period# This system may be 
retained for a pension scheme too.
4. Inspection
AnotEer’: point in connection with the bureaucratic machi­
nery is the problem of internal check and inspection regarding 
the contribution performance of the employers and their
1, ILO: Systems of Social Security; United States. Geneva 
1954, p 93.
( VII.29 )
with the relevant provisions of the scheme. Internal check 
should be utilised to ensure that the contributions are re­
gularly paid by the employers and that no defaults are made 
in this respect. External control is ensured through inspec­
tors for, they can see that covered employers are properly 
registered that no evasion of law is perpetrated* Internal 
check involves checking of particulars on the Contribution 
Cards of the employees so that entries are made to correct 
accounts. Again, a mathematical check is also required for 
the amount of the contributions to be payable in total. It 
should be ensured that contributions are calculated corrently. 
Another important matter in case of interanl check is the . 
amount of wages specified for each employee. In the first 
place, wages should be correctly entered. It may be checked
by a reference to back cards or the previous accounts of the
t
mployees as entered in the insurance register. Moreover, it 
should be borne in mind while checki%the amount of wages 
that the provisions of minimum wage regulations, court awards, 
and prevailing rates of wages in that line of activity do not 
present unseemly comparision. Likewise, exemptions, excusals, 
and other concessions granted for the payment of contributions 
should also be verified in an effective manner; for, they pro­
vide sufficient margin for collusion and suppression of facts 
and consequently evasion of payroll taxes by employers.
Any discrepancy that may come to light must be traced to 
its roots and located by an exhaustive system of inspection.
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It is imperative because discrepancies may sometimes arise 
quite involuntarily and surreptitiously* For this purpose, 
a regular machinery of inspection may be employed. Th^render 
useful service to the employers and employees both. As such, 
they should not approach their work with a foregone conclusion 
that the employer is necessarily in the wrong. He must take 
things easily. For detection and location of errors, the ins­
pector should be conversant with labour legislation and have 
a sound knowledge of accountancy principles and practice. He 
should also have working knowledge of the technicalities of 
the undertakings which he is in charge of, so that he may put 
intelligent questions in course of his visit. Existance of an 
inspector has a moral check on the employers and they would be 
less tempted to falsify records or make delays in paying con­
tributions in spite of him. This is of paramount importance 
for the working of an insurance scheme. Delays in payment of
contributions and non-co-operative attitude of the employers
asis harmful for them as well/for the insured persons. Short 
notices of payment of such contributions may involve them in 
financial troubles. It will also put the beneficiaries to 
hardship as the calculation of benefits or even the ascertain­
ment of their title to such benefits is not possible without 
a punctual rendering of all sums payable on their account.
In cause of unjustified or avoidable delays, the defaulters 
may be penalised by imposing a penalty or by charging reason­
able interest on the outstanding sums or by both, depending
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upon the nature of the default. This reduces the arrears to 
manageable proportions, if not avoiding them altogether.
State's responsibility in this respect is remarkable.
It may arise on account of its obligations as a third party
of finance in a tripartite scheme, or as an employer itself,
or in both capacities simultaneously. Here, the State must 
shoulder its moral responsibility of paying its due share 
with punctual regularity. Moreover, if any special taxes 
are allocated for social security schemes or any budgetory 
allocations are made, such moneys should be earmarked and 
credited to a separate fund so that its utilization for the 
same purpose may be assured. If the State defaults in pay­
ing its share of contributions, it must frankly agree to pay 
a reasonable rate of interest on the defaulted sum. No excuses 
of the State or public authorities in this behalf should be
entertained and it must be treated at par with other employers
or defaulting parties.
Under the existing arrangements^the employees can 
inspect their contribution cards to ensure that the contribu­
tions are regularly paid! A better arrangement in this respect 
may be done if the contribution cards can be made available 
for inspection by the employee on each payday or at least at 
the end of the collection period v;ithout any formal request.
Old age contingency being a long one if slackness is allowed 
in this respect, the employees may find on retirement that 
they have not adequately contributed either according to
1. Vide Chapter II, Section 1.
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Records or actually, to qualify for benefits. It is, therefore, 
all the more important that free inspection is allowed to 
the insured whenever they wish to do so. However, to avoid 
unnecessary calls a limit may be specified. Thus, under 
para 45 of the EPF scheme, members are permitted to inspect 
the contribution cards on making request, but a ceiling 
has been put to such requests by providing that such inspection 
shall be allowed only once in two months. The ESI scheme 
allows a monthly inspection. The fonaula for calculation of 
contributions should be easy so that the employers do not 
have to make elaborate calculations themselves. It may be 
noted that after specifying the amount of contributions for 
each wage-class the employers have simply to determine the 
wage category to which the employee belongs. For an additional 
convenience, the rates are printed on the contribution card 
itself. This is very useful for ready reference and it should 
be retained under a pension scheme. For a smooth working of 
the scheme an efficient internal check should be up to date.
Again, the existing machinery will only require reinforcement 
rather than complete overhaul. It is also desirable to 
educate the employers and insured persons about the working of the 
scheme and benefits to which they may be entitled. Their 
co-operation in this respect is vital for the scheme.
I t  may, t h u s ,  b e  p o in t e d  o u t  t h a t  th e  e x i s t i n g  m ach in ery  
o f  th e  ESI and th e  EPF may be  r e t a i n e d  f o r  th e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  
o f  th e  p e n s io n  schem e. F o r  e x t e r n a l  i n s p e c t i o n ,  th e  e x i s t i n g  
m ach in ery  may b e  r e i n f o r c e d .  But f o r  i n t e r n a l  c h e c k in g ,  th e
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employees' inspection will not be sufficient. In the first 
instance, they are illiterate. Even if the records are kept 
in regional languages, not all insured persons will be able 
to check their records. For this purpose a surprise audit 
may be organised by the insurance institution itself. This 
will secure a moral check on the employers’ performance as 
well as ensure the detection of discrepancies at an early 
date.
5* Disbursal of Benefits.
Under the EPF scheme, disbursal of benefits does not 
necessitate establishment of local offices because the payments 
are non-recurring. However, the payment of various benefits 
under the ESI scheme is made by local offices which have 
been stationed at convenient places. They work under the 
supervision of the Regional Office. The application for 
benefits is sent to the Regional Office which ascertains the 
title to beneifts and then directs the local office to pay the 
benefits. The pension scheme will not require such formalities 
as certification of sickness. But the volume of payments to be 
handled will be large* The records of the pension scheme 
will require to keep at central office which will send it to 
the Regional Office of the birth of the beneficiary. The
•jforeigners may be deemed to belong to national capital.
It may be noted that the Regional Office o f U*P. may take the 
place of Central Office of the pension scheme. But in case
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1. ILO; Administrative Practice of Social Insurance 
Institutions, v 67»
of an all-India scheme, centralisation of records will be 
necessary. After verification of claims, the local disburse­
ment offices will pay the benefits. However, the ESI scheme 
is handling.the disbursal of benefits; but the pension scheme 
will have to handle many more times of recurring disbursements 
because of many reasons: In the first instance, sickness^
maternity and employment injuries are short-duration contin­
gencies which require payment up to a limited period of time, 
whereas the pensions are long-duration benefits. Accordingly, 
the volume of transactions will be many times more under the 
integrated scheme. Additional local offices shall therefore 
have to be opened to handle the increased volume of transaction. 
This may increase the cost of administration. But the indepen­
dent scheme shall require entirely new machinery, which will be 
altogether saved under integrated scheme but for certain 
additions.
Although it is not possible to forecast at this stage 
the actual number of staff required for running the integrated 
scheme, the Study Group have, however, estimated the additional 
requirements of the scheme as follows:
EPF ESI Required Additional
No. to be 
employed.
State Directors Qrade I —  —  3 3
State Directors Grade II —  5 5 0
Deputy Directors (Insurance
and Administration). —  9 9 0
Assistant Directors ( -do- ) —  7 10 3
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Assistant radical Commissioners
(Rdgional). — 13 25 12
Assistant Directors (Finance and 
Accounts ) Grade I 9 6 16 1
Assistant Directors (Finance and 
Accounts) Grade II. 6 7 1
Local Office Managers Grade I — 27 40 13
Regional Provident Fund 
Commissioners. 3 -3
Assistant Provident i\md 
Commissioners. 1 -1
Provident Fund Inspectors 29 -29
Total 42 96 145 7
SOURCE: Op.Cit. Appendix I, Annexure III.
This shows that the total existing staff for these schemes
will require reinforcement of seven rather than retrenchment.
rather
But it will be economical to integrate the two schemes/than to 
run them independently; because, only seven additional posts 
will be required while under an independent pension plan 145 
new posts will be, recquired.
6* Integration and coordination
Another problem which focusses the attention in relation to 
organisation is that of coordination and integration. Co-ordi­
nation is linking together the operations of various agencies 
relating to the same line of activity. Under this, the 
agencies maintain their separate entitites but their activities 
are so fitted together that any duplication or v/aste of efforts 
is avoided. It is to be noted that social security provisions
e v o lv e d  one by one and nowhere i n  th e  w orld  d id  th ey  s p r i n g  
f u l l - g r o w n .  The prob lem  o f  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  i s  c o n ce rn ed  v/ith  
th e  k n i t t i n g  t o g e t h e r  o f  th e  p ie d e m e a l  p r o v i s i o n s .  The n e x t  
s t a g e  in  t h i s  d i r e c t i o n  i s  t h a t  o f  i n t e g r a t i o n .  I n t e g r a t i o n  
s i g n i f i e s  m aking p r o v i s i o n  a g a i n s t  d i f f e r e n t  c o n t i n g e n c i e s  
u n d e r  one s i n g l e  a u s p i c e s .  T h us,  w h ile  u n d e r  a  c o - o r d in a t e d  
schem e, th e  schem es a r e  run in d e p e n d e n t ly  w ith  m u tu a l  r e s p e c t  
a v o i d i n g  any d u p l i c a t i o n  o f  s e r v i c e s ,  s e p a r a t e  schem es c e a s e  
to  e x i s t  u n d e r  an  i n t e g r a t e d  sch em e. A l l  sch em es l o s e  t h e i r  
e n t i t y  and a r e  m erged t o g e t h e r  u n d e r  th e  c o n t r o l  o f  one s i n g l e  
a g e n c y .  T h is  i s  t h u s ,  a  s t e p  f a r t h e r  th an  c o - o p e r a t i o n .
A f t e r  a c h i e v i n g  th e  p r o c e s s  o f  o r g a n i c  c o - o p e r a t i o n ,  s t e p s  
may be ta k e n  to  i n t e g r a t e  th e  scheme i f  i t  i s  j u s t i f i e d  on  
th e  ground o f  economy, con v en ien ce .^ an d  e x p e d ie n c y .
H ere , i t  i s  u s e f u l  to  n o te  t h a t  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  o r
i n t e g r a t i o n  a r e  n o t  ends in  t h e m s e lv e s .  They a r e  mere means  
to  a c h ie v e  economy i n  c o s t  and c o n v e n ie n c e  b o th  to  th e  c l i n e t s  
and to  th e  a g e n c i e s  r e l a t e d  to  th e  schem e. A l l  t a l k  o f  
c o - o r d i n a t i o n  i s  f u t i l e  u n l e s s  t h i s  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  i s  k e p t  i n  
m in d. The p ro b le m  i s  im p o r ta n t  f o r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  a t  th e  eve  
o f  t a k i n g  a  d e c i s i o n  o f  i n t r o d u c i n g  an o ld  age  i n s u r a n c e  schem e.  
As a l r e a d y  n o t e d ,  some schem es o f  s o c i a l  i n s u r a n c e  f o r  i n d u s t r i a l  
w o rk ers  a r e  a l r e a d y  w ork ing  i n  I n d i a .  They a r e  V/orkmen’ s  
C o m p en sa tio n , M a te r n i ty  B e n e f i t ,  th e  C o alm in es  and Em ployees*
P r o v id e n t  Punds and th e  ESI sch em s-’. The f i r s t  one and th e
l a s t  two are a l l - I n d i a  schemes and a s  su ch  th e y  a r e  s i m i l a r  
i n  th e  e x t e n t  o f  t h e i r  c o v e r a g e ;  th o u gh , i t  may be m en tio n e d ,  
th e y  a r e  n o t  c o n c u r r e n t  a t  t h e  same t im e .  They a l s o  d i f f e i^
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in  t h e i r  t e c h n iq u e s  o f  f i n a n c e .  The Workmen’ s  C om pensation  
scheme i s  f in a n c e d  u n i l a t e r a l l y ,  w h ereas  th e  o t h e r  two a r e  
b i p a r t i t e  schem es f in a n c e d  by e m p lo y e rs  and th e  e m p lo y e e s .
T h is  g i v e s  r i s e  to  d i s s i m i l a r i t y  i n  t e c h n iq u e  o f  c o v e r a g e  
and c o n s e q u e n t ly  t o  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  th e  way o f  c o ~ o r d in a t i o n  
and i n t e g r a t i o n .  But i t  may b e  s a i d  t h a t  th e  V/orkmen‘ s  
C om pensation  scheme w i l l  be  e v e n t u a l l y  s u p e r s e d e d  by th e  ESI  
scheme: which may f a c i l i t a t e  i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  th e  re m a in in g  
two sch e m es .  C o a l  and M ica Mines P r o v id e n t  Pund schemes a r e  
a l s o  d i s t i n c t  from  o t h e r  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  m e a s u r e s .  As a  
m a t t e r  o f  f a c t ,  m in e r s  h ave  been a c c o r d e d  a  s e p a r a t e  t r e a tm e n t  
a l l  o v e r  th e  w o r ld .  T h e ir  s e p a r a t e  t r e a tm e n t  i s  j u s t i f i e d  
due t o  d i f f e r e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  o b t a i n i n g  i n  th e  m in e s .  M a te r n i ty  
B e n e f i t  schem es a r e  f in a n c e d  by e m p lo y e rs  u n i l a t e r a l l y .  More­
o v e r ,  th ey  a r e  th e  S t a t e  l e g i s l a t i o n .  No d o u b t ,  th e  c o n t in g e n c y  
h a s  been  p r o v id e d  f o r  u n d e r  th e  scheme.' o f  E S I .  T h e r e f o r e ,  
in  th e  lo n g  ru n ,  when th e  c o v e r a g e  o f  E S I  scheme i s  c o m p le te  
and f i n a l ,  i t  w i l l  be  n e c e s s a r y  to  a b o l i s h  th e  M a te r n i ty  
B e n e f i t  scheme which i s  d e f e c t i v e  i n  many r e s p e c t s .  At t h i s  
s t a g e ,  i n t e g r a t i o n  v / i l l  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  f o l l o w .
There i s  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  i n t e g r a t i n g  t h e  E SI and t h e  
EPF schem es w ith  th e  p e n s io n  schem e. In  f a c t  th e  two schem es  
a r e  f in a n c e d  by th e  e m p lo y ers  and em ployees  j o i n t l y ,  though I  
favourjG ovem m ent c o n t r i b u t i o n  to o  f o r  th e  p e n s io n  schem e. But 
t h i s  i s  no p r o b le m . A t r u l y  s o c i a l  in s u r a n c e  scheme i s  
f in a n c e d  by t r i p a r t i t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  I f  th e  Government d o e s  
n o t ,  hov/ever, f i n a n c e ,  even i n  t h a t  c a s e ,  t h e s e  sch em es v / i l l  
b e  n e a r e r  th e  s o c i a l  i n s u r a n c e  a p p ro a c h  th an  any o t h e r
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scheme working in India. It may be noted here that on 
introduction of a pension scheme, there will be no need of a 
provident fund scheme* Its retention will mean double provision 
for the same contingency as well as an undue burden on the 
industry. It is significant to note that if the pension scheme 
is co-ordinated with these two schemes, no reduction in rates 
of constributions will be possible for, neither the existing 
rates are too high to permit any cut-down nor is there any 
possibility of common coverage of contingencies under the two 
schemes so that the duplication may be avoided and an economy 
may be affected in the rates. The only possibility of cost- 
reduction is in respect of the cost of administration. The 
administration of the two schemes being merged into one, the 
existing machinery of administration will be profitably utilised 
to handle the new scheme. The two schemes are already being 
advised by tripartite committee. They may be merged into one.
At the same time, the existing personnel at the executive 
level shall be curtailed. One actuary, for example, may 
handle the job for both schemes when integrated though he may 
require more assistants, as the actuarial responsibility under 
the integrated scheme will be heavier than under the present 
schemes. In the same way, the highest executives viz., 
the Director-General of Employees• State Insurance Corporation 
and the Central Provident Fund Commissioner may be merged into 
one Director-General of Social Security Administration.
Likewise some other changes may be required in the loca^office 
personnel as well as the Regional Office.
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This will economise in cost of administration too.
During the year 1957-58 the ratio of administrative expenses 
to contribution income was 9.8 per cent and during 1958-59 
it was 10.84 per cent] This works out at about 0*4 per cent 
of the wage-bill. Thus, if any economy is affected in the 
cost of the administration expenses, say of 20 per cent, it 
will be only 0,08 per cent of the wage-bill, which is a 
negligible sum to deserve elaborate working out. But, inter- 
gration will undoubtedly save much trouble to the employers.
The inspectorates under the schemes of pensions, provident 
funds or ESI are all concerned with the same records of employers 
regarding their employees as to the wages paid, contribution 
compliance, age, family composition, service records and so 
on. It is very inconvenient for the employers to produce 
some set of records to different inspectors. When.the inspec­
torates are merged, additional trouble will be saved. This 
will also save inconvenience to the inspectorates themselves.
If, however, the pension scheme will be launched in U.P. 
alone, there will be a problem regarding the integration of 
the pension scheme with ESI scheme* Since the rest of the 
country will have no pension scheme there will be separate 
machineries for EPF and ESI schemes. Hence the integration 
will present constitutional difficulties. At the best, the 
machinery of the ESI scheme may be taken help of and some 
sort of gentlemen’s agreement may be entered into with the 
pension scheme. Thus the Employees State Insurance Scheme will 
be better integrated to the proposed pension scheme if the
1, Vide Statement XXXVI, ESIC Report 1958-59
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latter is instituted on all-India basis. This will, be adminis­
tratively convenient, affective, and economical so far as the 
cost of administration is concerned. Moreover it will pave 
the way for the planning of a comprehensive social security 
scheme in future, which will be eventually required hov/sover 
distant that future may be.
SUMMARY AND j
CONCLUSIONS { A good administrative machinery should
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- - be economical, speedy and amen^ ible to no
.^ishonesty. It has two aspects: Organisational and bureaucratic. 
In organisational matters,the ESI scheme is governed by the 
ESIC, S'tanding Committee and Medical Benefit Council. The 
scheme is administered by the Board of Trustees. These 
are all democratic bodies with tripartite representation. The 
pattera of organisational set up may be retained for a pension 
scheme; but the share of government should be brought in pro­
portion with the shares of employees and employers.
In the bureaucratic machinery the registeration of employers 
and employees, collection of contributions, inspection of 
performancej(disbursal of benefits are already working with 
satisfactory record. However, more disbursement officers 
will be required. Identity documents may be a pass-book in 
case of a pension scheme. Stamp system of collection is also 
suitable to conditions in U.P.
The possibility of converting EPF scheme into a pension 
scheme leads to the problem of integration. The pension 
scheme may be integrated with the ESI scheme. But there is
one constitutional difficulty. If pension scheme is limited 
to U.?* the integration would not be possible for ESI is a 
Central scheme. However, a gentlemen's agreement may be 
entered into and the scheme may be integrated on State level.
Ihe cost of administration should be distributed over the 
two schemes in agreed proportions.
An integrated scheme will need seven additional hands to 
man it according to the calculations of the Study Group, whereas 
pension and ESI schemes run independently will require a staff of 
145 men. Thus, an integrated sch^e will be comparatively 
economical. Though the economy will not be material to influence 
the rates of contributions, yet it will save trouble to employers 
and employees both.
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APPEHDIX
1: QUESTlOHHAIRE ISSUED TO IHDUSTRIAL WORKERS«
1 * Name male or female
2. Age
3t Do you belong to a Rural or Urban area?
4* Married, widowed/widower, unmarried*
5* Number of persons in your family:
(a) Earners
(b) Non-eamers
(c) Earning but sufficient for their upkeep
6. How many persons aged 55 (females) and 60 (males) are 
there in your family and their relation to you?
Relation Agen
2.
3.
4.
5.
7. Length of your service in the present undertaking 
8* Monthly income (in rupees)
9* If a pension scheme is instituted in which your employer 
also contributes a portion of the cost, would you like to 
contribute yourself? Yes / No.
N.B, Strike out ^at is not necessary*
This questionnaire was prepared in Hindi in order that 
the industrial workers may understand it* Here an English 
version has been rendered by the author.
(b)
The information obtained from the informants has been 
summarised in the following tables:
Table 1,1
SIZE OF THE FAMILIES OF INDUSTRIAL VORKERS
Persons per family Humber of families enumerated 
1 1
2 2
3 3
4 10
5 12
6 20
7 20
8 15
9 7
10 10
11 & over 22
(c)
COMPOSITION OF THE FAMILIES OP INDUSTRIAL WORKERS*
Table A.2
HinlSmlaoI Maximum no» Average Dependents per
of persons of persons per Fami- Bar-
ner<
Earnings Rs;
Upto 100 6 7 6,5 2.25 2.25
101 - 150 1 27 7.4 4.50 4.10
151 - 200 6 18 6,5 6.20 4.20
201 - 300 4 18 8,6 5.20 3.90
301 and over 8 20 14.0 10.00 2.50
--------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------ ----------------
Table A.3
CLASSIFICATION OP INDUSTRIAL WORKERS ACCORDING TO COMMUNITY 
(RURAL OR URBAN) AND THEIR REACTIONS TO PENSION INSURANCE
Earnings Total no. Rural Urban Ayes Nays
Upto 100 2 1 1 2 -
101 - 150 76 59 17 39 37
151 - 200 32 16 13 15 17
201 - 300 8 6 2 4 4
301 and over 2 wm 2 - 2
TOTAL 120 82 38 60 60
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